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Abstract
The first study presents a novel analysis of horizontal R&D networks in the presence 
of an industry leader that is not only the dominant firm in the market but also the 
large R&D investor. In particular, it considers a model of an industry leader and 
n — 1 followers. We analyse cost-reducing R&D investment by firms, which can be fully 
shared through collaborative links with other firms, while spillovers are not perfect when 
firms are not connected. The existing literature ignores the effects of market leaders 
or dominant firms on R&D networks. We contribute to the literature by considering a 
setting in which there is a dominant firm. We find that the follower firms always have 
incentives to collaborate with the leader firm because they can enjoy large R&D efforts 
of the leader firm through voluntary R&D knowledge sharing. In addition, the network, 
in which the industry leader has a large number of links, maximizes industry-profit for 
almost all values of the parameter. This result suggests that if transfers between firms 
are allowed, this network architecture is likely to survive potential deviations by firms 
because the more beneficial firms have the incentive to ‘sponsor’ other firms in order to 
maintain the network structure. Our result seems to be consistent with the empirical 
evidence in that we observe firms that invest largely in R&D are the central nodes of 
R&D networks. However, our result also reveal that the network, in which the leader 
firm is well-connected, performs badly from the social welfare viewpoint. The last 
finding shows that private incentives to form R&D collaborations are excessive from a 
social welfare viewpoint.
The second study explores vertical R&D collaborations between firms in a two-tier 
industry, with n upstream firms and n downstream firms, and exclusive dealings among 
upstream and downstream firms. In this context, we analyse cost-reducing R&D in­
vestment by a firm in a tier, which can be shared through collaborative links with other 
firms in the other tier while there are no R&D spillovers when firms are not connected. 
We do not consider R&D collaborations between firms in the same tier. We contribute 
to the literature by considering the stability and efficiency of vertical R&D networks 
which have not been studied in the literature on R&D networks. Our results show 
that the difference between voluntary R&D spillovers of the two directions, from the
upstream firm to the downstream firm and vice versa, plays an important role in the 
stability of vertical R&D collaboration networks. We find that, under certain circum­
stances, the network in which all vertical R&D collaborations are formed is stable and 
efficient. Otherwise, we can observe a sequence of networks due to continuously prof­
itable deviations by firms. In addition, our results suggest that the private incentives 
to establish R&D collaborations are not always adequate from a social welfare point of 
view. This potential divergence implies that there is room for public policy. For exam­
ple, R&D subsidy should be considered in order to enhance the collaborative activities 
when the private incentives to form vertical R&D collaborations are not adequate from 
a social welfare viewpoint.
The third study investigates a model of strategic R&D collaboration networks in 
the open economy framework with three countries. In each country, there is a firm 
that can sell in the domestic and foreign markets. Government of each country can 
initiate bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) to abolish the import tariffs of partners, 
or impose import tariffs on countries with whom it has no FTA, in order to maximizes 
its national welfare. The set of FTAs between countries creates the FTA network. 
Firms decide whether and with whom to form R&D collaborations and these R&D 
collaborations establish the R&D network. This setting builds a double-layer network 
structure where the FTA network is formed in the first layer and the R&D network 
is formed in the second layer. In this context, firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, 
which can be fully shared through collaborative links with other firms, while spillovers 
between non-collaborating firms are not perfect. Our first finding is that FTAs are 
beneficial to international R&D collaborations. This result seems to be consistent with 
the stylized facts that FTAs have grown fast since the early 1990s and international 
R&D collaborations account for about 60% of newly established R&D partnerships at 
that time. Our second result shows that the complete FTA networks, in which each 
country has FTAs with all others, is always stable in the first network layer regardless 
of the architectures of R&D networks among firms in these countries. In addition, all 
global social welfare maximizing double-layer networks must contain the complete FTA 
network as the first layer. Finally, our analysis reveals that private incentives of firms 
to form international R&D collaborations are excessive from a global welfare point of 
view.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter first presents the importance of R&D (Research and Development) 
networks. Empirical findings and theoretical explanations of the dominance of non­
equity over equity forms of R&D cooperation are discussed. It is the central motivation 
for the thesis to concentrate on a type of non-equity forms of R&D cooperation that 
has emerged - R&D networks.
1.1 The im portance o f R&D networks
It is widely accepted that the main reason for R&D cooperation is to internalize knowl­
edge spillovers and reduce free-riding problems, thus increase R&D efforts (Benfratello 
and Sembenelli, 2002). Leakage of knowledge - involuntary spillover- often happens as 
a result of employee mobility, security failure and reverse engineering, etc. It may bring 
about competitor’s free-riding, hence considerably lowering the returns to the innovat­
ing company. As a consequence, a firm may lower its R&D efforts if it expects that 
involuntary spillovers are large. By collaborating in R&D, competitors can internalize 
involuntary spillovers and hence increase R&D efforts. Moreover, by collaborating in 
R&D, firms can pool their resources and, as a result, can share R&D costs and reduce 
wasteful duplication of R&D efforts (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002).
R&D cooperation can be classified as horizontal and vertical cooperation. Horizontal 
cooperation refers to the cooperation among firms in the same industry or same sector.
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Vertical cooperation refers to the cooperation of firms that belong to the same supply- 
chain (Omta, 2004). This chain includes all the organizations (suppliers, customers, and 
third parties) involved in all the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and information (Van der Vorst, 2000).
R&D cooperation can take a variety of forms. Hagedoorn et al. (2000) suggest the 
classification of research partnerships as formal and informal agreements. The former, 
in turn, can be distinguished into equity and non-equity mode (Figure 1.1 illustrates 
these categories). The equity mode consists of many types such as equity based research 
joint ventures (RJVs) and R&D cartels. The non-equity mode also includes many types 
such as joint R&D agreements, R&D contracts, and research consortia (Roijackers and 
Hagedoorn, 2006).
Equity mode Non-equity mode
Research Partnerships
Formal Arrangements Informal Arrangements
Figure 1.1: The taxonomy of research partnerships"^
Informal arrangements refer to the diffusion of knowledge through informal channels 
in the form of information trading, i.e. the unofficial communication between staffs 
employed by different, and sometimes rival firms (Von Hippel, 1987). Informal agree­
ments among firms to let their research personnels share ideas or to let the employees 
of one firm tour the plant of another are examples of informal arrangements (Katz and 
Ordover, 1990). Even without a formal agreement, such tours may be considered to be 
ex ante cooperations when they are part of an industry custom that all participants 
expect to continue (Katz and Ordover, 1990).
1 Source: Hagedoorn et al.(2000).
Formal R&D cooperation can be further grouped into equity and non-equity modes. 
Traditionally, R&D cooperation has been undertaken in the form of equity-based al­
liances. A research corporation is a joint venture that is created separately by two 
or more firms pooling equity in order to conduct well-defined R&D projects for their 
benefit (Katz and Ordover, 1990). Research corporations allow for the spreading of 
risk, sharing of fixed costs, economies of scale (Hagedoorn et ah, 2000). R&D is usually 
very costly and the revenues are uncertain. By pooling resources together, firms in a 
research corporation can share the large fixed costs, hence reducing the risk of doing 
R&D. In addition, a research corporation may experience increasing returns to scale 
due to specialization, using complementary knowledge in avoiding duplication of R&D 
efforts, complementarity of resources and skills, and more efficient utilization of re­
sources. Research corporations may also be associated with achieving approach to new 
markets, creating entry barriers for competitors and the sharing of efforts (Hagedoorn 
et ah, 2000). Collaborating with domestic firms in a research corporation may help 
foreign firms to enter the market protected by trade and investment barriers against 
foreign competitors.
An R&D cartel is also a type of equity-based R&D partnership. In R&D cartels, 
firms coordinate their R&D efforts only to maximize joint profits (Kamien et al., 1992; 
Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002). In other words, an R&D cartel reflects the situation in 
which every member of the cartel cares about profits of all other members when it 
chooses its own R&D decision but each member does not share its R&D outcomes. If 
firms also want to share the innovation, they form a RJV (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002).
Non-equity forms of R&D partnerships cover all agreements in which two or more 
firms join their R&D efforts or share R&D knowledge without creating a separate 
corporation. They are contractual arrangements that are projects-based and have a 
limited time-horizon. Contractual arrangements include joint R&D agreements, R&D 
contracts and research consortia. Note that joint ventures are generally equity joint
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ventures while RJVs are normally classified as contractual agreements (Hagedoorn et 
ah, 2000). Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) propose an RJV competition model under 
which each firm chooses its R&D effort unilaterally and the results of their independent 
research efforts are shared fully between them. This is an example of non-equity based 
RJVs. Joint R&D agreement is formed when two or more partners pool the funds 
together in order to share R&D and to set up joint R&D programs (Roijackers and 
Hagedoorn, 2006). A type of non-equity based RJV is the research consortium, which 
may pursue broad programs in basic R&D in those areas where appropriability and 
spillovers are especially pervasive (Katz and Ordover, 1990).
A non-equity form of R&D partnership which is the research subject of this thesis 
is the R&D network. R&D networks are non-equity forms of R&D partnerships that 
are relatively loose in their form. In an R&D network, every firm decides its R&D 
efforts unilaterally to maximize its own profit but agrees to pool the technological know­
how together2. In other words, firms are doing R&D in their own labs and sharing 
R&D knowledge by forming R&D collaborations. A link in the R&D network refers to 
an R&D collaboration between two firms in order to exchange R&D knowledge and a 
network is simply a set of bilateral links. The relationship in a network is intransitive 
in the sense that a firm can establish a new partnership without the need of consent 
from its existing partners.
Since the mid-1970s, there is an emergence in the spread of R&D collaborations 
between firms that has led to the "age of alliance capitalism" in which firms form 
R&D collaborations in many ways to share R&D knowledge and enhance technological 
capabilities (Narula and Duysters, 2004). Recent empirical studies show a general 
trend in the increase and dominance of non-equity based contractual forms of research 
partnerships over equity mode of research partnerships (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roijakkers 
and Hagedoorn, 2006). Moreover, according to Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006),
2 See, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) for more details on R&D networks.
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there is a steady increase in the contractual modes of R&D partnering activity in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry during the 1980 to 1999, which is beyond 
90% of the overall number of R&D alliances in these sectors during 1990s.
The significance of horizontal R&D networks was shown in growing firm R&D part­
nering activities in many industries. For example, the growth of newly established R&D 
partnerships in biotechnology as well as pharmaceutical (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roij ackers 
and Hagedoorn, 2006), computer (Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2005), electron­
ics (Delapierre and Mytelka, 1998), and software industries (Cloodt, Hagedoorn and 
Roijakkers, 2010).
The importance of vertical R&D networks can be reflected by R&D collaborations 
between manufacturers and suppliers in many industries such as the electronic machin­
ery (Suzuki, 1993); automotive sector (Womack et al., 1990; Liker et al., 1996); aircraft, 
telecommunication, and biotechnology ( Imai 1989; Sydow 1992). These evidence show 
the cases where manufacturers collaborate with suppliers in order to do R&D process 
or improve the quality of custom-tailored products. A survey of Harabi (1998) with 
data from 14 industries in Germany from 1991 to 1993 shows that 84% of innovating 
firms involved in R&D cooperations with customers. In addition, the sharing of R&D 
knowledge is almost always in terms of non-equity forms. The number of RJVs only 
accounts for less than 20% of R&D cooperations.
Recent researches have provided evidence regarding the reason for the increase in the 
number of non-equity R&D alliances. Firstly, the loss from terminating a contractual 
arrangement is smaller than dissolving an equity-based RJV. This property can be 
viewed by firms as an advantage of R&D networks over the equity mode of R&D 
partnerships where an entirely new organizational entity needs to be established. This 
revealed that non-equity mode allows a relatively high degree of flexibility which is very 
important in a fast evolving business environment that makes it difficult for firms to 
follow all the necessary technological developments. This also means that the equity
forms of alliances are more costly to establish and, in addition, require more time to 
dissolve (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999).
Secondly, the flexibility of non-equity form of R&D partnership allows firms to par­
ticipate in various R&D collaborations. Therefore, firms can gain greater access to 
new technological know-how so that they can complement their internal resources with 
external ones. This is vital for their survival in the long run because rapid changes 
have caused interdependence in technologies. This happened in the automobile sector 
where rapid changes have rendered technologies increasingly interdependent (Narula 
and Hagedoorn, 1999).
Finally, in non-equity R&D collaborations, a vast number of flexible alliances enable 
firms to concentrate on their core competencies while developing knowledge jointly in 
non-core areas. Therefore, the locus of innovation is the R&D network to which the firm 
is attached (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). The vast growth in the number 
of non-equity forms of collaboration motivates the study of endogenous formation of 
strategic R&D alliances -  R&D networks.
1.2 Overview of th e  thesis
C hap ter 2, literature review, is aimed at providing an overview of the methodology 
used in analyzing R&D cooperation and important issues related to models of R&D 
cooperation. Moreover, chapter 2 presents the strand of literature on R&D network 
formation which focuses on architecture of the R&D networks that will endogenously 
emerge and the efficiency properties of resulting networks. This thesis consists of three 
studies which filled the gaps in the literature on R&D network formation. In each 
chapter, a multiple stage-game is developed. The game is solved by using backward 
induction. We obtain subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of stages after the network 
formation to the final stage. The network formation stages are solved by applying 
the definition of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The
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definition of strong stability introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) is 
also employed to find the strongly stable networks. Using measures of producer and 
consumer surplus, the comparative performance of networks is considered.
C hap ter 3, R&D networks with industry leaders, is motivated by the empirical 
observation that R&D partnership activities involve industry leaders that are not only 
dominant firms in the markets but also large R&D investors such as Microsoft in the 
software industry (see Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2010), IBM in the computer 
industry (see Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2005), and Roche in the pharmaceuti­
cal industry (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roij ackers and Hagedoorn, 2006). However, the existing 
literature focuses on R&D networks among firms who choose variables simultaneously, 
thus ignoring the effects of market leaders or dominant firms on R&D networks. In our 
stage game, the industry leader is assumed to be the first mover in the market stage in 
order to model the situation in which it accounts for a high market share. In addition, 
in the context of chapter 3, if a firms has a high market share, it also a large R&D 
investor in equilibrium. This chapter studies the R&D network structures that will 
emerge endogenously in the presence of an industry leader and the efficiency properties 
of resulting networks - two main issues in the literature on R&D networks.
In this chapter, if two firms have no direct R&D collaboration then they enjoy public 
spillovers3 from each other. If two firms have a collaborative link, they enjoy full private 
spillovers from each other. An R&D collaboration has two different effects of on a firm’s 
profit: efficiency and competition effects. On the one hand, the private spillovers enjoyed 
from R&D collaboration lower the cost of the partner, and therefore have a positive 
effect on its profit - the efficiency effect. On the other hand, R&D knowledge of one 
partner also spills over the other and makes the other partner a tougher competitor - 
the competition effect.
A model of one leader firm and n —1 follower firms is developed. A four-stage game is
3 Public spillover refers to involuntary spillover that is public in nature, so it does not relate to the distance between 
firms (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001).
established. In the first stage, firms form collaborative links in order to share knowledge 
of process R&D to reduce production costs. In the second stage, each firm chooses its 
R&D effort unilaterally but all firms choose R&D efforts simultaneously. In the third 
stage, the leader firm sets quantity. Finally, all follower firms decide quantities.
We find that industry leaders tend to be the central nodes of R&D networks. This 
finding may be of empirical interest. In particular, we observe that some industry 
leaders such as IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Roche, SmithKline Beecham, and Pfizerare have 
more R&D collaborative links on average than other firms in the same industries (see 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Roij ackers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Cloodt. et.al, 2006). In addition, 
the complete network is pairwise but is not strongly stable because a group of firms 
want to reduce the number of links among them. These results may help to explain the 
terminations as well as the rise and fall of R&D networks with a peak located either in 
the 1990-1993 or in the 1994-1997 period (see Tomasello et.al, 2013).
Our result also suggests that the industry leaders may not want to collaborate with 
follower firms if R&D collaboration does not result in a significant increase in knowledge 
sharing vis-à-vis non-collaboration while the follower firms always have the incentive to 
collaborate with the leader firm in order to enjoy large R&D effort of the leader firm. 
We also find that the industry leader is well-connected in industry-profit maximizing 
networks while it is poorly-connected in the consumer surplus maximizing networks. 
These findings suggest that policy measures towards R&D networks should be carefully 
designed, taking into account all the features of the industry, such as public versus 
private spillovers, and the presence of industry leaders. Finally, our result reveals 
that private incentives to form R&D collaborations are excessive from a social welfare 
viewpoint.
C hap ter 4, Vertical R&D Collaboration Networks, is a response to the empirical 
evidence that vertical R&D networks emerge recently. We observe R&D collaborations 
between manufacturers and suppliers in many industries such as the electronic machin-
ery (Suzuki, 1993); automotive sector (Womack et aL, 1990; Liker et aL, 1996); aircraft, 
telecommunication, and biotechnology ( Imai 1989; Sydow 1992); electric appliances, 
consumer electronics and office equipment (Bidault et aL, 1998).
Further evidence show that there is an exclusive relationship between an upstream 
firm and its respective downstream firm. This kind of relationship is a standard as­
sumption in the literature and can happen in many different industries (Milliou and 
Petrakis, 2007). For example, the relationship occurs in automotive sector between car 
manufacturers and their suppliers as well as their distributors (Breakers and Verboven, 
2006); in the petroleum industry, producers of petroleum often perform their dealings 
with gasoline distributors via exclusive contracts; exclusive relationships between food 
retailers and soft drinks producers (e.g. Coca-Cola), and between beer distributors with 
brewers (Lafontaine and Slade, 2008).
However, the literature on R&D networks has dealt with horizontal R&D collabo­
rations in one-tier industries or in each tier of an industry. We offer a model of R&D 
networks which examines the incentives of upstream and downstream firms to form 
vertical R&D links with each other. A model of a two-tier industry is explored. It is 
assumed that each tier consists of n ex-ante identical firms and there is an exclusive 
relationship between the upstream firm Ui and its respective downstream firm Di. In 
particular, the input produced by the upstream firm U{ is employed by its respective 
downstream firm Di to make the final good. For simplicity, we assume that there 
are no public R&D spillovers between non-collaborating firms and we do not consider 
horizontal R&D collaborations between firms in the same industry.
The interactions among firms are organized as a four-stage game. In the first stage, 
firms form vertical collaborations in order to share cost reducing R&D efforts. In the 
second stage, R&D efforts are chosen non-cooperatively and simultaneously by firms. 
In the third stage, each upstream firm chooses price to maximize its profit. Finally, the 
downstream firms compete in the downstream market for homogenous goods by setting
quantities.
In the chapter, a vertical R&D collaboration has different effects on the profit of 
a firm. If Ui and Di form the collaborative link, there is only the efficiency effect. 
Ui enjoys not only voluntary spillovers from Di but also the larger demand since Di 
becomes a tougher competitor to its downstream counterparts. Di  benefits from volun­
tary spillovers and from the lower price of its input because voluntary spillovers from Di  
help to reduce the marginal cost of Ui, and therefore the price of Ufs output. However, 
when Ui and D j  form a collaborative link, there are both competition and efficiency 
effects. On the one hand, voluntary spillovers from D j  benefit Ui and help to reduce 
its marginal cost. On the other hand, voluntary spillovers from Ui to D j  make D j  more 
aggressive and it may harm the downstream partner Di, leading to the decrease in the 
demand of Ui. The same effects occur to D j. On the one hand, D j  enjoys voluntary 
spillovers from Ui. On the other hand, voluntary spillovers from D j  to Ui can reduce 
the marginal cost of Ui, and therefore the output’s price of Ui. The latter effect ben­
efits Di by reducing its marginal cost since the price of U^s output is a part of D^s 
marginal cost. As a result, Di becomes a tougher competitor to D j.  In our model, 
the upstream firms do not compete directly against each other in the upstream market. 
However, they still incur competition effect from the downstream market because the 
competitive strength of a downstream firm decides the demand of its upstream partner. 
To put it slightly different, the upstream firms compete against each other indirectly 
through their downstream customers.
We find that the complete network, where all vertical links are formed, is stable if 
the difference between spillovers that the downstream firm enjoys from the upstream 
firm (i.e. 0) and spillovers that the upstream firm enjoys from the downstream (i.e. 
6) is not large. However, when the difference between 9 and ô is sufficiently large, the 
parallel network, in which each upstream firm Ui and its downstream partner Di form 
the vertical link and there is no link between Ui and D j, is uniquely stable.
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Our results also reveal that the complete network is the only efficient one for all 
value of 6 and 0. Together with the above result in stability, this finding shows that 
the private incentives to form vertical R&D links may not be adequate from a social 
welfare viewpoint. The finding reveals that vertical R&D collaborations mitigate the 
negative effect of the double marginalization that is absent within the context of one-tier 
industries.
C hap ter 5, International R&D Collaboration Networks, is motivated by empirical 
evidence that free trade agreements (FTAs) have grown fast, and international R&D col­
laborations account for an important part of R&D partnerships. Free trade agreements 
(FTAs) have mushroomed since the early 1990s (WTO.org). According to Hagedoorn 
(2002), international R&D partnerships account for about 60% of newly founded R&D 
partnerships in the early 1990s.
A model is developed in this chapter to explore the effect of FTAs on international 
R&D network formations. There are three ex-ante identical firms located in three ex- 
ante symmetric countries. The firm in each country can sell in the domestic as well 
as foreign markets. Government of each country can initiate bilateral FTAs to abolish 
the import tariffs of partners. The set of FTAs between countries creates an FTA 
network. Firms decide whether and with whom to form R&D collaborations and these 
collaborations establish an R&D network. If two firms have an R&D collaborative link, 
they enjoy full private spillovers from each other. Otherwise, non-collaborating firms 
enjoy public spillovers from each other. As a result, we have two layers of network in 
our model: an FTA network as the first layer and an R&D network as the second layer. 
This chapter also studies the double-layer network architectures that will endogenously 
emerge and the efficiency properties of the resulting architectures.
A five-stage game played by governments and firms is constructed. In the first stage, 
governments form bilateral free trade agreements to abolish import tariffs of partners. 
In the second stage, firms form R&D collaborations in order to share knowledge of
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cost reducing R&D. In the third stage, the government in each country decides the 
trade tariff on the countries with whom it has no free trade agreement to maximize 
domestic welfare. In the fourth stage, R&D efforts are chosen non-cooperatively by 
firms. Finally, each firm decides how much to produce for the domestic market and 
how much to export to the foreign markets.
In the model, different effects of horizontal R&D collaborations and free trade agree­
ments are at work. An R&D collaboration has the positive effect on the member firm’s 
profit - the efficiency effect - because it lowers the firm’s cost of production by the means 
of technological know-how spillovers. Nevertheless, an R&D collaboration also has the 
negative effect on the member firm’s profit - the competition effect - since its partner’s 
cost of production is lowered too, and therefore becomes a tougher competitor. An FTA 
has the positive effect on the national welfare of a partner since its consumer surplus 
increases due to higher competition in the domestic market, and domestic firm’s profit 
from foreign operation also increases because of greater access to the foreign market. 
However, an FTA also has the negative effect on national welfare of a partner because 
higher competition in its domestic market leads to lower domestic firm’s profit from the 
domestic operation, and the FTA also tends to lower the tax revenue. Another indirect 
effect of an FTA: it makes the markets of partners less valuable to foreign firms that 
are already active in the market.
We find that free trade agreements are beneficial to international R&D collabora­
tion. Intuitively, an R&D collaboration between two firms is more beneficial to them 
if the two countries, in which these firms are located, sign a bilateral FTA because the 
negative effect of competition on the domestic firm’s profits is dominated by the gains 
from greater access to the foreign market. This result seems to be consistent with the 
stylized facts that free-trade agreements have mushroomed since the early 1990s and 
international R&D collaborations have grown fast at the same time.
The complete FTA network, in which each country has FTAs with all others, is
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always stable in the first layer of network independently of the R&D network structure 
in the second network layer. In addition, the double layer network, in which the first 
layer is the complete FTA network and the second layer is the complete R&D network 
where each firm collaborates in R&D with all others, is the unique network architecture 
of which both layers are stable.
Our next result shows that all global social welfare maximizing double-layer networks 
must consist of the complete FTA network as the first layer. However, the double-layer 
networks that consist of the complete R&D network as the second layer are never 
the global welfare - maximizing networks. Taken together with the above findings on 
double-layer stability properties of different networks, our results show that private 
incentives to form R&D collaborative links are excessive from a global social welfare 
point of view.
C hap ter 6, conclusion, summarizes and discusses the main findings of this thesis. 
In addition, the limitations are acknowledged, and directions for further researches are 
presented.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
The approach of this thesis belongs to the industrial organization literature. This chap­
ter gives an overview of the mainstream theoretical industrial organization literature 
on R&D cooperation. There is a rich literature, from a theoretical point of view, ad­
dressing the question of why firms cooperate in R&D and what are the outcomes of 
R&D cooperation to the members, industry, and society. The literature can usefully be 
classified into three categories: transaction costs, strategic management, and industrial 
organization theory (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
The literature on strategic management has traditionally concentrated on the firm 
and the internal organization of its activities (Hagedoorn et ah, 2000). Industrial orga­
nization literature has recently focused on strategic interactions between firms as well 
as the influence of firms’ behaviours on industrial structure and social welfare mainly 
by using a game-theoretic approach. In the industrial organization literature on R&D 
cooperation, a model of multiple-stage game, with at least an R&D stage and a market 
stage, has become prevalent in the investigation of issues relating to cooperative R&D. 
In the R&D stage, firms choose R&D investment decision while they decide price or 
quantity in the market stage. The transaction cost literature has tried to explain the 
reasons for firms to cooperate in R&D by exploring the cost advantage of R&D cooper­
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ation over both market and hierarchies. Transaction cost is the cost of using the market 
to allocate resources. According to transaction cost scholars, firms try to organize a 
transaction through different organizational structures including internal administrative 
organizations or hierarchies.
The overlap between three categories is unavoidable. As noted by Hagedoorn et 
al (2000), most of the strategic management literature have used arguments from the 
transaction cost and industrial organization literatures. The converse applies for trans­
action cost or industrial organization literatures.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, the concept and character­
istics of R&D are presented. Theoretical models of R&D in the industrial organization 
literature are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the endogenous R&D coopera­
tives that are directly related to R&D networks in this thesis. In addition, we present 
the network approach. Section 5 explores important issues related to models of R&D 
cooperation. Section 6 is the summary of this chapter.
2.2 Research and developm ent
2.2.1 T he concept o f  R & D
It is widely accepted that technological change plays an important role in promoting 
economic growth (See, e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Elhanan Helpman, 1998; Tirole, 
1988; Verspagen, 2001). R&D is an important source of technological change. According 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Research 
and Development refers to "creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order 
to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, 
and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications"(OECD Factbook 
2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, p 178).
At the level of the whole economy, R&D inputs can be measured by Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D (GERD) in US dollars at purchasing power parity (Sppp) (Fras­
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cati Manual 2002). It includes expenditure on research and development by business 
enterprises, higher education institutions, as well as government and private non-profit 
organizations (Frascati Manual 2002).
2.2 .2  T yp es o f R & D
According to OECD Factbook (2011-12), there are three types of R&D: basic research, 
applied research, and experimental development. Basic research is undertaken in order 
to obtain pure science objectives. Researchers may not care about actual applications 
when they do research. The results of basic research are usually published in scientific 
journals or are circulated to interested colleagues and are not generally sold (Frascati 
Manual, 2002). Basic research can be classified as pure basic research and oriented 
basic research. In oriented basic research, performers still don’t have a particular use 
in view. However, they expect that this research can create a broad base of knowledge 
to help solve current or future possibilities.
Based on the findings of basic research, applied research is carried out in order to 
define their possible uses. Besides, it can be performed to find new methods to solve 
specific problem so it will be applied for a limited number of operations, products, or 
systems, etc.,.
According to the Frascati Manual (2002), experimental development refers to the 
process of translating knowledge gained through research into operational programmes, 
including demonstration projects undertaken for testing and evaluation purposes.
2.2.3 P u rp oses and ou tcom es o f R & D
The fast changes in economic environment, in customers’ preference as well as compe­
tition from other firms require a firm to keep revising the design as well as the range of 
products. Firms undertake different kinds of R&D which can be classified depending on 
the purposes and outcomes of R&D. The purposes of R&D are to reduce technical risk
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and cost, and to improve performance. In order to improve their competitive advantage, 
firms need to produce what the consumers want and spend on advertising to influence 
this. Market research is undertaken to find out what is needed. Another problem is 
selling what is possible to make. Development is carried out so the product range is 
developed which establishes the efficiency of production processes and the technically 
superior product.
If the outcomes of R&D are the improvement of existing and the creation of new 
production processes in order to reduce production costs, it is process R&D. If the 
outcomes are the improvement of quality of existing products and the creation of new 
products, it is product R&D4. If product R&D is aimed at enhancing the quality of 
a product, it is vertical product differentiation. Product R&D may also be aimed at 
horizontal product differentiation which indicates the differences in products that are 
unable to be easily evaluated in terms of quality. The difference in colour or flavour 
between two virtually identical products is an example. Customers may be clear on the 
quality of vanilla ice cream produced by different companies. However, the same cannot 
be said about their tastes. It is not easy to compare two flavours even at a subjective 
level of consideration. Perhaps, one can say that vanilla and chocolate ice cream may 
be more or less substitutable. Product and process R&D create a natural advantage in 
the market place.
2.2 .4  C haracteristics o f  R & D
Many characteristics have proved to be important in the economic analysis of R&D and 
in the understanding of market failure in its provision. They are uncertainty, inappro­
priability, indivisibility, and public good character. In this section, these characteristics 
are introduced. The remaining sections of this chapter will discuss how these charac­
teristics have been dealt with in the literature.
4See, e.g., Athey and Schmutzler (1995), Cohen and Klepper (1996), Klepper (1996) for more detail on the difference 
between product and process R&D.
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U ncertainty
Risk in economic investments comes from the uncertainty of how market will respond 
to new product (market uncertainty). Innovators deal with additional risks. Firstly, the 
outcomes of their R&D investment are uncertain so it may not lead to a new technology. 
Secondly, even if the outcome is a new technology, it has to be put into practice for 
a new and better product than the already existing ones (technological uncertainty). 
R&D is risky because of uncertainty about the nature of information to be generated. 
It sometimes implies that there is asymmetric information between producers and the 
sponsors. It makes difficulties in supporting R&D investment5. Uncertainty and risk 
prevail in R&D management at all levels. It is challenging to managers to recognizing, 
evaluating and controlling uncertainty and risk in R&D. Internal risks and uncertainties 
are inherent in the nature of R&D while external risks and uncertainties are generated 
by other outside sources such as change in the environment. They imply both oppor­
tunities and threats for a firm. Risk and uncertainty can be considered as a dynamic 
phenomenon which results from environmental sources (Floricel and Ibanescu, 2008). In 
this view, risks are distributed into four patterns of dynamic risk: velocity as perceived 
intensity of directional change in the environment, turbulence as perceived discontinuity 
of environmental change with respect to past trends and anticipated directions, growth 
representing the perception of expanding opportunities, and instability as perception 
of a steady and diverse array of competitive moves by other strategic actors (Floricel 
and Ibanescu, 2008).
Inappropriability
Arrow (1962) observed that the incentive of a firm to invest in R&D decreases if 
its R&D technological know-how involuntarily spills over its competitors through low 
cost imitation. He also indicates that some tools such as the assignment of intellectual 
property rights can be a solution to this problem but "no amount of legal protection can
5 See Bronwyn Hall (2002) for empirical evidence for the existence of difficulties in financing R&D investment.
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make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information" 
(p. 615). According to Arrow (1962), leakages of technological know-how are inevitable 
due to the embodiment of knowledge in products and the mobility of personnel among 
firms. Zvi Griliches (1992) showed that overall involuntary leakage of R&D knowledge 
were both prevalent and important.
Indivisib ility
Indivisibility simply means that an input cannot be scaled down below a certain 
minimum size, even when the level of output is very small. This implies that a minimum 
expenditure in R&D is required to an R&D project in order to make it profitable to 
the investor. This minimum expenditure determines threshold R&D levels under which 
firms do not find profitable to invest. Indivisibility in R&D means there are economies 
of scale in the R&D activity. R&D projects often require huge initial investments. It 
exhibit returns to scale since knowledge (outcomes of R&D) can be spread over many 
units at increasingly lower cost per unit, leading to monopolistic competition6 in R&D- 
intensive industries.
Public good character
Knowledge has many aspects of a public good. It is non-rival because there is no 
scarcity value to knowledge. It can be used repeatedly without diminishing the stock 
of knowledge. It is non-excludable when the leakage of knowledge is unavoidable (the 
free-rider problem). The outcome of R&D is knowledge, hence these above aspects 
are inherent in R&D. This character can make it difficult for innovators to obtain a 
reasonable return from trading the results of their R&D activities. Besides, public 
goods are a typical example of creating externalities. Knowledge is a public good and 
the returns that innovators can realize from it are often far below their investment 
in R&D. The public good character of knowledge can seriously diminish an agent’s
6 A type of imperfect competition where there are many producers in an industry producing differentiated products 
(such as from branding, quality, or location) (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2008). In monopolistic competition, a firm takes 
the prices that its competitors charge as given and ignores the impact of its own price on the prices of other firms 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2008).
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incentive to do R&D.
2.2.5 R & D  spillovers
Spillovers refer to the amount of knowledge a firm receives from others (competitors, 
customers or suppliers) without paying for it or the results of the R&D that are ’un­
derpriced’ by the market. “R&D spillovers refer to the involuntary leakage, as well 
as, the voluntary exchange of useful technological information” (Steurs, 1994: p. 2). 
Geroski (1995) points out three channels through which R&D spillovers can happen. 
First, the exchange of ideas between researchers in unintentional meetings, at seminars, 
or through published papers. Second, the mobility of researchers among companies. 
Third, a researcher can figure out important information by watching the actions of 
other researchers. Vertical spillovers refer to spillovers between a firm and its suppliers 
or customers. Horizontal spillovers among firms in the same industry have an immedi­
ate impact on firm’s R&D efforts since the firm may lower its effort if it expects that 
its R&D outcomes will spill over to rivals.
2.3 Industrial organization m odels o f R&D
2.3.1 Tournam ent versus non-tournam ent m odels
The roles of R&D spillovers and the effects of R&D cooperation on social welfare are two 
distinct features of the industrial organization literature compared with the transaction 
costs and the strategic management literatures (see Hagedoorn et. ah, 2000). The 
industrial organization literature recently examines R&D cooperation and competition 
by mainly using game theoretic tools and formal mathematical modelling (Hagedoorn 
et. ah, 2000). These models can be grouped into two categories: tournament and 
non-tournament models. The tournament model establishes a "technology race" where 
firms are in the race to be the first to innovate a new product or technology. The prize 
for winning the race is a patent and the winner enjoys the full value of the innovation,
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which is called winner-takes-all. Tournament modelling has mainly focused on the 
number of players in the race; aggregate R&D spending and how it is distributed across 
players and time; and innovation, uncertainty, the market structure and market power 
(Reinganum, 1989; Beath et ah, 1995).
Before the publication of seminal papers of Spence (1984), Kat (1986) and D’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988), there are some works focusing on the extent of innovation in 
the context of a non-tournament model: Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a); Brander and 
Spencer (1983). The industrial organization literature started to concentrate more on 
R&D cooperation, especially after the seminal paper of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988). In fact, most of theoretical works on R&D cooperation have been dealt within 
the context of a non-tournament model (Hagedoorn et. ah, 2000). In this context, 
firms are not engaged in a technology race and all firms can succeed in innovation at 
the same time.
Tournam ent m odels w ith  tim ing
Tournament models can be grouped further into tournament models with and without 
timing. In addition, tournament models with timing can be classified into deterministic 
auction and stochastic racing models (Reinganum, 1989). In a deterministic auction 
model, there is a deterministic relationship between R&D spending and the time needed 
to create a relevant innovation. The largest investor wins the race. In a stochastic racing 
model, this relationship is stochastic. An important feature is that tournament models 
with timing lead to overinvestment in R&D from social perspective due to duplication 
of R&D efforts. Intuitively, if an innovation is introduced, private and social gains are 
coincident but firms do not allow for the parallel nature of their activities.
The early studies that consider R&D in a context of a deterministic "auction" model 
are Scherer (1967), Barzel (1968), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b), Gilbert and Newbery 
(1982), and Katz and Shapiro (1985). The first studies to employ a stochastic rac­
ing model as a full equilibrium model are Loury (1979), and Lee and Wilde (1980).
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Generally, it is assumed that the probability of being the winner is influenced by an 
investment in R&D of a firm at a certain point in time.
Loury (1979) considers a stochastic racing model where all firms spend a fixed 
amount of cost at the beginning of a race in order to win a fixed reward. Once any 
firm succeeds in introducing a new technology, all other firms lose their R&D invest­
ments. Lee and Wilde (1980) depart from Loury (1979) by dividing the cost of R&D 
into fixed and variable costs. A firm stops paying variable cost once a new technology is 
introduced by any firm. Results on the relationship between the number of firms in an 
industry and a firm’s profit - maximizing investment in R&D depend on the importance 
of fixed and variable costs. If fixed costs account for a major part of R&D investments, 
the equilibrium R&D investment of a firm decreases with the number of competing 
firms in the industry. This result is in line with Loury (1979) where R&D investments 
consist of only fixed costs. However, if variable costs account for a major part of R&D 
investments, the equilibrium R&D investment increases with the number of competing 
firms in the industry. Note that the number of firms in an industry reflects the rivalry. 
Intuitively, the probability of winning is lower when rivalry increases because more firms 
are competing for the same prize. Firms are in the need to increase the probability of 
winning as long as the gain from higher probability to be winner overcomes the increase 
in R&D spending. The results show that the increase in variable costs is lower than 
the gain from higher probability to be winner as the rivalry increases. However, the 
increase in fixed costs cannot be covered by the gain from higher probability to be 
winner. Overinvestment in R&D from social perspective due to duplication of R&D 
efforts is predicted in both Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980).
The works by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) have been extended by in­
corporating the issue of appropriability (see, e.g., Mortensen, 1982; Reinganum, 1982; 
Stewart, 1983). In other words, the winner-takes-all assumption is relaxed to investigate 
the case where the winner of the technology race cannot appropriate the entire profit
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from the innovation due to incomplete patent protection. Factors such as leakages of 
knowledge, imitations of other firms are the reasons of incomplete patent protection. 
Mortensen (1982) considers the issue of appropriability by setting a scheme which is 
called the compensation rule. According to this rule, the winner of the innovation race 
compensates the losers for the loss due to the termination of the race. The compen­
sation equals to the lost capital value of continued play. Mortensen (1982) found that 
when a patent is exclusive and the winner receives the entire value of the innovation, 
overinvestment in R&D happens because no one takes into account the capital loss that 
all but the winner suffer due to the termination of the game. Nevertheless, under the 
compensation rule, the associated Nash solution is efficient.
Reinganum (1982) studies a technology race of a number of identical firms under the 
presence of imperfect patent protection. She found that under perfect patent protection, 
a firm’s equilibrium R&D investment increases with the number of rivals. However, 
under imperfect patent protection due to imitation, equilibrium R&D expenditure may 
increase or decrease with the number of rivals depending on the payoff structure (i.e. 
the payoffs to innovation versus the payoffs to imitation).
Stewart (1983) extends the work of Lee and Wilde (1980) by assuming that the 
innovator gains a share of the prize instead of the entire prize, and this share is larger 
than that of each "loser". The first result is that there exists a unique winner’s share of 
prize that maximizes each firm’s expected profit. Intuitively, an increase in the winner’s 
share of the prize raises the desirability to become the winner, and results in an increase 
in R&D investment. However, the increase in R&D investment will cause the firm’s 
profit to go up initially but eventually decline. Although there may be initial increasing 
returns to scale in R&D technology, decreasing returns are encountered eventually. The 
second result concerns the situation where all firms are in an R&D cartel and each firm 
chooses its R&D investment to maximize the joint profits of all firms. This result shows 
that the equilibrium R&D investment of each firm in an R&D cartel coincides with
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the level that each firm chooses to maximize its own profit if and only if the winner’s 
share of prize is the one that maximizes each firm’s expected profits. The third result 
says that the relationship between a firm’s equilibrium R&D investment and those of 
other firms depends on the winner’s share of prize. In particular, if the winner’s share 
of prize is below the optimal value that maximizes firms’ profits, a firm lowers its 
equilibrium R&D effort when other firms’ R&D efforts increase. The converse applies 
if the winner’s share of prize is beyond the optimal level. If the share is at the optimal 
level, increases in other firms’ R&D efforts have no effect on a firm’s equilibrium R&D 
effort. Intuitively, a firm lowers its equilibrium R&D effort if it expects that the gain 
from being the first to innovate is smaller than the value it would receive under the 
optimal share parameter. This happens if leakages of knowledge are very high and 
patent protection is very ineffective.
The tournament models with timing have also been extended by relaxing the as­
sumption of symmetry between firms in an industry (see, e.g., Gilbert and Newbery, 
1982; Reinganum, 1983; Reinganum, 1985). Gilbert and Newbery (1982) consider a 
deterministic auction model with the presence of an incumbent with monopoly power 
due to a patent or exclusive access to factors of production. The challengers can enter 
the monopolized industry by inventing and patenting a substitute for the monopolist’s 
product. They found that the incumbent is the largest investor in R&D because it 
enjoys greater marginal incentives to invest in R&D than the challengers under the 
assumption of deterministic relationship between R&D spending and the time needed 
to create a relevant innovation.
Reinganum (1983) considers a stochastic racing model in which there are an incum­
bent firm and a challenger. She found that when the innovation is sufficiently radical, 
the incumbent invests less in R&D than the challenger in the Nash equilibrium. This 
result is in contrast with the outcome in Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The difference 
in these results stems from the assumptions of uncertainty in Reinganum (1983) and
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certainty in Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The relationship between R&D spending 
and the time needed to create a relevant innovation in Gilbert and Newbery (1982) is 
deterministic so the incumbent invests more in R&D than the challenger in order to 
keep earning the monopoly profit as long as no firm has succeeded. If the incumbent 
invests less in R&D than the challenger, it will lose the monopoly profit because the 
challenger will patent the new technology shortly. However, there is a stochastic rela­
tionship between R&D spending and the time needed to create a relevant innovation in 
Reinganum (1983) so the benefit of the incumbent from investing more in R&D than 
the challenger decreases considerably because the future gain of R&D investment is 
uncertain. In other words, investors in Reinganum (1983) must sacrifice their current 
profits in order to obtain uncertain profits in the future. The incumbent must sacrifice 
more than the challenger because it also loses the current revenue as the success of the 
incumbent in the future will replace its current product with its new product. The 
challenger is not collecting the current monopoly profit so its loss is smaller than that 
of the incumbent. As a result, the challenger has more marginal incentive to invest in 
R&D than the incumbent.
Reinganum (1985) studies a multi-stage game in which there are an incumbent firm 
and some challengers. In each stage of the game, firms take part in a stochastic race 
to be the first innovator. The current stage ends whenever there is a winner of the 
stage and a new stage begins. Due to the sequence of innovations, the winner in each 
stage cannot reap monopoly profit forever after, but only until the next winner is found. 
The main finding is in line with the outcome in Reinganum (1983) that each challenger 
invests more in R&D than the incumbent within the current stage. Note that the 
incumbent in the current stage is the winner of the previous stage. Intuitively, the 
incumbent of the current stage invests less in R&D than each challenger because of the 
anticipation of future innovations of challengers that reduces the present value of the 
incumbent’s profit.
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Another extension of the tournament model with timing is to consider an innovation 
race as a multi-stage game in which the innovator is the first firm to finish all stages 
(see, e.g., Fudenberg et ah, 1983; Harris and Vickers, 1985; Harris and Vickers, 1987; 
Grossman and Shapiro, 1987). Fudenberg et al. (1983) consider two-stage R&D race of 
two firms where ’preliminary invention’ is discovered in the first stage and a patentable 
invention is the reward to the winner of the second stage. Note that the winner of 
the second stage is also the winner of the race. In addition, the first stage is either a 
stochastic or a deterministic race, and the second stage is a deterministic race. Harris 
and Vickers (1985) investigate a multi-stage patent race in which two firms compete 
in each stage to move closer to the finishing line. Note that the relationship between 
a firm’s R&D investment and the distance it moves toward the finishing line in each 
stage is deterministic. The winner will be the first firm to reach the finishing line. The 
works of Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985) show that if one firm 
is far enough ahead in the race, the other firm may drop out of the race. Grossman 
and Shapiro (1987) extend the stochastic race of Lee and Widle (1980) by casting the 
analysis in the context of a two-stage race between two firms. They found that when 
lagging firm catches up to the leading firm, both firms increase their R&D investments. 
In addition, if the two firms are at different stages of the race, the leading firm has more 
incentive to invest in R&D than the lagging firm.
Tournament m odels w ithout tim ing
A tournament model without timing does not establish a race with timing of in­
novation but the "tournament" property results from the setting of the model. For 
example, in Futia (1980), Hartwick (1982) and Rogerson (1982), the tournament is a 
contest where the reward for each period is an innovation and the winner is randomly 
determined with the probability of success being a function of R&D investments of the 
player and its rivals. In Sah and Stiglitz (1987), the "tournament" property comes 
from Bertrand competition where a firm can gain if it is the only one to innovate. If
26
more than one firm is a successful innovator, these firms will Bertrand compete benefits 
away and these benefits go to consumers. Moreover, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) assume 
that a firm can undertake more than one project targeted to the same innovation, and 
there is a stochastic relationship between a firm’s R&D effort and the probability that 
at least one of its projects is successful. Due to the assumption that leads to ex post 
symmetry between firms7 and the total number of projects is unchanged with respect 
to the number of firms in the market, the change in the number of firms only affects 
the number of projects undertaken by each firm. The first result that R&D investment 
of a firm is not affected by the number of firms in the market follows. This result is 
in contrast with the outcomes of previous studies by Lee and Wilde (1980), and Loury 
(1979) where R&D investment may increase or decrease depending on the portion of 
fixed and variable costs in the R&D expenditures. The second result that market in­
vestments on R&D are inadequate from a social perspective also contrasts with the 
previous outcomes in Lee and Wilde (1980), and Loury (1979). Intuitively, in Sah and 
Stiglitz (1987), social gains do not coincide with the first innovator’s gains because the 
benefits from innovations go to consumers when there is more than one innovator. This 
makes the parallel R&D efforts of firms not in vain.
Non-tournam ent m odels
Most theoretical studies on R&D cooperation have been in the context of a non­
tournament model. In this context, firms are not in pursuit of an innovation race 
and all firms may end up with innovations at the same time. Non-tournament models 
can also be grouped further into deterministic and stochastic models with respect to 
the relationship between R&D investment and innovation, or into process and product 
R&D models with respect to the objectives of R&D. In deterministic models, R&D 
investment must result in an innovation (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spence, 
1984; Poyago-Theotoky, 1996). The relationship between R&D investments and R&D
7 E x  p o s t  symmetry refers to the symmetric outcomes of a model.
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outcomes is stochastic in stochastic models (see, e.g., Reynolds and Isaac, 1992; Choi, 
1993; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998). In process R&D models, the outcome of R&D 
is the reduction in production costs (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1983; Kat, 1986; 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). The outcome of R&D is the improvement of the 
quality of products in product R&D models (see, e.g., Motta, 1992; Poyago-Theotoky, 
1997; Lambertini and Rossini, 1998; Cellini and Lambertini, 2002; Deroian and Gannon, 
2006).
The very first studies on R&D in the context of non-tournament model concen­
trate on the extent of innovation (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a; Brander and 
Spencer, 1983). Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) investigate the relationship between 
different market structures (i.e. oligopoly with free-entry, oligopoly with barriers to 
entry, socially managed industry) and R&D investment. In their framework, firms 
decide output and R&D expenditure simultaneously. Brander and Spencer (1983) com­
pare outcomes (i.e. R&D investment, profit and output) of the model with strategic 
R&D with those of the non-strategic model in a duopoly. In a strategic R&D model, 
actions of firms are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game where two firms decide 
R&D investments at the same time in the first stage, and then choose output levels in 
the second stage. In a non-strategic model, R&D investments and outputs are chosen 
simultaneously.
After the publication of the seminal papers of Spence (1984), Kat (1986), and espe­
cially D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), industrial organization scholars have started 
to be interested in R&D cooperation. As they realize the importance of R&D spillovers, 
non-tournament models on R&D cooperation emerge. Because of the public good prop­
erty of technology, the assumption of winner-takes-all is always not the case in reality. 
While tournament models imply an only path to succeed in R&D because firms are 
in a race and only one of them can be the winner, non-tournament models provide 
a scenario where there are many different research paths for firms in an industry for
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success in innovation and all firms can be successful at the same time. As a result, non­
tournament model allows for the incorporation of knowledge spillovers between firms 
on different research paths into the model. An important feature is that many non­
tournament models predict underinvestment in R&D from a social perspective due to 
leakages of R&D knowledge. Intuitively, involuntary leakage of R&D knowledge lowers 
the incentive of firms to invest in R&D because the returns that innovators can realize 
from their R&D investment decrease due to free-riding effect.
Spence (1984) was among the first to consider R&D spillovers and R&D subsidies in 
a model with an arbitrary number of firms. It is assumed that the unit production cost 
of a firm is a decreasing function of its stock of knowledge. The stock of knowledge of a 
firm is, in turn, an increasing function of its investment in R&D and involuntary R&D 
spillovers. The author found that the incentive of firm to invest in R&D decreases with 
the degree of involuntary spillovers. He also concludes that the R&D subsidies should 
be provided, especially when leakages of knowledge are large.
Traditionally, non-tournament models have focused on the comparison of the relative 
efficiencies of an industry in the case of no R&D cooperation with the one where R&D 
cooperation is industry-wide (see, e.g., Suzumura, 1992; Kamien et ah, 1992). More 
recent literature has paid attention to the endogenous R&D cooperatives (see., e.g., 
Katz, 1986; Combs, 1993; Poyago-Theotoky, 1995). The literature on endogenous R&D 
cooperatives will be presented in the next section.
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin(1988, 1990) - hereafter AJ - consider three two-stage 
games of firms in a duopoly. The demand function is linear. In each of these two-stage 
games, process R&D decisions are chosen in the first stage and outputs are decided in 
the second stage. Note that in the first stage, firms choose R&D outputs in the sense 
that each firm decides the amount of cost reductions it yields by doing R&D. In the 
first game, firms decide both R&D effort and outputs noncooperatively. In other words, 
each firm chooses its own R&D effort and output in order to maximize its profits. In the
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second game, firms choose R&D efforts cooperatively in the sense that each firm decides 
its own R&D effort in order to maximize the joint profits of two firm s. However, they 
still act non-cooperatively in the second stage. In the third game, firms act coopera­
tively in both stages of the game like a monopoly. AJ assume that there are involuntary 
spillovers in terms of leakages of R&D knowledge between two firms. AJ found that 
R&D cooperation without cooperation in production increases not only R&D expendi­
tures but also quantities of production, with respect to non-cooperative R&D solution 
if spillovers are sufficiently large. Intuitively, the higher leakages of knowledge, the more 
incentive of firms to ffee-ride if they decide R&D non-cooperatively. However, if each 
firm takes into account profit of the other firm when it chooses R&D effort coopera­
tively, the free-rider problem decreases considerably. As a result, R&D efforts of firm s 
are larger under cooperative R&D than non-cooperative R&D if involuntary spillovers 
are sufficiently large. If involuntary spillovers are sufficiently small, the opposite is 
valid.
Suzumura (1992) employs the framework of AJ to examine the effects of R&D co­
operation. However, he considers an industry consisting of n firms (n ^  2) competing 
in an oligopoly to produce a homogenous good. In other words, firms do not cooperate 
in the output decision stage. In addition, Suzumura (1992) considers general forms of 
demand and cost functions. He found that the level of R&D investment is always in­
adequate from a social perspective if involuntary spillovers are sufficiently large. R&D 
cooperation is better for society than non-cooperative R&D if involuntary spillovers are 
sufficiently large, but the opposite is valid for sufficiently small spillovers.
Kamien et al. (1992) - hereafter KMZ - develop a two stage game where R&D inputs 
are chosen in the first stage, and either Bertrand or Cournot competition is employed 
in the second stage. They consider an industry consisting of n firms {n ^  2) producing 
differentiated goods. Demand is linear and there are involuntary spillovers. Note that 
the amount of cost reductions that a firm yields by doing R&D is R&D output which
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is a function of R&D input that the firm decides in the first stage. KMZ compare four 
different scenarios. First, R&D competition is the scenario where firms decide R&D 
inputs non-cooperatively in the first stage. In this scenario, a firm can enjoy involuntary 
spillovers form other firms. Second, in R&D cartelization, firms decide R&D inputs 
cooperatively to maximize profits of the industry. However, they do not share R&D 
outputs. Each firm can only enjoy involuntary spillovers from other firms. Third, RJV 
competition is the scenario where firms choose R&D inputs non-cooperatively in the 
first stage but they share R&D outputs completely with each other. Fourth, in RJV 
cartelization, firms coordinate R&D decisions to maximize profits of the industry and 
they also share R&D outputs completely with each other. KMZ found that the most 
desirable scenario is RJV cartelization because technological improvement is highest and 
prices are lowest. On the other hand, the most undesirable scenario is RJV competition 
because of lowest technological improvement and highest prices.
Strengths and weaknesses
This section presents strengths and weaknesses of tournament and non-tournament 
models. Tournament models are strong in the sense that they can handle both product 
and process R&D (Caloghirou et.ah, 2003). In addition, the role of time and uncertainty 
are modelled explicitly. Market uncertainty is a variable which reflects the time at 
which any rival will introduce the innovation in the tournament model with timing. 
However, tournament models are weak in the sense that innovations are considered as 
discrete so the models may not be able to handle well the cases where technologies are 
developed and improved continually over time but are not radically new (Caloghirou 
et.ah, 2003). Innovations are cumulative over time and the winner is not necessarily the 
only beneficiary because part of the outcome is somehow beneficial to other players. 
A tournament context may be relevant to the case where there is an only path for 
players to end up with an innovation. The assumption of winner-takes-all eliminates 
the scenario where there are substitutable paths to pursue technological advance and
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the possibility of more than one winner. As a result, tournament models do not allow 
for R&D spillovers between firms pursuing different research paths.
The converse applies for strengths and weaknesses of non-tournament models. They 
reflect better the case of continually improving technologies. Moreover, non-tournament 
context implies that there are several paths to success in innovation. This setting allows 
for the accommodation of knowledge spillovers between firms on different paths into the 
model. Unfortunately, non-tournament models examine R&D cooperation from a static 
point of view in the sense that they do not allow for the changes of innovations over time. 
Even though multiple-stage games provide a useful tool, they cannot substitute for a 
dynamic framework. In addition, few number of non-tournament models incorporate 
uncertainty.
2.3.2 P rocess R & D  versus product R & D  m odels
As has been mentioned above, most of theoretical works in the industrial organization 
literature are in the context of a non-tournament model. Non-tournament models can 
also be classified further into process and product R&D models with respect to the 
objectives of R&D. Moreover, most of studies in the context of a non-tournament model 
are of process R&D models.
Process R&D m odels
In a process R&D model, firms are doing cost-reducing R&D (see, e.g. AJ; KMZ; 
Suzumura, 1992). More specifically, the marginal cost of a firm is a decreasing function 
with respect to its R&D investment. Process R&D models often deal with the case 
where firms are producing a homogenous good. In a non-tournament model, it is often 
assumed that a firm can reduce its marginal costs further by gaining access to the R&D 
outputs of other firms. Therefore, the total amount of cost reduction in the marginal 
cost of a firm which is defined as effective R&D output includes two parts: its own 
R&D output and spillovers from others’ R&D outputs. Another assumption in non­
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tournament model is that R&D spillovers cannot be larger than R&D undertaken by 
the firm itself.
Traditionally, R&D cooperation refers to the situation where firms coordinate in 
R&D in order to maximize their joint profits. Recent literature has focused on R&D 
collaboration which refers to the situation where firms do not coordinate in R&D but 
agree to share their R&D outputs (see, e.g., Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal 
and Joshi, 2003; Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2008; Zikos, 2010). When 
two firms agree to share R&D outputs with each other, each firm can enjoy voluntary 
spillovers from the other. As a result, effective R&D output is the sum of a firm’s 
R&D output and voluntary spillovers and involuntary spillovers from other firms in the 
industry.
Most process R&D models are multiple-stage games. In the R&D decision stage, a 
firm may be assumed to decide R&D output or R&D input. For example, AJ assume 
that a firm chooses R&D output in the first stage to reduce its marginal cost. To 
put it differently, a firm decides the amount of cost reduction it is going to yield by 
doing R&D. In KMZ, firms are assumed to choose R&D inputs in the R&D decision 
stage. In other words, each firm decides its R&D investment and it may not be able 
to observe the exact amount of cost reductions yielded by its investment. Intuitively, 
the assumption of R&D input decision reflects the fact that R&D process is believed 
to include trial and error.
Product R&D m odels
While process R&D models often assume that firms produce a homogenous good, 
product R&D models focus on the case where firms produce differentiated goods because 
product R&D is related to product differentiation. In product R&D models, it is 
assumed that customers incorporate the quality or characteristic of products in their 
utility function.
The first study to analyse R&D cooperation in the context of a product R&D model
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where R&D is aimed at enhancing the quality of product is the work of Motta (1992) 
which considers vertical product differentiation. Firms face a non-linear demand curve 
generated by incorporating the quality of products in the utility function of customers. 
Firms take part in a three-stage game. In the first stage, entry decision into the in­
dustry is made by each firm. In the second stage, firms choose R&D investments, and 
they decide outputs in the last stage. The results of Motta (1992) are in line with 
the outcomes in the context of a process R&D model (i.e. AJ; KMZ). In particular, 
R&D cooperation yields higher social welfare than non-cooperative R&D if voluntary 
spillovers are sufficiently large. Intuitively, there are two sources of welfare improve­
ment. First, cooperative R&D allows firms to internalize spillovers which increases the 
incentives of firms to invest in R&D as well as the efficiency of R&D investments. This 
source is in line with the studies in process R&D contexts. Second, R&D coopera­
tion allows more firms to enter the market than non-cooperative R&D if the leakage of 
knowledge is not too high, and hence increases competition in the output market. The 
increase in competition leads to lower prices and improves social welfare.
Poyago-Theotoky (1997) considers a model in which firms are doing product R&D in 
order to generate not only vertical but also horizontal product differentiation. Firms are 
distinguished into two types: Four specialists and the rest of firms are non-specialists. 
The non-specialist firms produce the basic product while the four specialist firms pro­
duce products that are differentiated from the basic one in two characteristics. In 
addition, two specialist firms are specialized in one characteristic while the other two 
are specialized in the other characteristic. The assumption of two specialists per charac­
teristic is necessary to examine R&D cooperation among a subset of different-type spe­
cialists. In noncooperative R&D scenario, there are three cases: no improved product, 
one improved product, and two improved products. However, in the R&D cooperation 
scenario, there may be the appearance of a product that is improved in both charac­
teristics which is called a "super-product". If it is the case, there are two products in
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the market: the basic product and the super products. It is assumed that innovation 
is uncertain and the probability of success increases with R&D investment. Poyago- 
Theotoky (1997) found that social welfare is improved in the case of R&D cooperation 
compared with non-cooperative R&D if the innovation is sufficiently radical or R&D is 
inefficient and has large decreasing returns to R&D. Intuitively, if innovation is radical, 
the increases in consumers surplus due to the appearance of super-product dominates 
the potential decrease in social welfare caused by lower R&D investments by all firms 
in the case of R&D cooperation than non-cooperative R&D. Total R&D investment by 
all firms in the case of R&D cooperation is lower than the case of non-cooperative R&D 
because non-RJV firms have less incentives to invest in R&D in the presence of the 
RJV. If R&D is inefficient and has large decreasing returns to R&D, the incentives of 
firms to invest in R&D decrease considerably in non-cooperative R&D scenario because 
of the difficulty in obtaining innovation. However, in the R&D cooperation scenario, 
firms in the RJV still have large incentives to invest due to the possibility of offering 
the super-product.
Lambertini and Rossini (1998) analyse a two-stage game where firms in a duopoly 
choose R&D efforts non-cooperatively in the first stage, and then compete in either 
Cournot or Bertrand fashion in the second stage. R&D investment is aimed at product 
differentiation. Therefore, products are homogenous if no firm invests in R&D. The 
finding is that firms may end up producing undifferentiated products because of a 
prisoner’s dilemma in the R&D stage. In addition, the incentive to invest in R&D 
is higher under Bertrand than Cournot competition. Intuitively, the market is more 
competitive under Bertrand competition so firms have more incentive to make product 
differentiation.
Cellini and Lambertini (2002) consider an oligopoly where firms invest in R&D in 
order to differentiate products. They found that if firms act as they are member of an 
R&D cartel, R&D investment, and thus product differentiation are higher than the case
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where firms act non-cooperatively in R&D. Note that firms choose R&D cooperatively 
to maximize their joint profits if they are members of an R&D cartel. In Cellini and 
Lambertini (2002), there is full spillover from each firm to others through consumer 
preferences so there is no wasteful duplication of R&D efforts. As a result, the R&D 
cartel does not mitigate the wasteful duplication of efforts, and hence, does not lower 
R&D efforts. Moreover, members of a cartel have more incentive to increase prod­
uct differentiation because each member takes into account all other members’ profits. 
Hence, by increasing product differentiation, the market will be less competitive for all 
members of the R&D cartel.
2.4 Endogenous R&D cooperatives
The literature on endogenous R&D cooperatives can be grouped into three strands 
of literature. The first strand focuses on the endogenous formation of RJVs. The 
relationship in a RJV is transitive in the sense that a member-firm needs consent 
from its existing partners to establish a new R&D partnership. The second strand 
is the coalition formation literature. This literature allows for group formation and 
cooperation. The relationship in a coalition is exclusive in the sense that a firm can 
only participate in one coalition. This approach is relevant to some situations such as 
the study of customs unions because a country cannot be a member of more than one 
customs union. However, it is not relevant to other studies on bilateral relationships. 
The third strand is the literature on R&D collaboration networks. The relationship in 
an R&D network is intransitive in the sense that a firm can form a new R&D partnership 
without the need of consent from its existing partners.
2.4.1 R J V  form ation
Traditionally, the literature on R&D cooperation has focused on comparing the per­
formance of an industry in the case of no R&D cooperation with the one where R&D
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cooperation is industry-wide (see, e.g., Suzumura, 1992; KMZ). Whether firms cooper­
ate in R&D in equilibrium, the number of R&D cooperations as well as the number of 
cooperating firms in equilibrium have not received much attention. However, there has 
been a few researches on the size of RJVs that are formed in equilibrium at that time 
(see, e.g., Katz, 1986; Combs, 1993, Poyago-Theotoky, 1995; Attallah, 2003). Never­
theless, these works assume that there is only one RJV in the industry. Kamien and 
Zang (1993) is a notable exception. They explore an industry consisting of several 
competing RJV cartels that are formed endogenously. They assume that the industry 
is divided into equally sized RJV cartels. Members of a RJV cartel choose their R&D 
efforts cooperatively to maximize their joint-profits and fully share R&D knowledge. 
The authors find that R&D investment is higher under competing RJV cartels than the 
case where all firms belong to a grand RJV cartel. Moreover, firms’ profits are higher 
under the former case than the latter because competition decreases with the size of 
the RJV cartel.
Katz (1986) considers a model with symmetric outcomes between firm s that de­
cide to participate in a cooperative research agreement. Firms can choose their R&D 
efforts cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Whether the choice of R&D efforts is non- 
cooperatively or cooperatively does not affect the outcomes because every firm has the 
same amount of profit. Katz (1986) found that there exists an equilibrium membership 
size that equals to the industry-wide RJV.
Combs (1993) investigates a stochastic model where the probability of success in 
innovation increases with R&D expenditure and R&D cooperation. The probability 
of becoming an innovator increases with R&D cooperation because firms can share 
technological know-how about research strategies and outcomes. In Combs (1993), it is 
assumed that members of the RJV choose R&D cooperatively and R&D knowledge can 
be accessed freely by all members. The author finds that the greater the probability of 
success in innovation, the larger the size of the RJV in equilibrium. However, the stable
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size of RJV is never greater than the socially optimal number of the RJV’s members.
Poyago-Theotoky (1995) analyses a model of firms competing in an oligopoly with 
the presence of a unique RJV formed endogenously. Firms make investments in R&D in 
order to reduce their costs. Member firms of the RJV choose R&D efforts cooperatively 
but they still compete in quantity. In addition, member-firms of the RJV completely 
share R&D knowledge with each other. There are leakages of R&D knowledge between 
non-cooperating firms. It is assumed that firms in the oligopoly will form an RJV 
if participating firms earn more profits than the case where they decide R&D effort 
non-cooperatively, and that members of the RJV can block entry of non-member if 
the entry decreases the profit of any existing member. Poyago-Theotoky (1995) found 
that if leakages of knowledge are small, the equilibrium size of RJV is smaller than the 
social optimum degree of cooperation. Intuitively, given small leakages of knowledge, 
RJV-firms have a large advantage compared to non-RJV firms. Non-RJV firms are 
much more inefficient than RJV-firms so bringing one more firm inside the RJV means 
sharing the market with a less efficient co-venturer. Therefore, if the size of RJV is over 
a certain number, average profit will fall because the additional firm in the RJV is far 
inefficient than the rest of the member-firms. That is the reason why the equilibrium 
degree of R&D cooperation in the RJV is smaller than the social o p tim um  one for small 
leakages of knowledge.
Atallah (2003) studies the stability of a cost reducing RJV. The size of the RJV is 
determined endogenously by member and non-member firms. An assumption of the 
model is that members of the RJV can restrict the entry of a non-member firm. In 
addition, a non-member firm will join the RJV only if it is allowed by all member firms. 
The degree of voluntary spillovers that members of the RJV share with each other is an 
endogenous variable, and is decided in the same stage as R&D investment decision. In 
addition, involuntary spillover from the members of the RJV to the non-members is an 
exogenous variable, and this leakage of knowledge is directly proportional to the degree
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of voluntary spillovers. Atallah (2003) found that the degree involuntary spillovers 
is inversely proportional to R&D spending of the RJV. However, both relationships 
between the degree of involuntary spillovers with the size of the RJV, as well as the 
degree of voluntary spillovers, are non-monotonic. The size of the RJV initially increases 
with the degree of involuntary spillovers, and then decreases. Intuitively, when leakages 
are not very large, the size of RJV increases with the degree of leakages because lager 
RJVs can tolerate more leakages. In this case, the degree of voluntary spillovers is not 
affected by the leakages. However, when the degree of involuntary spillovers are very 
high, the incentives for information sharing vanish with the increases in leakages, and 
the size of the RJV decreases as the attractiveness of the RJV decreases considerably.
2.4.2 R & D  coalition  form ation
In the coalition formation literature, the group formation of any size can be formed in 
terms of a coalition structure which is a partition of the set of all firms (see, e.g., Bloch, 
1995; Yi, 1998, Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999; Yi and Shin, 2000). The relationship in 
a coalition is exclusive in the sense that a firm can only be the member of one coalition.
Bloch (1995) proposed a model of a two-stage game where firms decide whether to 
form or enter in a coalition in the first stage in order to gain cost reductions through 
a process of sequential bargaining. Cost reductions are exogenous and outsiders of 
the coalition cannot reduce costs by doing R&D. In the second stage, firms compete 
in Cournot or Bertrand fashion. A firm is the initiator who proposes the coalition of 
which it wants to be a member. Prospective member-firms respond to this proposal. 
If a prospective member accepts the proposal of the initiator then it loses the right to 
propose. Otherwise, it will be the next to offer a coalition to which it wants to belong. 
Once all prospective members accept the proposal, the coalition will be formed. An 
assumption of the model is that the benefit that a member gets from a coalition is 
exogenous, and is proportional to the size of the coalition. The finding is that this
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process of sequential bargaining yields two asymmetric associations, one consisting of 
about three-fourth of the firms in the industry and the other consisting of the rest of 
firms. Intuitively, firms in a coalition are still competitors so there is an optimal size of 
coalition at which the benefit of bringing a new member into the coalition is offset by the 
loss because of the presence of more aggressive competitors on the market. Furthermore, 
the author found that socially efficient outcome is one industry-wide coalition.
Yi (1998) studies stability property of RJVs of symmetric firms. He compares the 
open membership game, where membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms, 
with the coalition unanimity game which is considered in Bloch (1995). Cost reduc­
tions are also exogenous. The outcome of the coalition unanimity game is in line with 
Bloch (1995) that the equilibrium joint-venture structure may not be the industry 
profit-maximizing structure. Nevertheless, the socially optimal and stable outcomes 
are coincident if membership of a joint venture is open to outside firms. The RJV 
that consists of all firms in the industry is both efficient and stable. Intuitively, the 
industry-wide RJV is stable in open membership game because a non-member can join 
the RJV without the consent of existing members, and the non-member always benefits 
by joining a large joint venture.
Yi and Shin (2000) endogenise cost reductions by adding an investment stage to the 
game in which all firms invest in cost reducing R&D. Members of a RJV choose R&D in­
vestment cooperatively. They found that the industry-wide RJV is the socially efficient 
outcome but it is unlikely the equilibrium RJV structure because of free-riding prob­
lems in the coalition formation which prevent the outsider from joining the coalition. 
In addition, the open membership game yields better social outcome than the coalition 
unanimity game for high involuntary spillovers because a large leakage of knowledge 
makes the underinvestment problem more severe in the absence of R&D cooperation, 
and therefore increases the benefit of an outsider from joining a RJV.
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2.4 .3  R & D  netw ork form ation
The literature on R&D collaboration networks has evolved shortly after the appearance 
of the coalition formation literature. Because the relationship in an R&D network 
is intransitive, a simple way to investigate the incentives of agents to collaborate in 
a network as well as the architecture of networks that will endogenously emerge in 
the long run is to examine the status where agents have no incentive to alter the 
network architecture - the stable status. The study of stability properties of economic 
networks was initiated by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, the study of Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) was the first to apply this approach to R&D collaboration.
In a network, agents are denoted as nodes and a link represents a bilateral rela­
tionship. Formally, a network is a collection of bilateral relationships. Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996) introduced the definition of pairwise stability. Denote ij  as the bilat­
eral relationship between agents i and j  then i j  G g indicates the link between i and j  
under the network g. Denote g +  i j  as the network obtained when agents i and j  form 
the new link between them in the existing network g. Let g — i j  denote the network 
obtained when agents i or j  severs the existing link between them in g. The payoff of 
agent i under g is denoted as n^g).
D efinition 2.1
A network g is pairwise stable if the following conditions hold:
/or %-;(#) ^  7Ti(p -  (?) and ^ (p )  >  %j(# -  %j), and
ybr a/Z p, #  Tr;^) < %-;(# + %?), #&en 7%(p) > 7Tj(p + Ü ).
This definition states that a network is pairwise stable if each agent has no strict 
incentive to sever any of its links and each pair of agents has no strict incentive to set 
up a new link. It also implies that a link can be severed unilaterally but it must be 
formed bilaterally. Pairwise stability allows for a pair of agents to create a new link or 
an agent to sever an existing link at any point in time. There may be the case that a
41
group of agents wants to add or sever links. Strong stability introduced by Jackson and 
van den Nouweland (2005) deals with this situation. Pairwise stability is a special case 
of strong stability so it is a necessary condition for strong stability. A strongly stable 
network must survive all potential deviations by any coalition of agents. Denote S  as 
the group of agents, the following definition by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) 
reflects the move from a network to another by the deviation of a group of agents.
D efinition 2.2
A network g/ £ G is achievable from g £ G via deviations by S  if:
(Hi) i j  £ g'and i j  ^ g implies {i , j}  C S, and
(iv) i j  £ g and i j  £ g' implies {i,j}C\S^<j>.
Based on the above definition, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) introduce the 
definition of strong stability.
D efinition 2.3
A network g is strongly stable if for any S  C N , g/ that is achievable from g via
deviations by S, and i£ S  such that ir^g1) > Ki(g), there exists j  £ S  such that
3^ (s') <
This definition shows that a strongly stable network g survives all potential devia­
tions (to gf) by S  because in any deviation by S, there exists at least an agent worse off 
because of this deviation (agent j). Hence, j  has an incentive to block the deviation. 
Strong stability is a restrictive notion because some of potential deviations involve a 
significant degree of coordination. Such a high degree of coordination is possible to be 
achieved when the number of agents is small. However, it is less likely to be obtained 
with a larger number of agents, as we may observe in reality. In a sense, strong stability 
may work as an upper bound in terms of “restrictiveness”. On the other side, pairwise 
stability is mildly restrictive, and in some cases less restrictive than one could expect 
in a specific context, so it can act as a lower bound in restrictiveness.
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) - henceforth GM - investigate firms’ incentives
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to create R&D networks, and the stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks. 
Firms are initially identical. Two different settings are studied in the article. First, 
each firm is operating in an independent market. Second, all firms are operating in 
a homogenous-product oligopoly. For the first setting, GM consider both symmetric 
networks, in which each firm has the same number of links, and asymmetric networks 
in a model including n firms (n > 3). This setting makes it easy to study asymmetric 
networks with n firms because the price in each market depends only on the output of 
the firm in this market and the relationship between cost reduction and R&D efforts is 
monotonie. As a result, the authors can present a general expression of profits of firms 
with respect to R&D efforts by using backward induction to solve the last stage and 
then plugging the results into the expression of firms’ profits. Using Topkis’s theorem8, 
GM explore the stability and efficiency of general R&D networks. The second setting, 
where firms are competing in a homogenous market, makes it not analytical tractable in 
dealing with asymmetric networks with n firms because the price in the market depends 
on the total output of all firms. Moreover, the relationship between cost reduction 
and the degree of collaboration is non-monotonic. To this end, GM study symmetric 
networks with n firms because they can solve the model by invoking symmetry. An 
analysis of asymmetric networks with three firms is considered in the second setting 
because it is the smallest numbers of firms that allows them to have different number 
of links.
A three stage game is used to model the situation. In the first stage, firms set 
up their collaborative links to share knowledge on a cost reducing technology. In the 
next stage, firms choose simultaneously and independently the level of R&D outputs. 
In stage three, firms decide their quantities in Cournot fashion. The R&D spillover 
between two firms is perfect when there is a direct collaborative link and is imperfect 
otherwise. GM model involuntary spillovers between two firms that have no direct
8Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1999).
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collaborative link. These involuntary spillovers are "public" in nature; so they are the 
same for any "distance" between firms. For networks with n firms, GM assume that 
public spillovers are zero for simplicity. For the three-firm case, public spillovers vary 
between zero and one.
The first result concerns the relationship between a firm’s collaboration activities 
and its R&D effort. GM found that a firm’s R&D effort increases with the degree 
of collaboration if firms are not competitors (i.e. firms are in independent markets), 
but decreases when firms compete in a homogenous product market. The reason is 
that when firms compete in a homogenous market, voluntary spillover from the R&D 
effort of a firm may also benefit its partners and makes them tougher competitors- the 
competition effect.
The second result is the relationship between the number of collaborative links and 
the level of cost reduction. By investigating firms operating in independent markets, 
GM showed that costs decrease with the level of collaboration. However, in the ho­
mogenous market case, costs initially decrease, then increase. The reason for the latter 
finding is that: when the network becomes denser, the harm from R&D effort reduction 
outweighs the savings in R&D effort.
The third result concerns stability of network structure. GM found that the complete 
network, where all firms are linked, is uniquely pairwise stable when firms operate in 
independent markets, while the empty network - no firm is linked - is never stable. This 
result holds when firms operate in a homogenous market. For asymmetric network of 
three firms in a homogenous market, the partial network- two firm are linked and 
the third is isolated - is only pairwise stable if public spillover is su ffic ien tly  small. The 
intuition behind the pairwise stability of the partial network stems from the asymmetries 
in the market which makes the linked firms more competitive than the isolated one. 
As a result, the linked firms have no incentives to offer an R&D collaboration to the 
isolated firm.
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The final result investigates the relationship between stability and efficiency of a 
network. GM found that the complete network is uniquely social welfare - maximizing 
one when firms are in independent markets. However, an intermediate degree of collab­
oration maximizes social welfare when firms are competing in a homogenous market. 
For asymmetric networks of three firms in a homogenous market, the empty network is 
efficient with high degrees of public spillover while the partial network is only efficient 
when public spillovers are small. Together with the results in stability, GM show that 
when firms compete in a homogeneous product market, the complete network is stable 
but intermediate degree of collaboration secures highest aggregate profits and social 
welfare. In contrast, when firms are located in independent markets, the complete net­
work is uniquely stable, industry-profit and social-welfare maximizing. The reason is 
that when firms are in independent markets, there is no harm from competition effect.
The three-firm case in GM has been extended in various ways (see Song and Van- 
netelbosch, 2007; Mauleon et. al., 2008; Zikos, 2010). Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) 
- henceforth SV - extended the model by considering R&D subsidies in order to eval­
uate the effect of government policies on the stability and efficiency of R&D networks. 
The network consists of three firms located in three different countries. These firms 
compete in the homogenous product market located in the fourth country. SV showed 
that permitting government to provide R&D subsidies may reduce the conflict between 
stability and efficiency and increase social welfare.
Mauleon et al (2008) extend the three-firm case by investigating the effect of labour 
unions on stability and efficiency properties of R&D networks. A different point in 
modelling compared with GM and SV is spillover. Mauleon et.al model spillovers within 
the network while GM and SV focus on public spillovers. "Within-network spillovers" 
relate to the distance of the shortest path between firms. In addition, there are no 
spillovers between non-collaborating firms and spillovers may not be fully absorbed even 
when two firms have a direct collaborative link. Mauleon et. al. find that an increase
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in the union’s bargaining power leads to more symmetric stable R&D networks. More 
precisely, the complete network is the unique strongly stable one when unions set wages 
while the partial one is the unique strongly stable one when firms set wage. Intuitively, 
the competitive advantage of linked firms with respect to the isolated one in the partial 
network is reduced considerably in the presence of labour unions because unions of the 
link firms set higher wages than that of the isolated one. As a consequence, linked firms 
have less incentive to invest in R&D while the isolated one has incentive to invest more 
in R&D.
Zikos (2010) develops a model of a public and two private firms in an oligopoly. This 
is an attempt to shed some light on the possibility of resolving the conflict between 
stability and efficiency by privatization or nationalization policy that the government 
can implement. In the model, instead of maximizing its own profit like other private 
firms, maximization of welfare is the objective of the public firm. The author found 
that the complete network is the only stable and Pareto efficient, so there is no conflict 
between stability and efficiency.
The symmetric networks case in GM is extended by Deroian and Gannon (2006) 
in order to investigate product R&D alliances. The same game structure is adopted. 
Deroian and Gannon also found the same results as GM. Similar considerations to the 
setting where firms are located in different markets can be applied for the case of highly 
differentiated product markets.
Goyal and Joshi (2003) - henceforth GJ - propose a two-stage game where n firms 
choose their R&D collaborations in the first stage, and then compete in either Cournot 
or Bertrand fashion in the second one. Furthermore, an R&D collaboration requires a 
fixed cost, and results in an exogenously specified reduction in marginal cost of produc­
tion. Since the benefit of doing R&D is exogenously given, GJ can deal with asymmetric 
networks of n firms. GJ then separated market competition into two types: moderate 
and aggressive competition. The moderate competition type where all firms make pos­
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itive profits but lower cost firms make higher profit corresponds to the case of Cournot 
fashion. Aggressive competition type where only the lowest cost firms make profits 
corresponds to the case of Bertrand fashion. GJ showed that the empty network is 
uniquely pairwise stable under aggressive competition regardless of the costs of forming 
links. Under moderate competition, costs of link formation are decisive for the equilib­
rium outcome. The complete network is uniquely pairwise stable if the cost of forming 
links is sufficiently small. If costs of link formation are intermediate, the network where 
there is one non-singleton complete component and the remaining firms are singletons 
is pairwise stable. If costs of forming links are high, the empty network is pairwise 
stable. If costs of link formation are very high, the empty network is uniquely pairwise 
stable. Finally, GJ found that under moderate competition and small costs of fink for­
mation, the complete network is the unique pairwise stable and efficient one. However, 
the empty network is uniquely pairwise stable while inter-linked star networks9 with 
two central firms are efficient under aggressive competition. Because of the complexity 
of the analysis, GJ have been unable to analyse efficient networks in the presence of 
large costs of forming links.
Goyal et.al (2008) study hybrid forms of organizing research where individual firms 
perform in-house R&D on core activities, and carry out bilateral joint projects on non­
core activities with other firms. There are n firms choosing actions in a two-stage game. 
In stage one, firms decide decide two actions: how much to spend on in-house R&D and 
to invest in joint R&D projects. In the second stage, firms compete in either Cournot 
or Bertrand fashion. The first result examines the relationship between investments in 
in-house R&D and in joint R&D projects. The authors found that R&D projects in 
the portfolio of a firm are complementary regardless of the presence of spillovers across 
projects. Intuitively, an increase in investments in a joint project has two different 
effects. On the one hand, it lowers the investor’s costs, and therefore increases the
9In a k inter-linked stars network of n firms, there are k central firms and n-k peripheral firms. Each central firm has 
n-1 links. Each peripheral firm has k links with k central firms (Goyal and Joshi, 2003).
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marginal returns from investments in in-house R&D. On the other hand, it also reduces 
the costs of partner firms so the benefit of making these investments is lowered. It 
turns out that in standard models of oligopoly with Cournot or Bertrand competition, 
the former effect always dominates the latter, so investments in in-house R&D and 
joint R&D projects are complementary. The result also holds if firms are located in 
independent markets because the latter effect vanishes.
The second result concerns the relationship between equilibrium R&D investments 
and the number of joint projects of a firm. Focusing on symmetric networks, Goyal et.al 
(2008) found that a firm’s investment in in-house R&D as well as in each of its joint 
projects increases with the degree of collaboration. This result is in contrast with the 
outcome of GM where R&D effort of a firm decreases with the degree of collaboration 
when firms compete in a homogenous product market. The intuition behind the results 
stems from two considerations. First, R&D efforts that a firm puts in a joint project only 
benefit the partner of this project. Second, an increase in the degree of collaboration 
means the formations of new joint projects. Because of complementarity, firms have 
more incentive to invest in R&D. For asymmetric networks, the authors found that 
better connected firms invest more in the in-house as well as joint projects. Nevertheless, 
the inequality of contributions in a joint project raises concerns about exploitation and 
free-riding. Finally, the results reveal that firms’ incentives to form R&D collaboration 
are excessive from an aggregate profit viewpoint if the industry size is large. Intuitively, 
if two firms form a new joint project, their profits increase while profits of the rest of 
firms decrease.
2.5 Im portant issues related to  m odels o f R&D cooperation
2.5.1 Spillovers
Exogenous versus endogenous spillovers
Industrial organization scholars deal with spillovers in two ways. First, spillovers are
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considered as exogenous (see., e.g., KMZ; Choi, 1993; Brod and Shivakumar, 1997; GM; 
Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002; Hinloopen, 2003; Goyal et.al., 2008). Second, spillovers are 
endogenised into a multiple-stage game by adding a stage where firms make decisions 
on the degree of spillovers (see., e.g., Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998; Kultti and Takalo, 
1998; Kamien and Zang, 2000; Lambertini et al., 2004).
Exogenous spillovers
Brod and Shivakumar (1997) use a two-stage game to investigate the social and 
private benefits of R&D cooperation and output cooperation. They consider an industry 
consisting of n identical firms. Apart from three types of cooperation in AJ, Brod 
and Shivakumar (1997) also examine a production cartel in which firms coordinate in 
output decision but they still act non-cooperatively in the R&D stage. Spillovers are 
exogenous variables of the model and it is assumed that firms completely share R&D 
output if they join R&D efforts to maximize joint profits. Brod and Shivakumar (1997) 
found that R&D cooperation in the first stage always generates more profit as well as 
social welfare than non-cooperative R&D if the actions of firms in the second stage are 
taken as given. There is a difference between the assumption of spillovers in Brod and 
Shivakumar (1997) and AJ. In AJ, R&D cooperation does not automatically result in 
information sharing. The assumption that firms fully share R&D information if they 
join R&D efforts is similar to the RJV scenario in KMZ.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) offer a definition of RJV as an arrangement not only 
to cooperate in R&D but also to share R&D information. This definition is in fact 
introduced by KMZ. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) also distinguish between RJV and 
R&D cartel. In R&D cartel, firms coordinate R&D activities but they do not share 
R&D information. Using a patent race framework, the authors find that firms do not 
always earn more profits if they share R&D information but this sharing is good for 
social welfare. Intuitively, sharing information may decrease the benefit generated by 
an innovation from the innovator’s viewpoint if the market is very competitive or the
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innovation is drastic.
Hinloopen (2003) points out three technical problems in modelling spillovers in AJ. 
Firstly, R&D spillovers in AJ are output spillovers. However, in reality, R&D spillovers 
happen during the R&D process rather than after the R&D process is completed. Sec­
ondly, it is assumed that a firm can enjoy full R&D effort of the other firm through R&D 
spillovers. This assumption does not take into account the duplication of efforts between 
two firms, the absorptive capacity of firms, and the differences in internal organization, 
research strategy, corporate culture between two firms. Thirdly, the assumption of de­
creasing returns to R&D entails that the firm investing more in R&D will receive less 
R&D output than the one investing less in R&D if two firms undertake a same amount 
of R&D investment. As a result, the large R&D investor will hire its competitor invest­
ing much less in R&D to do R&D and then enjoys full R&D spillovers10. However, this 
action is not observed in reality. To avoid these problems, Hinloopen (2003) follows 
KMZ and adjusts the assumption of full spillovers by introducing an upper-bound on 
the level of R&D spillovers. The first result is in line with the literature (i.e. AJ; KMZ; 
Motta, 1992) that R&D cooperation yields higher R&D efforts than non-cooperative 
R&D if pre-cooperative R&D spillovers are sufficiently large. However, even if pre­
cooperative R&D spillovers are small, R&D cooperation is still likely to increase R&D 
efforts if the post-cooperative R&D spillover is sufficiently larger than pre-cooperative 
one. Intuitively, firms have more incentive to invest in R&D when they coordinate if 
the coordination leads to a significant increase in R&D knowledge sharing.
Endogenous spillovers
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) endogenise R&D spillovers to investigate how successful 
RJVs mitigate market failures related to R&D. They found that non-cooperating firms 
in R&D may completely share R&D information given a set of conditions. Otherwise, 
these firms choose the minimum R&D information sharing. If firms coordinate in R&D,
10The third problem has already been pointed out by Amir (2000).
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at least one firm fully share information when both firms succeed in innovation. When 
only one firm in the RJV discovers innovation, it may decide to fully, partially, or 
minimally share information. The reason firms in an RJV choose not to completely 
share R&D information is to avoid a too competitive market.
Kultti and Takalo (1998) consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms 
choose R&D efforts non-coordinately and there are no spillovers. In the second stage, 
firms decide whether or not to exchange R&D knowledge. Note that firms exchange 
knowledge only if both firms agree to share R&D information. The authors found that 
firms have incentives to exchange R&D information even without involuntary leakages 
of knowledge.
Kamien and Zang (2000) investigate a three-stage game where voluntary sharing 
of knowledge is chosen in the first stage, before the R&D investment decision. It 
is assumed that firms need absorptive ’capacity’ to reap R&D spillovers. Moreover, 
there are involuntary spillovers considered as exogenous. They found that firm s choose 
not to share R&D knowledge if they act coordinately in R&D stage. In contrast, 
firms completely share R&D knowledge if they coordinate at the R&D stage except for 
the case of no involuntary spillovers where firms decide not to share R&D knowledge. 
Intuitively, firms offset involuntary spillovers by voluntary exchange of R&D knowledge.
Public spillover versus spillover w ithin networks
The literature on R&D networks has dealt with spillovers in two distinct ways. 
GM model both voluntary and public spillovers. In their model, if two firms have a 
direct R&D collaboration then they enjoy full "voluntary" spillovers from each other. 
Otherwise, they enjoy public spillovers from each other. Public spillover refers to the 
involuntary leakage of knowledge that is public in nature. Because the knowledge is 
public, it is not related to the distance between different firms in the network. This 
setting seems more appropriate for transmission of codified knowledge which is perfectly 
accessible and is transmitted via patent documents.
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Mauleon et al. (2008) model spillovers within the network which depend on the 
distance between firms. These spillovers include both direct spillovers which refer to 
voluntary spillovers between two firms having a direct collaborative link, and indirect 
spillovers which mean the involuntary spillovers between two firm s having no direct 
R&D link. Indirect spillovers are always smaller than direct spillovers. In addition, 
indirect spillovers depend on the distance between two firm s.
2.5.2 R & D  in p u t versus R & D  ou tp u t
As mentioned before, there are two ways of modelling the R&D decision stage: R&D 
outputs and R&D inputs. Amir (2000) has pointed out that the two ways of modelling 
are not equivalent from a qualitative or quantitative perspective. He found that KMZ 
model is always valid while the validity of AJ model appears to be of questionable if 
the value of spillovers is sufficiently large. If spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint 
returns to scale (in the number of firms and own R&D expenditure) are increasing in 
the AJ model. In the KMZ model, the joint returns to R&D scale are always non­
increasing. Nevertheless, the AJ model may be adequate for some particular industry 
or R&D processes where the overall benefits that firms receive from large spillovers 
overcome the negative effects of increased competition on their profits. Examples of 
these situations are technological parks like Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Amir, 2000).
2.5 .3  A b sorp tive  capacity
In many contributions on R&D cooperation, spillovers are typically modelled as manna 
from the heaven that rains down upon its recipients (Geroski, 1995a). Beneficiaries 
don’t need to do anything, even the purchase of a bucket. However, it is stated by 
Geroski (1995 a,b) that a firm has to invest in R&D in order to take full advantage 
from spillovers. In particular, any firm intending to absorb or improve R&D knowledge 
created by other firms will need imitative or adaptive capability. This statement is
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supported by some empirical evidence. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) use econometric 
models to find that a firm’s own R&D activity improves its ability to absorb R&D 
outputs created by other firms. The same result is obtained in an empirical study by 
Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). In addition, Mansfield (1981) found that imitation 
costs account for about 65 per cent of the original innovation costs on average. Garcia 
and Montero (2010) compared the case where firms invest in R&D with the case of no 
R&D investment in Spain. They found that, the marginal benefit of knowledge spillovers 
on a firm’s probability of innovation increases six-fold when the firm undertakes its own 
R&D activity, as compared to the case of no R&D investment.
Kamien and Zang (2000) incorporate absorptive capacity in a Cobb-Douglas function 
as a strategic variable. It is the firm to decide whether or not to follow a narrow R&D 
program that does not yield R&D spillovers to other firms. If a firm decides to follow a 
narrow R&D program, it also does not have the absorptive capacity. Kamien and Zang
(2000) found that R&D investment increases with absorptive capacity effects.
2 .5 .4  M arket failures rela ted  to  R & D
Private-sector under-investment in R&D may occur for a variety of market failures. 
First, leakage of knowledge leads to the case where R&D knowledge of a firm can be 
exploited by other firms without approval from the innovator. Furthermore, leakage of 
knowledge from a firm also makes its rivals tougher competitors in the market. This 
negative effect is detrimental to the incentive of firms to invest in R&D. Second, even 
in the absence of involuntary spillovers, the underinvestment in R&D can result from 
the fact that a firm may be unable to appropriate the extra consumer surplus from its 
innovation (Ulph, 1999). Since consumer surplus is not included in a firm’s objective, 
firms will under-value the returns to R&D from a social perspective (Ulph, 1999). 
This mechanism leads to under-investment in R&D. Third, firms choose R&D non- 
strategically (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a). In Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a), firms
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decide output and R&D expenditure simultaneously. As a result, firms have incentives 
to under-invest in R&D because they don’t take into account the potential benefit from 
the possibility of sharing R&D outputs either voluntarily or involuntarily.
Overinvestment in R&D is also a market failure. An important feature of tournament 
models with timing is that they predict overinvestment in R&D from a social perspective 
due to dupfication of R&D efforts (see, e.g., Loury, 1979; Lee and Wilde, 1980, Futia, 
1980; Rogerson, 1982). However, overinvestment may arise even in non-tournament 
model if the leakages of R&D knowledge are sufficiently small and firms make their 
R&D decisions non-cooperatively prior to outputs decisions (see Suzumura, 1992). The 
reason is that firms do not take into account the impact of the outcomes of R&D on the 
profits of other firms through changes in market share. This is known as the business 
stealing effect.
Katz (1986) has pointed out two other market failures due to imperfect price dis­
crimination: low levels of utilization and wasteful duplication. Because the innovator 
cannot price-discriminate perfectly, it cannot reap the entire surplus from licensing of 
its innovation. As a result, the innovator will sell its innovation at prices that are dif­
ferent from the utility-maximization prices. In addition, the failure in licensing may 
lead to duplication of R&D efforts. Since the cost of discovering an innovation is large 
but the cost of disseminating it is relatively small, it could be seen as wasteful from a 
social perspective when firms conduct duplicated R&D investments.
Asymmetric information and opportunism also play an important role in social inef­
ficiency (Katz, 1986). R&D knowledge is difficult to value, price and sell, because it is 
hard to the buyer to appraise R&D knowledge before it is transmitted from the buyer 
to the seller. However, it is hard to the seller to regain R&D knowledge once it has 
been “loaned” to the buyer (Katz, 1986). These issues decrease the incentive of firms 
to invest in R&D as well as the incentive of firms to disseminate R&D knowledge.
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2.5 .5  R & D  policy
In this section, we discuss the policies that may be employed to restore incentives of 
firms to invest in R&D. These policies are aimed at resolving the source of market 
failures (e.g. leakages of knowledge, imperfect price discrimination, and asymmetric 
information and opportunism) or stimulating R&D investment.
The first approach is to prevent leakages of knowledge by patent and copyright laws 
that can be used strictly to restrict the uses of involuntary spillovers. However, this 
policy cannot solve the problems of inadequate dissemination of R&D knowledge. The 
policy may also reduce the incentive of firms to cooperate in R&D because involun­
tary spillovers may force firms to share their R&D knowledge in order to internalize 
spillovers. Moreover, this policy may reduce the positive effect of involuntary spillovers 
on social welfare. In some situations, social performance is improved with high invol­
untary spillovers because involuntary spillovers reduce the cost at the industry level of 
obtaining a given amount of cost reduction (Spence, 1984).
The second approach is to stimulate R&D investment by R&D subsidies. This policy 
also does not alleviate the problems of inadequate dissemination of R&D knowledge. 
In addition, this approach may lead to problems associated with R&D subsidy such as 
inefficient exploitation of R&D subsidies or excessive incentive to invest in R&D from 
the social perspective. These problems happen when firms try to accumulate R&D 
subsidy revenues.
The third approach is to foster R&D cooperation by “having a permissive antitrust 
treatment of R&D joint ventures, cross-licensing agreements, and similar arrangements 
among firms” (Katz, 1986). By cooperating in R&D, firms can internalize spillovers 
and avoid waste of duplication. In addition, cost-sharing provisions allow the sharing 
of risk among partners and the improvement of financial ability to undertake R&D 
projects because R&D investment is costly and risky. Irwin and Klenow (1996) study
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the Sematech program in the US electronic components industry where U.S government 
subsidizes 100 million USD per year to 14 leading U.S. semiconductor producers to 
establish a joint R&D consortium-Sematech. They found that Sematech led to 300 
million USD per year reduction in members’ R&D investment. This fact supports the 
hypothesis that Sematech reduced duplication of members’ R&D efforts. Branstetter 
and Sakakibara (1998) look at similar initiatives in Japanese hi-tech industries. They 
found evidence that research consortia have a positive effect on R&D investment and 
R&D productivity of members. In addition, part of this effect arises from the increased 
R&D spillovers that occur within these consortia.
By R&D cooperation, the problems of asymmetric information and opportunism 
are also alleviated. When firms cooperate in R&D, they usually agree on R&D inputs 
that are much easier to measure than R&D outputs. This helps avoid the problem of 
asymmetric information. Moreover, moral hazard is less serious when all firms pool 
their resources to achieve the sufficient capital to finance large R&D projects, or to 
share R&D costs, because they have to share the risk.
2.6 Summary
Industrial organization scholars have recently investigated R&D cooperation and com­
petition by mostly using game theoretic tools and formal mathematical modelling. In­
dustrial organization models of R&D cooperation and competition can be classified into 
two categories: tournament and non-tournament models. Most of theoretical works on 
R&D cooperation have been dealt with in the context of a non-tournament model. 
Non-tournament models can also be classified further into process R&D and product 
R&D models with respect to the objectives of R&D. Most of studies in the context of 
a non-tournament model are of process R&D models.
Traditionally, the literature on R&D cooperation has focused on comparing the 
performance of an industry in the case of no R&D cooperation with the one where
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R&D cooperation is industry-wide. The degree of involuntary and voluntary knowledge 
spillovers play an important role in determining whether the incentive of a firm to in­
vest in R&D, the firm’s profit and social welfare are higher or lower in the case of R&D 
cooperation compared to the case of non-cooperative R&D. A general result is that 
R&D cooperation yields higher R&D efforts and social welfare than non-cooperative 
R&D if either pre-cooperative or post-cooperative R&D spillovers are sufficiently large. 
Note that pre-cooperative spillovers are involuntary while post-cooperative spillovers 
are voluntary in nature.
Whether firms cooperate in R&D in equilibrium, the number of R&D cooperations 
as well as the number of coordinating firms in equilibrium have not received much 
attention until recently. The recent literature on endogenous R&D cooperatives focuses 
on these questions. The literature on endogenous R&D cooperatives can be grouped 
into three strands of literature: RJV formation, R&D coalition formation, and R&D 
network formation. The relationship in a RJV is transitive in the sense that a member- 
firm needs consent from its existing partners to establish a new R&D partnership. The 
relationship in a coalition is exclusive in the sense that a firm can only participate in 
one coalition. The relationship in an R&D network is intransitive in the sense that a 
firm can form a new R&D partnership without the need of consent from its existing 
partners.
Many factors have proved to be important in theoretical modelling of R&D coop­
eration: Spillovers, R&D input versus R&D output, and absorptive capacity. Policy 
makers should take into account as many factors as possible before deciding to issue an 
R&D policy.
In summary, this chapter surveys the development of theoretical models of R&D 
cooperation. The most recent literature focuses on a type of R&D cooperation that 
has been growing fast -R&D networks. The literature on R&D network often deals 
with the stability and efficiency of R&D networks in the context of a non-tournament
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model which allows for the accommodation of public and private spillovers. Due to the 
complexity of network analysis, almost all studies on R&D networks are of process R&D 
models for the reason of tractability. Some assumptions were adopted in the literature 
for tractability such as the linear demand function, zero fixed cost of firms and ex ante 
symmetry between firms in R&D networks. In addition, the models on R&D network 
do not incorporate some important factors in the literature such as absorptive capacity, 
risk, and indivisibility. These are issues to wait for future research.
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Chapter 3 
R&D networks with industry leaders
3.1 Introduction
The significance of horizontal R&D collaborations was shown in growing firm R&D part­
nering activities in many industries. For example, the growth of newly established R&D 
partnerships in biotechnology as well as pharmaceutical (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roijackers 
and Hagedoorn, 2006), computer (Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2005), electron­
ics (Delapierre and Mytelka, 1998), and software industries (Cloodt, Hagedoorn and 
Roijakkers, 2010).
An important feature of R&D partnership activities is that they involve industry 
leaders that are not only dominant firms in the markets but also large R&D investors 
such as Microsoft in the software industry (see Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 
2010), IBM in the computer industry (see Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2005), 
and Roche in the pharmaceutical industry (Hagedoorn, 2002; Roij ackers and Hage­
doorn, 2006). There are several ways to model industry leaders in the literature. In 
the Price-leadership model, it is assumed that the market leader sets the price and all 
other firms in the industry behave like perfectly competitive price-taking firms (see, 
e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 2000). In the Stackelberg model, the dominant firm is as­
sumed to be the first-mover in the product market. In theory, the first mover in the 
Stackelberg model is naturally the dominant firm that accounts for a high market share
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in equilibrium. In addition, in our setting here, if a firm has a high market share, it is 
also a large R&D investor in equilibrium because it has a greater incentive to invest in 
R&D than others as higher output makes further R&D investment more worthwhile. 
However, in reality, the industry leader is not necessary the first mover. Therefore, we 
explain that the industry leader is assumed to move first in the market stage in our 
stage game in order to model the situation in which it does not only account for a 
high market share but also invests largely in R&D. This chapter studies R&D network 
structures that will emerge endogenously in the presence of an industry leader, and 
the efficiency properties of the resulting networks - two main issues in the literature 
on R&D networks. The reason in reality for a firm to be the industry leader does not 
affect our results on stability and efficiency.
A model with one leader firm and n — 1 follower firms interacting in a four-stage 
game is developed. The timing of moves is as follows. In the first stage, firms form 
collaborative links in order to share knowledge of process R&D. In the second stage, 
each firm chooses its R&D efforts unilaterally but all firms decide R&D efforts simul­
taneously. In the third stage, the leader firm sets quantity. Finally, all follower firms 
decide quantities.
We employ some definitions: The definitions of pairwise stability by Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996), and strong stability by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). Social 
welfare is used as a measure of efficiency.
In this chapter, if two firms have no direct R&D collaboration then they enjoy 
public spillovers from each other. If two firms have a collaborative link, they enjoy full 
private spillovers from each other. An R&D collaboration has two different effects on a 
firm’s profit: efficiency and competition effects. On the one hand, the private spillovers 
enjoyed from an R&D collaboration lower the cost of one partner and therefore have a 
positive effect -the efficiency effect- on its profit. On the other hand, R&D knowledge of 
one partner also spills over the other and makes the other partner a tougher competitor:
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the competition effect.
In the first part of the chapter, we pay attention to the network of n firms. Due 
to the presence of a leader firm, it is quite complicated to deal with a general network 
structure even if every firm has the same number of links. As a result, we focus on the 
network structure that can be solved by invoking symmetry. In addition, we assume 
that there is no public spillover in this part for simplicity.
Our first result considers the relationship between the level of collaborative activity 
and R&D effort. It is shown that a firm’s R&D effort decreases if more links are added 
to a dense network because the competition effect of the R&D collaboration dominates 
the efficiency effect as the network is denser.
The second result investigates stability properties of R&D networks. The complete 
network, in which each firm collaborates with all others, is pairwise stable. The empty 
network, where all firms are isolated, is not pairwise stable. It turns out that any two 
follower firms in the empty networks have the incentive to form an R&D collaboration 
between each other. In addition, no firm in the complete network has an incentive 
to sever its existing link. We also find that the complete network is not strongly 
stable. This result is in line with Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) who found that 
an intermediate level of R&D collaboration between firms in a symmetric network 
maximizes each firm’s profit. Therefore, the coalition of all firms in the network has 
the incentive to decrease the level of collaboration by severing some links. The finding 
may be of empirical relevance in that many strategic R&D networks are unstable, or 
are terminated early (see Tomasello et.al, 2013). This finding may also be consistent 
with the stylized fact that there is the rise-and-fall trend in R&D networks with a 
peak located either in the 1990-1993 or 1994-1997 period (see Tomasello et.al, 2013). 
Unfortunately, we have been unable to characterize the strong stability of a general 
R&D network with an arbitrary number of firms due to the complexity of computations 
involved that requires us to exploit the symmetry in a network in order to obtain the
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sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In addition, it has not been possible for us to 
establish whether the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network. These 
questions are investigated in the context of asymmetric networks with three firms.
The third result pertains to social welfare. We find that there exists an intermediate 
degree of collaborative activity that maximizes social welfare. This result is also in line 
with Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001). Intuitively, on the one hand, R&D collabora­
tions reduce costs of firms and increase their profits. On the other hand, well-connected 
firms undertake very little R&D efforts because of competition effect. When the net­
work is sparse, the former effect dominates the latter one, leading to the increase in 
social welfare as more links are added to the existing network. However, in the dense 
network, the latter effect dominates the former one, leading to the decrease in social 
welfare.
In the second part of the chapter, we consider asymmetric networks with three firms. 
This simple setting allows us to investigate the role of public spillovers by incorporating 
it into the model. We find that while the follower firms always have the incentive to 
form a link, the industry leader may not want to collaborate with follower firms if 
R&D collaborations do not lead to the significant increase in R&D knowledge sharing 
vis-à-vis the non-collaboration (i.e. if public spillovers are sufficiently large). The 
intuition behind these results stems from two considerations. On the one hand, the 
competition effect of the link on each partner is higher if the increase in R&D knowledge 
sharing because of the link is larger. The leader firm invests more in R&D than follower 
firms so the increase in R&D knowledge sharing due to R&D collaboration brings less 
R&D efforts in terms of private spillovers to the leader firm than to the follower firm. 
On the other hand, the efficiency effect of the link is higher if the increase in R&D 
knowledge sharing because of the link is larger. Due to decreasing returns to R&D, 
the marginal returns to R&D investment of the leader firm is smaller than that of
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the follower firms11. The external source of R&D knowledge is more valuable to the 
leader firm as a substitute for in-house R&D. Therefore, the marginal returns to R&D 
knowledge enjoyed from spillovers of the leader firm is higher than that of the follower 
firms. It turns out that the efficiency effect of R&D collaboration on the leader firm’s 
profit increases faster than the competition effect as the increase in R&D knowledge 
sharing due to R&D collaboration vis-à-vis non-collaboration is larger. Therefore, if an 
R&D collaboration leads to the significant increase in R&D knowledge sharing vis-à-vis 
the non-collaboration, the leader firm has an incentive to form the link. However, the 
follower firms always have incentive to collaborate in R&D with the leader firm because 
they can enjoy large R&D effort of the leader firm.
Our next result shows that the complete network is pairwise stable if public spillovers 
are not large. However, there is no strongly stable network. Network architectures may 
be altered continuously by groups of firms. We find that the leader partial network, in 
which there is a link between the leader firm and a follower firm and the other follower 
firm is isolated, is mostly visited while the empty network is least visited. Moreover, 
the leader firm is the one who severs the link in any deviation where a collaborative link 
between the leader firm and a follower firm is severed. In contrast, the follower firms 
always have the incentive to collaborate with the leader firm because they can enjoy 
large R&D spillovers from the leader firm. In addition, the leader star network, in which 
the industry leader is at the hub and directly connects with the two follower firms while 
none of the follower firms has a direct link with each other, maximizes industry-profit 
as well as the leader firm’s profit for almost all values of public spillovers. This result 
suggests that if transfers between firms are allowed, the leader star network will be 
stable because the more beneficial firm has the incentive to ‘sponsor’ others in order to
11 The assumption of decreasing returns to R&D investment is supported by some empirical evidences. Cohen (1995) 
finds that R&D output tends to increase less than proportionately along with firm size, and may even decrease at large 
sizes. He infers that small firms obtain more innovations per unit of R&D spending than large firms. However, the result 
can be explained in a different way that large firms tend to focus on fewer ideas more intensively so their innovations may 
have higher quality than that of small firms. The empirical study by Plehn-Dujowich (2009) shows evidences that small 
firms are more innovative than large ones as they obtain more patent counts and citations per unit of R&D expenditure.
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maintain the network structure. Our result seems to be consistent with the empirical 
evidence in that we observe firms that invest largely in R&D are the central nodes12 
of R&D networks. According to Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999), IBM, Intel, and 
Microsoft are large R&D investors in the computer industry in 1995. The empirical 
study by Cloodt. et.al (2006) shows that these firms have the most R&D partnerships 
in this industry in 1995-1999. The empirical study by Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) 
shows that the large R&D investors in pharmaceutical biotechnology such as Roche, 
SmithKline Beecham, and Pfizerare are the central nodes of R&D networks in this 
industry.
Next, we investigate the efficiency of R&D networks with three firm s . We find 
that the complete network is never efficient because of the considerations that have 
been explained in the part of network of n firms. Our result also reveals that the 
degree of R&D collaborative activity of the efficient network decreases with public 
spillovers as follows. The partial network, in which there is one R&D link, is efficient 
if public spillovers are not large. The empty network is efficient if public spillovers 
are sufficiently large. Intuitively, public spillovers can be considered as a substitute for 
R&D collaborations. The increase in public spillovers leads to greater sharing of R&D 
outputs without the severe decrease in R&D efforts because the sharing of knowledge 
by the means of public spillovers is smaller than by R&D collaborations so firm s do not 
lower their R&D efforts severely as the competition effect is smaller. So the sparser 
network is efficient as public spillovers increase.
Together with the results on stability, the above results show that private incentives 
to form R&D collaborations may be excessive from a social welfare viewpoint. In 
particular, the complete network is pairwise stable but is never efficient.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The literature on R&D networks is 
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 explores the stability
12 Nodes with many links.
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and efficiency of R&D networks with n firms. Section 5 investigates the stability and 
efficiency of asymmetric R&D networks. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 R elated literature
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on R&D network formation concen­
trating on the endogenous emergence of network architectures, and on the efficiency 
properties of the resulting R&D networks (see, e.g., Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; 
Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Deroian and Gannon, 2006; Mauleon et. ah, 2008; Goyal, 
Konovalov and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2008; Zikos, 2010)13. While the existing literature on 
R&D networks provides important insights, it has been restrictive by considering that 
all firms choose variables simultaneously, thus ignoring the effects of market leaders 
or dominant firms on R&D networks. The contribution of the chapter to this litera­
ture is that it investigates the effect of industry leaders on the stability and efficiency 
properties of R&D networks.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on leader firms and R&D cooperation 
in oligopolies (see, e.g., Lambertini et ah, 2004; Mukherjee and Marjit, 2004). The 
above literature compares R&D investments of leaders with those of followers. It also 
studies the incentive of firms to cooperate in R&D in the presence of a Stackelberg 
leader. The approach of this chapter is richer in that it allows the strategic effects 
of R&D to be mediated through an R&D collaboration network where the network 
structure and the position of firms in the network play an important role.
Lambertini et al. (2004) explore the relationship between spillovers and R&D in­
vestments in the presence of a Stackelberg leader in the output market. In their model, 
spillovers from the leader to the follower may be different from spillovers from the fol­
lower to the leader. By investigate noncooperative behavior with respect to spillovers 
and R&D efforts of firms in a duopoly, Lambertini et al. (2004) found that the market
13For more details on these articles see section 2.4.3 of chapter 2.
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leader invests more in R&D than the follower if spillovers are endogenous variables and 
can be controlled by firms. The result holds if spillovers are exogenous and spillovers 
from the leader to the follower are sufficiently small. The converse applies if spillovers 
are exogenous and spillovers from the leader to the follower are not sufficiently small.
Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) investigate the effects of licensing on R&D organiza­
tion. They find that if two firms engage in Cournot competition, R&D collaboration 
in terms of Multiple Research Projects is prefered by firms than non-cooperative R&D 
independently of the possibility of licensing. However, if two firms engage in Stackel­
berg competition, the possibility of licensing is critical for their outcomes. If there is 
no possibility of licensing, firms prefer R&D collaboration than non-cooperative R&D. 
If there is possibility of licensing, firms may prefer non-cooperative R&D than R&D 
collaboration. Intuitively, the asymmetry between firms plays an important role in the 
decision of R&D collaboration because there is a difference between the licensing fee of 
the leader and the follower. This difference may encourage a firm not to collaborate in 
R&D, thus keeping the option for licensing open. Therefore, the possibility of licensing 
may lower the probability of success in R&D because it stimulates firms to do non- 
cooperative R&D rather than multiple research project. As a result, the possibility of 
licensing lowers social welfare because the increase in firms’ profit due to licensing is 
smaller than the decrease in consumer surplus due to non-cooperative R&D.
In summary, the literature on R&D network formation shows that the incentive 
of firms to collaborate in R&D is quite large because the complete network is always 
pairwise stable, and private incentives to collaborate are often excessive from a social 
welfare perspective (see Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001). In addition, an isolated 
firm always has an incentive to collaborate with linked firms because it has a significant 
cost disadvantage while connected firms may not want to form the link with the isolated 
firm. Contrary to them, our result suggests that the isolated leader firm may not want 
to collaborate with linked followers if R&D collaboration does not lead to a significant
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increase in knowledge sharing.
The literature on dominant firms and R&D cooperation in oligopolies demonstrates 
that spillovers play an important role in R&D investment of the leader firm and follower 
firms (see Lambertini et ah, 2004). In addition, the presence of a leader firm may 
change the incentive of a firm to collaborate in R&D and affects social welfare because 
of the asymmetry between the leader and the follower firms (see Mukherjee and Marjit, 
2004). This chapter constructs a strategic network model to study the influence of the 
presence a leader firm on other firms’ R&D efforts, on R&D collaborations, and on 
social welfare. In addition, the role of public spillovers is also considered in the context 
of R&D networks - the form of R&D collaborations that has been grown fast recently.
3.3 The m odel
There are n ex-ante identical firms who are competitors in a homogenous- product 
market. The interaction between firms is described as a four stage game mentioned in 
the introduction. This timing of moves makes the model an appropriate description of 
a situation in which investment in R&D decisions of firms are mostly long-run while 
product market quantities can be adjusted on a much shorter basis14. When longer- 
term decisions are modelled as being made at an earlier stage, this is intended to have 
the effect that in subgame perfect equilibrium, shorter-term decisions are made with 
the longer-term decisions taken as fixed (Selten, 1998). This multi-stage game is solved 
by backward induction. We obtain subgame perfect Nash equilibria of stages two to 
four. Finally, stage one is solved by applying the notion of pairwise and strong stability.
Networks o f collaboration
Let N  = {1,2,..., n}, n > 3 be the set of all firms in the oligopoly. Without loss of 
generality, let 1 denote the leader firm and 2,3,..., n be the follower firms. Let g denote
14It could mean that due to exogenous institutional circumstances, investment in R&D decisions can be adjusted only 
at certain points in time whereas quantity can be changed every day (Selten R, 1998).
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the networks of collaboration. The link between firm i and firm j  is represented15 by 
ij, so i j  G g represents the link between firm i and j  under network g. Denote g  +  ij  
as the network obtained when i and j  form the new link between them in the existing 
network g. Similarly, g — ij  denotes the network obtained when i or j  in g deletes the 
link between each other. Define Ni(g)  as the set of firms consisting of firm i and all 
firms that are directly connected to firm i, and G as the set of all possible networks.
R&D effort levels and spillovers
In our model, each firm invests in R&D in order to reduce its marginal cost. Denote 
R&D effort of firm i as e*. Carrying out R&D is costly with R&D cost: Z(e^) =  
je f  where 7  > 0 denotes the efficiency of the R&D technology. This specification is 
introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998). Under this specification, the cost 
of R&D effort is an increasing function and reflects diminishing returns to the level of 
R&D output ei. Hence, by investing je f  in R&D, firm i can reduce its costs by an 
amount e;. It is assumed that 7  is sufficiently large so that the second-order conditions 
for profits and social welfare are satisfied and it ensures non-negativity of all variables 
in equilibrium.
Another assumption is that firm i can reduce its marginal costs further by forming 
collaborative links in order to gain access to the R&D outputs of other firms. The 
process of knowledge transmission in this chapter follows Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez
(2001). In particular, if two firms have no direct R&D collaboration then they enjoy 
public spillovers from each other - denoted as (3 G [0,1). If two firms have a collaborative 
link then they enjoy full "private" spillovers. Denote Ei as the effective R&D efforts 
for firm i, specification for Ei is as follow:
E i =  2  e k +  ( 3 J 2 e l
kGNi(g) l<£Ni(g)
15 We assume that the link are non-directional, i.e., i j  =  j i .
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M arginal cost
The cost function of firm i in network g when producing the quantity of good qg. 
Ci =  =  (c — Ei)qi, z G c > 0
The assumption of zero fixed cost is adopted to make the model more tractable16. 
Payoffs
n
The inverse demand function is as follows: p  = a —Q  where Q  =  (o > c > 0).
i=l
The profit that firm i is assumed to maximize:
7Ti = (a -  Q)qi -  C i -  7 e?; i G N  
S tability  and  efficiency
The definitions of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and 
strong stability introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) are adopted in 
this chapter to explore the incentives of firms to alter the structure of a network17.
Next, the efficiency property of R&D networks reflects performances of networks 
under a social welfare point of view. Denote consumer surplus as C S  and producer 
surplus as PS', social welfare is given by:
)2 n
2" ' i=l
A network g G C? is efficient if no other network dominates it in terms of social 
welfare; that is if W(g) ^  W(g') for all g' G G. As pointed out in Goyal and Moraga- 
Gonzâlez (2001), this concept of efficiency is in the spirit of a second best since firms 
choose R&D efforts and quantities non-cooperatively. Because there is no cost attached 
to a link, the first-best socially optimal network is the complete network in which firms 
coordinate their R&D efforts as well as quantities to maximize social welfare.
16This assumption is standard in the literature on R&D collaboration networks.
17See part 2.4.3 of chapter 2 for these definitions.
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3.4 Networks w ith  n firms
Due to the presence of a leader firm, every firm in our model is not ex post symmetric 
even if we consider the networks in which each firm has the same number of links. For 
example, consider a network of n firms where each firm has k links. Because the leader 
firm moves first in the output market, in equilibrium it will perform a different level 
of R&D from other firms. As a consequence, the k firms that are directly connected 
to the leader firm will enjoy full private spillovers from the leader firm, so they will 
also perform a different level of R&D from the remaining firms. If we denote the firms 
directly connected to the leader firm as group 1, a firm that is directly connected with 
any firm in group 1 will enjoy full private spillover of the firm who belongs to group 1 
and therefore will also have a different equilibrium level of R&D. Continuing with this 
reasoning suggests that there may be many R&D outcomes among the n firms.
0--- 0-----0
0 0
0 0-----0
Figure 3.1: Networks in which each firm has the same number of links
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple network with n = 8. By referring to figure 3.1, one 
can see that: apart from the leader firm, four types of firms may arise in equilibrium 
with different quantitative results. First, two firms that are connected to the leader 
firm (firm 2 and firm 3). Second, two firms that are linked to firm 2 and firm 3 (i.e. 
firm 4 and firm 5). Third, two firms that are connected to firm 4 and firm 5 (i.e. firm 
6 and firm 7). Fourth, firm 8 .
In a simple network like the one in figure 3.1, there are many groups of firms that 
arise in equilibrium with different R&D outcomes. Therefore, it turns out that a general 
analysis of networks in the presence of a Stackelberg leader is quite complicated due to
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ex post asymmetry even though every firm has the same number of links. As a result, 
this section focuses on the case in which the symmetry can be exploited to solve the 
model. It is assumed that there are no public spillovers in this section for simplicity 
(i.e., ft =  0).
Denote k as the number of links of each follower firm: k E [0, n — 2]. We focus on 
the network where the leader is fully connected to all follower firms and each follower 
firm has k links with k other followers (denoted as g^). Figure 3.2 illustrates the above 
network with five firms (n =  5, k = 2).
Figure 3.2: Symmetric network
In the last stage of the game, the output of a follower firm at equilibrium is as follows 
(where firm 1 is the leader and 2 , ...,n are the followers):
a — q\ — nci +  'Yhcj ~  cl
jz= \
qi =    where i E {2, . . , n }n (3.1)
Plugging the above expression of output into the profits of firms, profits of firms at the 
Nash equilibrium of the last stage are as follows:
2
7Ti =
j  n  \
a — qi — nci +  ^2cj — ci 
3=1
n (3.2)
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7Tl —
f  n \
C1 — 5 3  cj  +  ° ( n  — 1) +  91 
i=ia ---------------------------------------- cin
V
91 -  7 ei (3.3)
/
In the third stage, the leader firm’s output at equilibrium:
91
a +  53 — cl( l +  n)
i=i (3.4)
Substituting the above output qi into (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) the payoffs of firms at the 
Nash equilibrium of the fourth stage obtain:
9i =
(I +  5 3  Cj +  Cl {in — 1) — 2CiTl
3=1___________________________
2n (3.5)
[ a - c i ( n  +  l ) +  i tc j] 2
7T1 = 4n —  7ei
TTi =
/ n \
cl +  53 9? "b ^ i — 1) — 2 c { T i  
3=1
2n
\ /
In network gfi, the marginal costs of firms are as follows:
(3.6)
(3.7)
Cl — C — Cl — 6 i  — f l l (3.8)
Ci — c — ei — ei — fli (3.9)
The expression of 53 cj can be presented as follows: 
3=1
Y c j  = nc — (k + 2)e* — nei — 
3=1
(3.10)
Plugging the expression of marginal costs and 53cj fr°m (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) into
3=1
(3.6) and (3.7). Taking the first-order condition of tti and TTi with respect to ei and e^ ,
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respectively18. To solve the FOCs, we invoke symmetry between the followers.
Qi = keï, Qi = (n — 2)eï, Qj = (n — 2)(& +  2)ei
Plugging Qi, Qi, and Qj above into FOCs and solving FOCs, the subgame-Nash equi­
librium efforts obtain:
_  (a — c)[2 + k2 + k(3 — 2n) +  n2 +  77,(27 — 3)] /-o 1 -n
1 _  At
e, =  ^ - c ) ( n - k - l ) y  (3.12)
Where:
A i=  3n + 2(7 -1) + 2n37  +k2[2( l+ n )7  -1] +n2(872 -67  -1) +k[n(2 + 47 ) -4n27  + 4 7  
-3].
We first establish the relationship between k and R&D efforts. The following results 
obtain:
3.4.1 R & D  efforts
Proposition 3.1
(i) The leader firm ’s R&D effort decreases with k in g^.
(ii) A follower firm ’s R&D effort decreases with k in g[ if k is sufficiently large. 
Proof:
We prove result (i) by showing that:
ei(9f )  -  ei(fff+1) = f c ^ h +  > 0 (3.13)
Where:
Â2= 3n + 2(7 -1) + 2n37  + (k + l)2[2(l+ n )7  -1] +n2(872 -67  -1) + (k+ l)[n (2 + 4 7 ) - 
4n27  + 4 7  -3].
18In the network , all second order conditions (SOCs) are satisfied if 7 >  — ,
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Si=n2(47-l)-n(67-3)-k[n(47-2)+ 3]-k2-2 .
From (3.12), it is easy to see that the numerator is positive so A i must be positive in 
order to keep e* positive. Therefore, A2 is also positive. The sign of ei(gjf) — ei(g[+1) 
depends on Si. For simplicity, we limit out attention to 7  > 1. As a result, it is easy 
to see that Si decreases with k. Because /c < n — 2, we plug k = n — 2 into Si. The 
following result obtains: =  2ny > 0. Therefore, ei(g^) — ei(g^+1) > 0 for all 7  >  1.
We now prove that efigj?) — ei(g^+1) > 0 if A; is sufficient large.
ei(9£ ) - e i (g£+1) = 2 ia - j £ S 2 > 0  (3.14)
Where:
S2= 2-3n-47-2n37 +k2[l-2(l+ n)7]+k(2n-3) [2 (1+n) 7~ 1] +u2 ( 1+ 47+ 87  ^) •
If n — 1 is even, we show that ei(g^_3) — ei(g^_2) > 0. However, as noted by 
Okumura (2007), there is no g^_3 if and only if n — 1 is odd. This fact follows directly 
from Euler’s handshaking lemma: the sum of the degrees of all nodes in any network 
is even. In addition, by the theorem on existence of a simple graph with given degrees 
the by Erdos-Gallai (I960)19, there exists g^-A if w — 1 is odd. Therefore, we show that 
e i ( 9 n - d  -  e i ( 9 n - 2 )  > 0 if n -  1 is odd.
/ f  \ _  z F \ _ __________ (a — c)[l +  4?227 2 — (2 +  371)7 ]___________
^  1 ^ ^ 4^ 3  _  1 2 ^ 7 2  +  2 7 1 2 7 ( 1 0 7  -  1 )  -  7 1 (9 7  -  2 )   ^ ^
( F x_ z f  \  ______________ (q -  c)7 [3 -  67  -  7717 +  4ti27 2]______________
i  9 n  A i  9 n —S  3  _  2 I 7  +  717 +  3672 — 7 i7 2 — +  527i 273 +  4 t i 3 7 3 +  16t i474
(3 . 16)
In this part, we consider 71 ^  4 firms. The three- firm case will be consider in the next 
part. It is easy to see that ei(g^_3) -  ei{g^_2) > 0 and e;(pf_4) -  ei{g^_3) > 0 as 7  ^  1 
and 71 ^  4. As a result, ei(g^_4) — ei(g^_2) > 0 because of the transitive property of 
inequalities. ■
19See, e.g., Berge (1976, p.115).
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The intuition behind result (i) is as follows. The increase in the number of links 
among follower firms has two different effects. On the one hand, a follower firm enjoys 
R&D efforts from more R&D partners. On the other hand, its R&D effort spills to 
more R&D partners and makes them tougher competitors. It turns out that the latter 
effect dominates the former one if k is large, leading to the decrease in R&D efforts of 
every follower firm.
Result (ii) says that R&D effort of the leader firm decreases when follower firms form 
links between them in network g£. There are two considerations: Firstly, when follower 
firms form links with each other and k is sufficiently large, they decrease their R&D 
efforts due to the dominance of competition effect over the efficiency effect. Therefore, 
the efficiency effect of all the links between the leader firm and all follower firms de­
creases because the leader firm enjoys less voluntary spillovers from all follower firm s . If 
the leader firm remain its R&D effort, the competition effect caused by its R&D effort 
overcomes the efficiency effect. As a result, the leader firm lowers its R&D effort to 
decrease voluntary spillovers from its R&D efforts to follower firms. Secondly, if k is 
small, follower firms may increase their R&D efforts so the leader firm has the incentive 
to lower its R&D effort as it enjoys the substitution for its in-house R&D.
3.4.2 S tab ility
In this part, we investigate the incentives of firms to collaborate in a network as well 
as the architecture of networks that will endogenously emerge in the long-run.
Pairwise stability
Applying definition of pairwise stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the fol­
lowing results obtain:
Proposition 3.2
The complete network g^_2 is pairwise stable while the empty network is not pairwise 
stable.
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Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 shows that the incentives of firms to form R&D collaborative links 
are quite large. Intuitively, any two follower firms in the empty networks have the 
incentive to form an R&D collaboration between each other. In the complete network, 
no firm in a pair of any two firms has an incentive to sever the link.
However, in the empty network, the isolated leader firm has no incentive to form the 
link with a follower firm if n is sufficiently large and 7  is sufficiently small20. Intuitively, 
the leader firm’s R&D effort is larger than that of every follower firm. Therefore, when 
a link is formed between the leader firm and a follower firm, the follower firm enjoys 
large R&D spillovers of the leader firm while the leader firm enjoys small R&D spillovers 
of the follower firm. As a result, the efficiency effect of the link on the leader firm’s 
profit is smaller than on the follower firm’s profit while the competition effect of the 
link on the leader firm’s profit is larger than on the follower firm’s profit. Larger n and 
smaller 7  make the advantage of moving first more pronounced. The disparity between 
R&D efforts of the leader firm and a follower firm is larger as the number of follower 
firms is larger and R&D expenditure is more efficient. When the disparity is sufficiently 
large, the link is detrimental to profit of the leader firm because the competition effect 
dominates the efficiency one. That is the reason why the isolated leader firm prefers to 
have no link in the empty network if the number of follower firms is sufficiently large and 
R&D expenditure is sufficiently efficient. Nevertheless, this result is sensitive to some 
factors such as the absorptive capacity of the follower firms versus that of the industry 
leader, the efficiency of R&D investment, and the competitiveness of the market21. For 
example, if the absorptive capacity of industry leaders is larger than that of follower 
firms, the leaders may want to collaborate with follower firms because the link yields 
more benefit for the industry leaders.
Unfortunately, we cannot characterize the strong stability of a general R&D network
20 See the simulation results in the appendix.
21 The competitiveness of the market is reflected by the number of follower firms in the market.
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with an arbitrary number of firms due to the complexity of computation involved that 
leads us to exploit the symmetry in a network in order to obtain sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium. In addition, it has been unable for us to establish whether the complete 
network is the unique pairwise stable network. These works will be considered in the 
context of asymmetric networks with three firms in the next section.
S trong stab ility
Even though we cannot characterize the strong stability of a general R&D network 
with an arbitrary number of firms, applying the definition of strong stability by Jackson 
and van den Nouweland (2005), the following result obtains.
P roposition  3.3
The complete network is not strongly stable.
Proof: If n — 1 is even, we show that tt; ( ^ _ 2) — (p^Lg) < 0 . If n — 1 is odd, we 
show that ^i{gn-2) — < 0- The comparisons are illustrated in the Appendix.■
Intuitively, the competition effect on a follower firm’s profit dominates the efficiency 
effect in the complete network so the coalition of all follower firms has an incentive to 
reduce the degree of collaboration between them (i.e. k). As a result, the complete 
network is not strongly stable. This result seems to be consistent with the stylized fact 
that many strategic R&D networks are unstable, or are terminated early (see Tomasello 
et.al, 2013). This result seems to be also consistent with the stylized fact that there is 
the rise-and-fall trend in R&D networks with a peak located either in the 1990-1993 or 
in the 1994-1997 period (see Tomasello et.al, 2013).
3.4 .3  Efficiency
Applying the definition of efficiency in section 3.3, the following result obtains:
P roposition  3.4
The social welfare maximizing network is neither the complete nor the empty network.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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Proposition 3.4 shows that an intermediate level of R&D collaboration is desirable 
from the social welfare point of view. On the one hand, R&D collaborations reduce 
costs of firms, therefore, increase their profits and the total output. On the other hand, 
well-connected firms undertake very little R&D efforts. When the network is sparse, the 
former effect dominates the latter one, leading to the increase in social welfare as more 
links are added to the existing network. However, in a dense network, the latter effect 
dominates the former one, leading to the decrease in social welfare when the network 
is denser.
Taken together with the findings on the stability properties of the different R&D 
networks, the above proposition suggests that the private incentives to collaborate in 
R&D may be excessive from a social welfare point of view. In particular, the complete 
network is pairwise stable but an intermediate level of collaborative activity yields 
highest social welfare22.
3.5 A sym m etric networks w ith  public spillovers
In this section, we consider the network of three firms - the lowest number of firm s  
possible for asymmetric networks. It has been noted that one of the main incentives 
of firms to form R&D collaborations is to gain competitive advantage against their 
competitors (see, e.g., Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990). Therefore, asymmetric net­
works are appropriate to these cases because they allow firms to maintain a different 
number of collaborative links. In this section, it is assumed that public spillover may be 
positive: j3 G [0,1) while private spillovers are still 1. It is found that when 7  > 2, all 
second order conditions for profit and welfare functions are satisfied and all variable are
22 As mentioned in chapter 2, strong stability is not necessarily the better notion than pairwise stability in considering 
the conflict between stability and efficiency of R&D networks. Strong stability is a restrictive notion because some of 
potential deviations involve a significant degree of coordination. Such a high degree of coordination is possible to be 
achieved when the number of agents is small. However, it is less likely to be obtained with a larger number of agents, as 
we may observe in reality. In a sense, strong stability may work as an upper bound in terms of “restrictiveness”. On the 
other side, pairwise stability is mildly restrictive, and in some cases less restrictive than one could expect in a specific 
context, so it can act as a lower bound in restrictiveness.
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non-negative in equilibrium23 for all (3 E [0,1). For simplicity, we assume that 7  =  2 .
With three firms in the network, there are eight possible different types of network. 
However, only six types generate different qualitative results, so we focus on them: (z) 
Firstly, the empty network in which there is no link between firms, denoted as gE. (ii) 
Secondly, the partial network where only one link exists in the network. Due to the 
presence of the leader firm in the network, it yields two different cases: The follower 
partial network (denoted as gFP) in which the leader firm is isolated, and the leader 
partial network (denoted as gLP) in which one of the follower firms is isolated. (Hi) 
Thirdly, the star network in which there are two links between three firms. There are 
two different types of network: The leader star network (denoted as gLS) with the 
leader firm at the hub and two follower firms at spokes. And the follower star network 
(denoted as gFS) with a follower firm at the hub. (iv) Finally, the complete network 
(denoted as gc ) in which there are three links between firms in the network. The 
followings are illustrations of these networks. Firms are denoted as nodes and a link 
represents an R&D partnership.
© ©
©
9E
©  ©
©
F P9
©
,L P ,F S 9L S
Figure 3.3: Different network structures
23The different between the market size parameter and the marginal cost {i .e.  a  — c) will be the scale parameter in 
the expressions of variables in equilibrium. Therefore, they play no role in determining the signs of the variables.
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From this part, for a variable x ,  where x  G {e, 7r,g}, the following notations are used 
throughout to denote variables at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium:
X i ( g E ) denotes firm i in the empty network
Xi (gc ) denotes firm i in the complete network
Xi{gFP) and Xi(gLP) denote firm i in the follower and leader partial network, respec­
tively
Xi (gFS) and Xi (gLS) denote firm i in the follower and leader star network, respectively
3.5.1 R & D  efforts
This section investigates the impact of forming links on the firms’ R&D efforts. Firstly, 
we explore what happens when a firm, either leader or follower, forms an R&D collab­
orative link. Secondly, we consider the effects of other firms forming links on a firm’s 
R&D effort.
P roposition  3.5
The leader firm ’s R&D effort:
(i) Decreases with the number of own links
(ii)Decreases when follower firms form a link
A follower firm ’s R&D effort:
(Hi)Decreases with the number of own links
(iv) Decreases when the other follower and the leader firm form a link except in ge.
Proof. Result (i): Figure 3.4 shows deviations of when the leader firm adds own 
links. Result (i) that e i(gE) > ei(gLP) > ei(gLS) follows directly from simulation 
which is illustrated in figure 3.6.
Result (ii): Figure 3.5 shows three cases in which a link between two follower firms is 
added to the existing networks. Result (ii) that: e i(gE) > ei(gFP)] ei(gLP) > ei(gFS); 
ei (gLS) > ei(gC) follows directly from simulation which is illustrated in figure 3 .6 .
Result (iii): ei(gE) > e2 {gLP) > e2(gFS); and ei(gE) > ei(gFP) > e2(gFS) follows
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directly from simulation which is illustrated in figure 3.8.
Result (iv): Figure 3.9 shows four cases in which a link between the leader firm 
and a follower firm is added to the existing networks. Result (iv) that: (gFP) >
eg(gFS); e2 (gLP) > e%(gLS)] e2 (gFP) > ei(gc ). follows directly from simulation which 
is illustrated in figure 3.8.0
0  Q
0
Empty Network
Leader Star N etwork
Figure 3.4: Network architectures when the leader firm adds own links
First, we discuss the behaviour of a firm with respect to its R&D effort when it forms 
a new link. Results (i) and (iii) highlight the effect of competition effect of an R&D 
collaboration. These results show that a firm lowers its R&D effort when the number 
of competitors benefiting from its R&D effort increases.
Leader Partial Network
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Case (i)
© © 0  ©
©  ©
Empty Network Follower Partial Network
Leader Partial Network Follower Star Network
Leader S tar Network Complete Network
Figure 3.5: Network architectures from the leader firm’s viewpoint when follower firms add own finks
Second, we discuss the behaviour of firm i with respect to its R&D effort when two 
other firms form a link between them. Result (ii) and (iv) show that a firm reduces its 
R&D effort when two other firms form an R&D collaboration. Private spillover is the 
reason why the connected firm i decreases its R&D effort when two other firms form a 
new link. Figures 3.6 shows that e\(gLP) > ei(gFS)-, ei(gLS) > ei(gc ) for all (3 £ (0,1]. 
Figure 3.8 shows that ei(gFP) > es(gFS); e2 {gLP) > ei(gLSy, and e2{gFP) > ei(gc ) 
for all /3 G (0,1]. In all these inequalities, firm i always decreases its R&D effort for 
all yd £ (0,1] when two other firms form a link because firm i was already connected 
with one of the two other firms before the move. After the move, firms other than 
firm i lower their R&D efforts because of the dominance of competition effect over the 
efficiency effect. As a result, firm i enjoys less voluntary spillover from other firms. 
Therefore, firm i lowers its R&D effort to reduce its private R&D spillover to other 
firms.
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R&D efforts
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Figure 3.6: The leader firm ’s R&D efforts
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Figure 3.7: Network architectures when a follower firm adds own links
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Figure 3.8: Follower firms’ R&D efforts (Z G {2, 3})
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Figure 3.9: Network architectures from a follower firm ’s viewpoint when other firms add links
3 .5 .2  S ta b ility
In this sub-section, we consider stability properties of asymmetric networks. The analy­
sis yields the following result.
Pairw ise stab ility  
Define:
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Solu tions E q u a tio n s
/A % 0.41 TIT = 71-1(9 ^ )
-  0.55 T T l(^ )  =  T T i ( ^ )
Table 3.1: Solutions 3.1
Applying the definition of pairwise stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the 
result is as follows:
Proposition  3.6
TAe compWe network emerges endogenonsfi/ os pmrw&se sWZe rfpnWrc spz/Wer &s 
not /orge (r.e. /) < ^ 2  ^ wWe tke /o//ower porfW network emerges endogenons/g os 
gorrwrse sto6/e r/gn^/rc sgd/orer zs sn^zczent/g Zorge (^ z.e.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate the profits of 
firms. ■
Profits 
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Figure 3.10: The leader firm ’s profit 
First, consider the networks that are not pairwise stable. Intuitively, the incentive 
to collaborate of a follower firm is larger than the leader firm because its R&D effort is 
smaller than that of the leader firm so the competition effect of an R&D collaboration 
is smaller while the efficiency effect is larger. A follower firm always has an incentive to 
form links until it is fully connected. Therefore, the empty, the leader partial, and the
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leader star networks are never pairwise stable because both follower firms always have 
an incentive to collaborate with each other.
The follower star network is never pairwise stable because the spoke-follower firm 
always has an incentive to form a link with the leader firm while the leader firm has an 
incentive to either connect with the spoke-follower firm if public spillovers are not large 
or sever the link with the hub-follower firm if public spillovers are large. It is initially 
surprising that the leader firm in the follower star network may have an incentive to 
become an isolated firm in the follower partial network by severing its link with the 
hub-follower firm because an isolated firm is often in a disadvantage position in the 
network. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) found that an isolated firm always has 
the incentive to form a link with other firms. In addition, they found that the linked 
firms in the partial network may not want to connect with the isolated firm if public 
spillovers are sufficiently small in order to keep their advantage positions. In contrast, 
our results suggest that the leader firm may have incentive to keep being isolated if 
public spillovers are large.
Profits 
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Figure 3.11: Follower firm s’ profits (Z E {2,3})
The intuition behind our results stems from the large disparity between R&D effort
of the leader firm and that of a follower firm. When the link is formed between the 
leader firm and a follower firm, the follower firm lowers its R&D effort considerably 
because it enjoys the large R&D effort of the leader firm. However, the leader firm 
does not lower its R&D effort significantly because it enjoys small R&D effort of the 
follower firm. If public spillovers are not large, the spoke-leader firm in the follower- 
star network still has incentive to keep the link with the hub-follower firm because the 
efficiency effect of the link surpasses its competition effect. Without the link, the leader 
firm can only enjoy small amount of R&D efforts of other firms because public spillovers 
are small.
If public spillovers are sufficiently large, the leader firm has an incentive to sever 
the link with the hub-follower firm in the follower-star network and become isolated 
because of the following considerations. First, public spillover is a substitute for R&D 
collaborations because the leader firm can enjoy R&D efforts of follower firms without 
forming links. Second, if the leader firm forms a link with a follower firm in the follower 
partial network to create the follower star network instead of keeping being isolated in 
the follower partial network, the hub-follower firm will reduce its R&D effort consider­
ably because it enjoy large R&D efforts of the leader firm while the decrease in leader 
firm’s R&D effort is less than that of the hub-follower firm. This effect, in turn, leads to 
the decrease in the spoke-follower firm’s R&D effort. As a result, the spoke-leader firm 
enjoys little private spillover from the hub-follower firm and little public spillover from 
the spoke-follower firm. It turns out that the link is still beneficial to the hub-follower 
firm’s profit but is detrimental to the leader firm’s profit. Because of these consider­
ations, the leader firm prefers to be isolated in the follower partial network if public 
spillovers are large in order to maintain R&D efforts of follower firms higher and enjoy 
their R&D efforts through public spillovers.
Next, we consider the networks that are pairwise stable. The follower partial network 
is pairwise stable if public spillovers are sufficiently large for the two reasons have
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been mentioned above: First, the follower firms in the empty network always have 
incentive to form a link between them in order to limit the leader firm’s competitive 
strength. Second, if public spillovers are sufficiently large, the leader firm prefers to 
stay unconnected in the follower partial network.
The complete network is pairwise stable if public spillover is not large. If public 
spillovers are large, the leader firm in the complete network has an incentive to sever a 
link to form the follower star network because of the same reasons that keep it isolated in 
the follower partial network. If public spillovers are not large, no firm has the incentive 
to sever its existing links.
Our results are in contrast with the outcomes when there are no industry leaders 
(see Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001) where the complete network is always pairwise 
stable and the partial network is pairwise stable only if public spillovers are sufficiently 
small Contrary to them, we show that the complete network is no longer pairwise stable 
and the follower partial network is stable in the presence of the leader firm if public 
spillovers are sufficiently large. In other words, the presence of the leader destabilizes 
the complete network and creates the stability of the follower partial network. The 
reason why the partial network is pairwise stable in our framework is also in contrast 
with that of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) who found that the partial network is 
pairwise stable because linked firms have no incentive to establish R&D collaborative 
links with the isolated firm. Contrary to them, We find that the follower partial network 
is pairwise stable because the isolated leader firm has no incentive to form an R&D 
collaboration with the linked firms.
Strong stability
Applying the definition of strong stability by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005), 
the following result obtains.
Proposition 3.7
No R&D network emerges endogenously as the strongly stable network.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
The candidates for strongly stable networks must be the pairwise stable networks. 
The follower partial network is no longer stable if two actions can be made by a group 
of firms consisting the leader firm and a follower firm. First, a follower firm sever the 
link with the other one. Second, the leader firm and the follower firm that has severed 
the existing link form a new link between them to create the leader partial network. 
Both firms who created the new link to form the leader partial network are better off in 
terms of profits (see illustrations in figures 3.10 and 3.11). The reasons are as follows. 
On the one hand, forming a link with the leader firm in the empty network is always 
more beneficial to a follower firm than forming the link with the other follower firm. 
On the other hand, having one of the follower firms to sever its existing link and then 
form a new link with the leader firm is desirable to the leader firm in terms of profits 
because the leader firm can switch from the isolated position in a partial network to 
the linked position in another partial network. Consequently, the group of a follower 
firm and the leader firm has an incentive to alter the follower partial network to the 
leader partial network in which they are linked firms.
The complete network is not strongly stable because both firms in the coalition of 
a follower firm and the leader firm in the complete R&D network will be better off in 
terms of their profits if they sever their R&D collaborations with the remaining firm 
to create the leader partial network. Intuitively, the structure of the partial network 
allows two linked firms to have competitive advantage against the isolated firm. Song 
and Vannetelbosch (2007) found that the complete network is never strongly stable for 
the same reason.
When there is no strongly stable network, network architectures should be altered 
continuously because of deviations by groups of firms. We can observe sequences of net­
works. It is interesting to investigate how frequently a network structure is constructed 
in this sequence. To this end, we employ the definition of a closed cycle (see, e.g, Song
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and Vannetelbosch, 2007).
Definition 3.1
A network g is strongly defeated by g' if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) g* £  G is achievable from g £  G via deviations by S  C  N
(ii) TTi(g') ^  7Ti(g) for all i £ S  and nj(g ' )  > 7Tj(g) for some j  £ S.
The definition says that some firms in the coalition S  have strict incentives to make 
the deviation while other firms in S  are not worse off.
D efinition 3.2
An improving path form a network g to a network g1 is a finite sequence of graphs 
9i , 92,--,  9k with gi =  g and gk = g' such that for any h £ {1 ,2 ,...,A: -  1}, gh is 
strongly defeated by gh+i.
Definition 3.3
A set of networks G £ G is a closed cycle if for any g £ G and g' £ G, there exists 
an improving path connecting g to g’.
We observe several closed cycles of R&D networks. Figure 3.12 illustrates these 
closed cycles. In cycle 1, the leader partial network is always strongly defeated by the 
empty network. The empty network is always succeeded by the follower partial network. 
The follower partial network is always defeated by the leader partial network.
In cycle 2, the leader partial network is defeated by the leader star network if public 
spillovers are not large. The leader star network is always succeeded by the complete 
network. Finally, the complete network is always defeated by the leader partial network.
In cycle 3, the leader partial network is always defeated by the follower star network. 
The follower star network is succeeded by the complete network if public spillovers are 
not large. The leader partial network always defeats the complete network.
In cycle 4, the follower star network always defeats the leader partial network but it 
is succeeded by the follower partial network if spillovers are large. The leader partial
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network always defeats the follower partial network.
In an improving path, the complete network is defeated by the follower partial net­
work if public spillovers are sufficiently high. The follower partial network is always 
succeeded by the leader partial network. This improving path does not create a closed 
cycle because the leader partial network is defeated by the follower star or the leader 
star network if public spillovers are sufficiently low. In addition, the leader partial 
network is never defeated by the complete network.
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Figure 3.12: Closed cycles of networks
We can see that the leader partial network is visited most frequently because it 
presents in all closed cycles and even the improving path. The empty network is vis­
ited least frequently. Moreover, in any deviation where a collaborative link between 
the leader firm and a follower firm is severed, it is the leader firm who severs the link. 
As a result, we would expect to observe networks with links between the leader firm 
and follower firms. We note that follower firms want to collaborate with the leader 
firm because they can enjoy large R&D effort of the leader firm. Our result may be of 
empirical relevance in that we observe firms investing largely in R&D are the central
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nodes of R&D networks. Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) provide a list of some com­
panies that invest largely in R&D in 1995 including IBM, Intel, Microsoft. According 
to Cloodt. et.al (2006), these firms have the most number of R&D partnerships in 
computers in 1995-1999. Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) found that the companies 
that invest largely in R&D in pharmaceutical biotechnology such as Roche, SmithKline 
Beecham, and Pfizerare are the central nodes of R&D networks in this industry from 
1995 to 1999.
3.5 .3  A ggregate Perform ance
This section considers the performance of different network architectures in terms of 
consumer surplus CS, and total profits II.
Define:
Solutions E quations
^3 =  0.44 CS(gB) = CS(gFP)
^4 =  0.55 n(gLS) = Tl(gLP)
^5 =  0.74 n ( j i p ) =  n ( s B )
Table 3.2: Solutions 3.2
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 illustrates the consumer surplus and total profit associated 
with different networks expressed as the functions of public spillovers, respectively. We 
are ready to state the following results.
Consumer surplus
(i) Consumer surplus decreases with the level of collaborative activity except the 
move from the empty network to the follower partial network if public spillovers are 
not large (i.e. p < /93). In particular, CS(gE) > CS(gLP) > CS(gFS); CS(gLS) > 
CS(gc ); and CS(gFP) > CS(gFS). In addition, CS(gFP) > CS{gE) if /3 < /?3 and 
CS(gFP) < C S { g E) i î f } >
(ii) If two networks have the same degree of collaborative activity, the network in 
which the leader firm is poorly connected dominates the other in terms of consumer 
surplus. In particular, CS{gFP) > CS(gLP) and CS(gFS) > CS(gLS).
Total profits
(in) The complete network is dominated in terms of total profit for all level of public 
spillovers. The level of R&D collaborative activity that maximizes total profit decreases 
with public spillovers. Specifically, the leader star network maximizes total profit if 
spillovers are not very large (i.e. /3 < /34 ). The leader partial network is total profit- 
maximizing network if spillovers are neither small nor very large (i.e. /34 < (3 < d5 ), 
and the empty network maximizes total profit if spillovers are very large (i.e. (3 > f35 ).
(iv) In all total profit-maximizing networks, the leader firm is well-connected (i.e. it 
is the linked firm in the partial network or hub-firm in the star network).■
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Figure 3.13: Consumer surplus
We now provide some intuitions for the above results. The result (i) expresses the fact 
that R&D collaborations lower the total output. On the one hand, R&D collaborations 
have a positive effect on consumer surplus because they lower firms’ cost by voluntary 
spillovers and therefore increase total output. On the other hand, R&D collaborations 
have a negative effect on consumer surplus because firms decrease their R&D efforts 
when new links are formed. Intuitively, result (i) shows that the negative effect of 
decreases in firms’ R&D efforts when firms form R&D collaborative links outweighs the
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positive effect of lower costs of firms.
Next, we provide intuition for the result (ii). Because the leader firm invests more 
in R&D than follower firms, there are two negative effects on consumer surplus if the 
leader firm is well-connected. First, the leader firm’s marginal returns to R&D effort 
is smaller than that of follower firms. Therefore, the leader firm has more incentive 
to lower its R&D effort when it receives external sources of R&D effort (i.e. R&D 
spillovers) than follower firms. If the leader firm is well-connected, it will lower its 
R&D effort severely. Second, if the leader firm is well-connected, more follower firms 
can enjoy its R&D effort which is larger than that of follower firms. As a consequence, 
follower firms also have more incentive to lower their R&D efforts. It turns out that the 
two negative effects overcome the positive effect of sharing R&D knowledge, leading to 
smaller total output.
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Figure 3.14: Total profits
The intuition behind result (in) is as follows. On the one hand, denser networks 
cause greater sharing of knowledge. On the other hand, well-connected firms invest 
very little in R&D. As a result, the complete network is dominated in terms of total 
profit by the leader star network and the leader partial network for all values of public
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spillovers because the latter effect dominates the former one.
Public spillovers can be considered as a substitute for R&D collaborations. They 
also cause sharing of R&D knowledge but do not decrease R&D effort severely because 
firms still do not share R&D efforts completely like the case of R&D collaborations so 
they incur less competition. Consequently, the level of R&D collaborative activity that 
maximizes total profit decreases with public spillovers.
We now explain the reason behind result (iv). Result (ii) states that when the leader 
firm is well-connected, total output decreases as firms lower their R&D efforts. As a 
result, the lower total output leads to the increase in the total profit because of higher 
market price. Result (ii) and (iv) show that well-connected leader firm is good for total 
profit but is bad for consumer surplus.
3.5 .4  Efficiency
Define:
Solutions Equations
/?6 =  0.17 W{ g LP) =  W{ gFP)
^7 =  0.53 W( gFP) =  W( g E)
Table 3.3: Solutions 3.3
Figures 3.15 illustrates welfare levels of different networks. We have the following 
results.
Proposition 3.8
The leader partial network is efficient for all j3 E [0,/36], the follower partial network 
is efficient for all J3 E and the empty network is efficient for all (3 E [/37, 1].
Intuitively, when public spillovers increase, the degree of R&D collaboration of the ef­
ficient network decreases because of the same reason mentioned above: public spillovers 
can be considered as a substitute for R&D collaborations. Thus, the empty network 
dominates all others in terms of producer surplus and social welfare if public spillovers 
are sufficiently large. The complete network is dominated by all others in terms of
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producer surplus and social welfare if public spillovers are sufficiently large.
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Figure 3.15: Social welfare levels 
Taken together with the findings on stability properties of different networks, our 
results show that private incentives to establish R&D collaborations may be excessive 
from a social welfare point of view. In particular, the complete network is pairwise 
stable if public spillovers are not large but it is never efficient. In addition, the leader 
star network, in which the leader firm is well-connected, is almost always dominated by 
other networks apart from the complete network in terms of social welfare.
3.6 Conclusion
The chapter extended previous studies by investigating R&D collaboration networks 
with industry leaders. In this chapter, we have shown that the complete network is 
pairwise but is not strongly stable because a group of firms want to reduce the number 
of links among them. These results may be of empirical interest. In particular, although 
other factors such as changes in business environment and company culture would also 
be at work here, our result may help to explain the terminations as well as the rise and 
fall of R&D networks. In addition, we have found that industry leaders tend to be the 
central nodes of R&D networks. This result may help to explain why some industry
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leaders such as IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Roche, SmithKline Beecham, and Pfizerare have 
more links on average than other firms in the same industries. However, the leader 
star network, in which the leader firm is well-connected, performs badly from the social 
welfare viewpoint. In addition, the private incentives to establish R&D collaborations 
may be excessive from a social welfare viewpoint. These findings suggest that policy 
measures towards R&D networks should be carefully designed, taking in account all 
the features of the industry, such as public versus private spillovers, and the presence 
of industry leaders.
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Chapter 4 
Vertical R&D Networks
4.1 In troduction
R&D cooperations between vertically related firms take an important part of R&D 
partnerships (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Vertical R&D cooperation can take a 
variety of forms. Ishii (2004) studies three different types of vertical R&D cooperation: 
R&D cartel, research joint venture (RJV), and RJV cartel. A vertical R&D cartel is 
formed when an upstream firm and a downstream firm coordinate their R&D decisions 
without sharing the knowledge obtained. When a downstream firm and an upstream 
firm share only their technological know-how but they don’t coordinate in R&D, they 
form a vertical research joint venture. A vertical RJV cartel is established when both 
a downstream firm and an upstream firm decide the level of R&D efforts cooperatively 
and then fully share R&D knowledge.
The importance of vertical R&D collaborations between manufacturers and suppliers 
is reflected in many industries such as the electronic machinery (Suzuki, 1993); automo­
tive sector (Womack et ah, 1990; Liker et ah, 1996); aircraft, telecommunication, and 
biotechnology ( Imai 1989; Sydow 1992); electric appliances, consumer electronics and 
office equipment (Bidault et al., 1998). Manufacturers collaborate with suppliers in or­
der to do R&D process or to improve the quality of custom-tailored products. A survey 
by Harabi (1998) with data from 14 industries in Germany from 1991 to 1993 shows
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that 84% of innovating firms involved in R&D cooperations with their customers. In 
addition, the sharing of R&D knowledge is almost always in terms of non-equity forms. 
The number of RJVs only accounts for less than 20% of R&D cooperations.
Further evidence shows that there may be an exclusive relationship between an up­
stream firm and its respective downstream firm. This kind of relationship is a standard 
assumption in the literature and can happen in many different industries (Milliou and 
Petrakis, 2007).24 Switching cost is an important reason for the above exclusive relation­
ship (Milliou and Petrakis, 2007). Switching costs happen when the suppliers produce 
inputs tailored to match the specific needs of their downstream firms. They may even 
jointly carry out relationship-specific investments (see Symeonidis, 2008). These in­
vestments also prevent the pair of the upstream firm and its partner from breaking up. 
For instance, manufacturers often employ a strategy where only specific and complete 
components of a product can function correctly in a final good without any further 
and potentially prohibitive customization costs (see e.g. Ulrich, 1995; Schilling, 2000). 
In addition, downstream firms may have specific inter-organizational communication 
systems to communicate with those of particular upstream firms (Milliou and Petrakis, 
2007). As a result, trading with other upstream firms that use different communication 
systems is impeded (Milliou and Petrakis, 2007). That makes a firm’s costs of trading 
with other vertically related firms higher, and therefore creates the "lock-in" effects.
Motivated by the above empirical evidence, a formal model of vertical R&D networks 
is developed in this chapter in order to study the incentives of firms to set up vertical 
R&D relationships, the structures of R&D network that will emerge endogenously, and 
the efficiency of the resulting networks. A two-tier industry is explored. It is assumed 
that each tier consists of n ex-ante identical firms. Another assumption is an exclusive 
relationship between the upstream firm Ui and its respective downstream firm Di. In
24For example, the relationship occurs in automotive sector between car manufacturers and their suppliers as well as 
their distributors (Brenkers and Verb oven, 2006); in the petroleum industry, producers of petroleum often perform their 
dealings with gasoline distributors via exclusive contracts; exclusive relationships between food retailers and soft drinks 
producers (e.g. Coca-Cola), and between beer distributors with brewers (Lafontaine and Slade, 2008).
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particular, the downstream firm Di uses each unit of output of the upstream firm Ui to 
produce one unit of its own output. For simplicity, we assume that there are no public 
R&D spillovers between non-collaborating firms and we do not consider horizontal R&D 
collaborations between firms in the same industry. If an upstream firm collaborates with 
a downstream firm, the downstream firm enjoys private spillovers from the upstream 
firm (denoted as 9) and the upstream firm enjoys private spillovers from the downstream 
(denoted as J).
To study stability property of vertical R&D networks, the definitions of pairwise 
stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and strong stability by Jackson and van den 
Nouweland (2005) are employed. In addition, social welfare works as a measure of 
efficiency. In this chapter, R&D collaboration is the matter of "voluntary" spillovers. 
A vertical R&D collaboration in is a collaborative link between an upstream firm and a 
downstream firm to share technological know-how. We assume that there are no costs 
of forming these links
A four-stage game played by upstream and downstream firms is developed. The 
timing of moves is as follows. In the first stage, firms form vertical collaborations in 
order to share cost reducing R&D efforts. In the second stage, R&D efforts are chosen 
non-cooperatively and simultaneously by firms. In the third stage, each upstream firm 
chooses price to maximize its profit. Finally, the downstream firms compete in the 
market for a homogenous good by setting quantities.
There are different effects of a vertical R&D collaboration. If the upstream Ui 
and its downstream partner Di form the collaborative link, there is only the efficiency 
effect. Ui enjoys not only voluntary spillovers from Di but also the larger demand since 
Di becomes a tougher competitor to its downstream counterparts. Di benefits from 
voluntary spillovers and from the lower price of its input because voluntary spillovers 
from Di help to reduce the marginal cost of Ui and therefore reduce the price of its 
output. However, when Ui and D j  form a collaborative link, there are both competition
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and efficiency effects. On the one hand, voluntary spillovers from D j  benefit Ui and 
help to reduce its marginal cost. On the other hand, voluntary spillovers from Ui to 
D j  make D j  more aggressive and it may harm the downstream partner Di, leading to 
the decrease in the demand of Ui. The same effects occur to Dj.  On the one hand, D j  
enjoys voluntary spillovers from Ui. On the other hand, voluntary spillovers from D j  to 
Ui can reduce the marginal cost of Ui, and therefore the output’s price of Ui. The latter 
effect benefits Di by reducing its marginal cost since price of U^s output is a part of 
D i ’s marginal cost. As a result, Di  becomes a tougher competitor to D j.  In our model, 
the upstream firms do not compete directly against each other in the upstream market. 
However, they still incur competition effect from the downstream market because the 
competitive strength of a downstream firm decides the demand of its upstream partner. 
To put it slightly different, the upstream firms compete against each other indirectly 
through their downstream customers.
The magnitude of efficiency and competition effects of an R&D collaboration on 
each firm’s profit depends on voluntary spillovers that a downstream firm enjoys from 
an upstream firm and spillovers that an upstream firm enjoys from a downstream firm. 
The spillovers 6 and 5 can differ for many factors such as differences in the portion of 
the knowledge created by the downstream firms which is useful to the upstream firms 
and that of knowledge created by the upstream firms which is useful for the downstream 
firms; different absorptive capacities between suppliers and customers; and differences 
in the efficiency of communication channels. The survey by Harabi (1998) with data 
from 14 industries in Germany in the years 1991 - 1993 shows that the importance 
of voluntary R&D spillovers that a firm can enjoy from its customers or its suppliers 
varies across these industries. The survey shows that voluntary R&D spillovers that a 
customer in an industry enjoys from its supplier in the other industry are different from 
voluntary R&D spillovers that the supplier enjoys from the customer.
We find that the complete network where all vertical links are formed is pairwise
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stable as well as strongly stable if the difference between 6 and 5 is not large. However, 
when the difference between 6 and Ô is sufficiently large, the parallel network, in which 
each upstream firm Ui and its downstream partner Di form the vertical link and there 
is no link between Ui and D j ,  is uniquely pairwise stable.
Next, we assert that the complete network is the only efficient one for all value of ô 
and 6. Together with the above result in stability, these results suggest that the pri­
vate incentives to form vertical R&D links may not be adequate from a social welfare 
point of view. This result is in contrast with the outcomes of the context of horizontal 
R&D networks within one tier industry (see Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001) where 
the private incentives to form horizontal R&D collaborations are ambiguously exces­
sive from a social welfare point of view. Intuitively, our result is driven by the double 
marginalization effect that is absent within the context of one-tier industry. The re­
sult shows that vertical R&D collaborations mitigate the negative effect of the double 
marginalization on social welfare.
This chapter is structured as follows. The literature on vertical R&D network is 
discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 examines the stability 
and efficiency properties of symmetric networks. Section 5 investigates the stability 
and efficiency properties of asymmetric networks. Section 6 presents discussion and 
extensions. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 R elated literature
This chapter is a contribution to the growing literature on R&D network (see, e.g., 
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Deroian and Gannon, 2006; 
Mauleon et. al., 2008; Goyal, Konovalov and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2008; Zikos, 2010)25. 
This literature deals with R&D networks of horizontally related firms in the context 
of a one-tier industry. Recently, the work of Kesavayuth and Zikos (2012) extends the
25For more details on these articles see section 2.4.3 of chapter 2.
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literature by casting the analysis in the context of a two-tier industry and by allowing 
both downstream and upstream firms to form horizontal R&D networks. However, 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2012) still investigate horizontal R&D collaborations between 
firms in each tier. In contrast, this chapter studies vertical R&D collaborations between 
vertically related firms, i.e., upstream and downstream firms, so it should be seen as 
complementary to the above works. Perhaps the main contribution of our chapter 
to this literature is the finding that the individual incentives to form vertical R&D 
networks may not be adequate from a social welfare point of view because of the double 
marginalization effect that is not taken into account within the context of one-tier 
industries.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on R&D cooperation between verti­
cally related firms in oligopoly (see, e.g., Banerjee and Lin, 2001; Atallah, 2002; Ishii, 
2004). The approach of this chapter is different from the above literature in several im­
portant ways. First, the literature considers vertical R&D cartel or RJV cartel where 
firms join R&D efforts to maximize the joint profits when they cooperate in R&D. 
In contrast, firms in R&D networks choose R&D efforts non-cooperatively and then 
communicate their results through voluntary spillovers. Second, firms also choose R&D 
efforts non-cooperatively in a RJV but an R&D network is different from a RJV in 
that R&D relationship between firms is intransitive in an R&D network but transitive 
in a RJV. In other words, the network approach allows a firm to form a new R&D 
collaboration without the need of consent from its existing partners. In a RJV, a firm 
needs consent from its existing partners to form a new R&D partnership.
Banerjee and Lin (2001) investigate the motivations of firms to collaborate in vertical 
RJVs. They start by setting up a model of an upstream firm monopoly who supplies 
inputs to an oligopoly consisting of n downstream firms. The basic model is then 
generalized to the case of an upstream oligopoly including m  upstream firms where 
only one upstream firm has the opportunity to do R&D. Banerjee and Lin (2001) show
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that the results of the basic model hold for this case. The reduction in the price of 
upstream firm’s output is beneficial to downstream firms so the upstream firm may 
invite the downstream firms to share the R&D costs. Two scenarios are considered. 
In the proportional cost sharing, the cost of doing R&D are shared based on the ratio 
of a firm’s added profit when it join the RJV over the whole increment in all firms’ 
profit. In the fixed fraction cost sharing, the upstream firm spends a fixed ratio of the 
R&D cost and the rest is shared equally among all downstream firms. It is assumed 
that the upstream firm can discriminate the prices of its outputs between the members 
of the RJV and non-member firms. The downstream members of RJV enjoy a lower 
price of input due to the new technology while non-member firms continue to buy 
products produced by the old technology. Under both scenarios, the authors found 
that the optimal size of RJV is larger under the upstream firm’s viewpoint than that 
of the the downstream members. Intuitively, downstream members want to keep their 
competitive advantage against non-member rivals while the upstream firm benefits when 
it can serve more downstream firms with the new technology. The next result concerns 
social welfare. Since social welfare increases with the number of members in the RJV, 
it is better to social welfare if the upstream firm has the right to decide the size of the 
RJV. In addition, R&D subsidy increases social welfare if it goes to the upstream firm 
but decreases social welfare if it goes to the downstream firms.
Atallah (2002) investigates how vertical as well as horizontal involuntary spillovers 
affect R&D investment and social welfare. Four R&D cooperation types are consid­
ered in two vertically related duopolies: non-cooperative R&D, horizontal R&D cartel, 
vertical R&D cartels, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical R&D cartel. Under 
non-cooperative R&D, firms decide their level of R&D efforts non-cooperatively. Under 
simultaneous horizontal and vertical R&D cartel, each firm chooses its own R&D effort 
to maximize the joint profits of all four firms. Firms are in a three stage game. In 
stage one, firms choose R&D efforts simultaneously. In stage two, the upstream firms
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compete in the upstream market to decide quantities. In stage three, downstream firms 
compete in the same fashion in the downstream market. Atallah found that vertical 
spillovers always increase R&D effort as well as social welfare while horizontal spillovers 
may increase or decrease them. In addition, R&D effort under a cooperation mode is 
not dominated by any other modes. R&D effort in a type of cooperation may be larger 
or smaller than that of other type depending on horizontal and vertical spillovers.
Ishii (2004) also studies a same framework as Atallah (2002). However, he compares 
R&D efforts, joint profits and social welfares of different modes of R&D cooperation: 
non-cooperative R&D, horizontal R&D cartels, vertical R&D cartels, vertical RJVs, and 
vertical RJV cartels. The differences of Ishii (2004) compared with Atallah (2002) are as 
follows. Firstly, Ishii (2004) allows for the differences between horizontal spillovers in the 
upstream market and the downstream market, and between two-way vertical spillover 
rates (i.e. spillovers that an upstream enjoys from a downstream firm and spillovers that 
a downstream firm enjoys from an upstream firm). Secondly, Ishii (2004) undertakes 
social welfare comparisons between different R&D cooperation modes including vertical 
RJVs. The author found that vertical R&D cartel yields more R&D effort and social 
welfare than non-cooperative R&D. Intuitively, when each firm cares about its own 
profit, it chooses a lower R&D effort than the case where an upstream firm and a 
downstream firm take into account each other’s profit because firms can exploit the 
positive externalities of vertical spillovers in the latter case. The second result states 
that social welfare is higher when firms create vertical R&D cartels than horizontal R&D 
cartels if horizontal spillovers between upstream firms are not very high. Intuitively, 
vertical R&D cartels reduce inefficiency from underproduction and underinvestment 
because total effective R&D under vertical R&D cartels is larger than that of horizontal 
R&D cartels if horizontal spillovers between upstream firms are not very high. However, 
when horizontal spillovers between upstream firms are very high, the increase in R&D 
effort of an upstream firm in vertical R&D cartels also benefits its upstream rival.
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This free-riding effect leads to lower R&D efforts, and therefore the inefficiency from 
underinvestment. Next, the author found that vertical RJV cartels yield the highest 
R&D effort and social welfare but they do not necessarily achieve the highest total 
profit of all firms due to overinvest in R&D from the producer surplus viewpoint.
4.3 The m odel
We investigate a two-tier industry. There are n  initially identical firms in each tier (n >  
2). All n  downstream firms produce a homogenous final good. Let U =  {Vi, L2, Un } 
be the set of the upstream firms and D  = {Di, D2, ..., Dn} be the set of downstream 
firms. N  = { U , D }  is the set of all firms. The downstream firm Di  uses one unit of 
output of the upstream firm Ui to produce one unit of the final good.
As mentioned above, the interaction between firms is described as a four stage game. 
This multi-stage game is solved by backward induction. Subgame perfect Nash equi­
libria of stages two to four are obtained. Finally, we solve stage one by applying the 
notions of pairwise and strong stability.
Networks o f collaboration
Let g denote the network of collaboration. We will not consider horizontal collabo­
rations in the upstream or downstream market. The link between Ui and D j  under the 
network g is represented by i j  e g .  The link between Ui and its downstream partner Di  
under the network g is represented by ii G g. Denote g +  i j  (or g +  ii) as the network 
obtained when Ui and D j  (or Di)  add a new link between them to the existing network 
g. Similarly, g — ij  (or g — ii) denotes the network obtained when Ui or D j  (or Di)  
in g deletes the link between them. Define Ni{g)  as the set of firms that are directly 
connected to Ui. Similarly, Mi(g)  is the set of firms that are directly connected to Di.  
G  is the set of all possible networks.
R&D effort levels and spillovers
Firms invest in process R&D. We denote the R&D effort of Ui as Xi and the R&D
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effort of Di as e*. R&D cost26 of Di is given by Z(e^) =  7 e2 and R&D cost of Ui is 
given by 7 a;2. We assume that 7  is sufficiently large to ensure the concavity of the 
profit functions and to guarantee that all equilibrium variables are non-negative. 7  > 0 
denotes the efficiency of the R&D technology.
In our chapter, we assume that there are no spillovers between non-connected firms27. 
If an upstream firm has a vertical link with a downstream firm, the voluntary spillovers 
- the level of voluntary information sharing - that the downstream firm enjoys from the 
upstream firm are 6 G [0 ,1] and that the upstream firm enjoys from the downstream 
firm are 5 G [0,1]. Denote Ei as the effective R&D efforts of D%, and X% as the effective 
R&D efforts of Ui. Specifications for Ei and Xi are as follows:
Upstream firms: Xi = X(+
k e N i ( g )
Downstream firms: Ei = ei+  Oxj,
k e M i ( g )
M arginal cost
In this chapter, we concentrate on the role of R&D collaborations as a way to reduce 
variable costs of production. Therefore, the assumption of a zero fixed cost is adopted 
to make the math easier. In addition, fixed costs are sunk costs so they do not affect 
output decisions28.
The downstream firm transforms the intermediate good into the final good via a one 
to one technology. Let pi be the unit price of the upstream firm UJs output. The cost 
function of Ui and Di in g when Di produces the quantity of good %.
Upstream firms: Hi =  =  (d — Xi)qi, i G { 1 , 2 , ..., n}, d>  0
Downstream firms: Q  =  =  (c +  p* -  Ei)qi, i G {1,2,..., n}, c > 0
26 This specification is introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998).
27For more details on these spillovers, see chapter 2.
28The assumption of a zero fixed cost also allows us to place the approach of this chapter in perspective with regard 
to the previous literature on R&D networks (see, e.g., Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Zikos, 
2010 ).
107
Payoffs
We assume that the demand function of the downstream market is linear and the
n
inverse demand function is p(Q) = a — Q; where Q = and 0 < Q < a. Q is the 
total demand for downstream homogenous good market. To ensure that all equilibrium 
variables are non-negative, we need the assumption that a > c +  d, c > 0 , and d>  0 . 
The profit of A  is:
7Ti = ( a -  Q)qi - C i ~  qe? where i G {1,2,..., n}
The profit of A  is:
Vi =  PiQi -  H i -  where i E {1,2, ...,n}
Stability and efficiency
Definitions of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and of 
strong stability by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) are adapted to study the 
stability properties of vertical R&D network29.
Social welfare is used as a measure of efficiency of the vertical R&D networks. Denote 
consumer surplus as CS) and producer surplus as PS, social welfare under the network 
structure g is given by:
n 2 n  n
w =  y  +  +
C S  "---------------   '
P S
We say that a network g E G is efficient if it is not dominated in terms of social 
welfare by any other network; that is if W{g) > W(g') for all g' E G.
4.4 Sym m etric networks
In this part, we consider symmetric networks in which every firm has the same number 
of links. For simplicity, we assume that 6 = 1 and J =  1. We consider two network
29 See part 2.4.3 of chapter 2 for these definitions.
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structures. First, the network glk in which every Ui has an R&D link with Di and k 
vertical links with k other downstream firms. Second, the network in which every 
Ui has no R&D link with Di and k vertical links with k other downstream firms. We 
present here the network glk. The network is presented in the Appendix.
In the last stage of the game, the output of Di at equilibrium is as follow:
Qi =
a — Cj (1 +  n) +  y i Cj
________________3 = 1
n +  1
Plugging the above expression of output into 7r% and rjf
(  n \  2a — c^(l +  n) +  ^ 2 cj
3 = 1tt,: n +  1
O
(4.1)
(4.2)
(jPi — di)[a — Ci(n +  1) +  X) cj]
3 = 1  2rk = ----------------------  Jxi
In the third stage, the unit price of output of Ui at equilibrium is as follow:
(4.3)
Pi =
a +  (c — S j ) +  din — (c — Ei){n +  1) +  
3 = 1
2n
From (4.4), we achieve the following result:
Y j p j  =
3¥*
n  n
n {a +Y2 dj) — X) (c — Ej) — (n +  l)pi 
3 = 1  3 = 1
n +  1
Plugging (4.5) into (4.4) and solve for pg.
(4.4)
(4.5)
Pi
a(l +  2 n) — (c — Ei)(l +  n) +  ^ [X  (c Ej) +  df(n +  1) +  X dj]
3 = 1  3 = 1 (4.6)1 +  3n +  2n2
Substituting the above price pi into (4.2), (4.3). Invoking symmetry between upstream
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firms as well as downstream firms to solve the second stage30:
, (a -  c -  cQre2[2ra2 — (k — 2 )n +  2]
' (9k) (1 +  2n)B\ ( J
T ( J )  _  (a ~ c ~ d)n (n +  l)[2ra2 -  (* -  2)n +  2]
“  (1 +  2n)B! (4"8)
Using the same step to solve the network the equilibrium R&D efforts of firms under
the network are as follows.
« < » )  -  ( « >
_  (a -  c -  d)n(l +  n)[n{n +  1 — fc) +  1] 
a : ! W “  (1 +  2n)B2 (4'10)
We consider R&D efforts of upstream and downstream firms when they form R&D
collaboration. The following results obtain:
4.4.1 R & D  efforts
P roposition  4.1
A firm ’s R&D effort:
(i) Increases with the change from the network to the network glk.
(ii) Decreases with the degree of collaboration k in g^.
Proof:
First, we prove result (i) by showing that:
«(si) -  «(*) -  T îT S ia â 1 > " t41I)
w . )  -  « m ^ -o ( « y
Where:
B i=2n(l+n2) (27-2-k)+7 +n47 +n2 (67+k2-4).
30In the network all second order conditions (SOCs) are satisfied if 7 >  ’
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B2=n47 +n(47-k-1 ) (n2+1 ) + 7 + 112 (67+k2-1 ).
Fi=n[2+2n(2+3n+2n2+n3)-kn(3+3n-kn+3n2)]+ 7(l+ 5n+ lln2+14n3+ l ln 4+5n5+n6).
It is easy to see that the numerators of e* (g^) and ei (glk) are positive so B\ and B2 
must be positive. Therefore, the signs of e ; ^ )  — e^(^) and Xi (glk) — Xi (gk) depend on 
Fi.
Rewrite B\:
B1= 2n(n7-k) +k2 n2 + 7 + 4n(7 -1 ) (n2+ n+ 1 ) +n3 (n7 -2k).
We can see that if 7  ^  2 then Bi > 0 and B2 > 0. Therefore, we shall assume that 
7 ^ 2 , which suffices to ensure the non-negativity of variables. In addition, F\ increases 
with 7  so if Bi > 0 for 7  =  2 then i7! > 0 for 7  ^  2. Plugging 7  — 2 into Bf:
Fi=2+12n+26n2-3kn2+34n3-3kn3 +k2 n3+26n4-3kn4+12n5+2n6 > 0.
Second, we prove result (ii) by showing that:
ei(9k) -  ei(9k+l) =  +  >  °  (4'13)
Xi{9k) ~  æi(9fc+l) =  - (1 +  2)re)B 2B 3 ) 2 >  0 (4-14)
Where:
Bg=n(n2+1 ) (47-k-2) + 7 +n47 +n2 (67+k2+2k).
F2 =- l-n+2kn-2n2 +kn2-k2 n2-n3+2kn3-n4+( 1+4n+6n2+4n3+n4 ) 7 .
We shall show that F2 > 0 for all 7  ^  2. It is easy to see that F2 increases with 7 . 
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that +2 > 0 for 7  =  2 .
If 7  — 2 then F2= l+ 7n+ 2kn+10n2+kn2-k2n2+ 7n3+ 2kn3+n4> 0 .B
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Results (i) states that when Ui and D{ create the collaborative link between each 
other, both of them find it particularly appealing to increase their R&D efforts. In­
tuitively, when Ui and its downstream partner Di form the collaborative link, there is 
only the efficiency effect. Both firms benefit from voluntary spillovers. Ui can reduce 
its marginal cost, and therefore its output’s price. D{ can reduce its marginal cost 
because of lower input price as well as voluntary spillovers from Ui. This effect makes 
Di a tougher competitor in the downstream market, increases its output, and therefore 
extends the demand of Ui. As a result, both firms have the incentive to invest more 
in R&D because a larger output makes further increases in R&D effort more profitable 
since the decrease in marginal cost will spread across more units of output. Moreover, 
there is no competition effect of this collaboration. Result (i) reflects the presence of 
efficiency effect of the R&D collaboration between Ui and Di in the absence of the 
competition effect.
Result (ii) says that both Ui and Di find it desirable to decrease their R&D effort 
when the degree of collaboration k increases in the network This result highlights 
the competition effect of the link. When k increases, each Ui has more links with D j. 
A link between Ui and D j yields both efficiency and competition effects on the profits 
of R&D partners. On the one hand, a firm can enjoy voluntary spillovers from the 
link. On the other hand, voluntary spillovers of the firm also flow along the link to its 
R&D partner, and therefore make the partner more aggressive. It turns out that the 
latter effect dominates the former one, leading to the decrease in R&D efforts of R&D 
partners as is denser.
4.4 .2  S tab ility
In this sub-section, we consider stability properties of symmetric networks. The analysis 
yields the following result.
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Proposition 4.2
I f  0 = S = 1 , the complete network gln_i is pairwise stable while the empty network
go and the parallel network gl0 are not pairwise stable.
I f  (0 =  1, 5 =  0) or (0 = 0, 6  = 1), the parallel network is pairwise stable while the 
complete network and the empty network are not pairwise stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, the empty network is never stable because each pair of Ui and Di has 
the incentive to form the R&D collaboration between them. The reason is that the link 
has efficiency effect on their profits in the absence of competition effect. Proposition
4.2 also says that the complete network is pairwise stable ii 6 = 5 = 1. It turns out 
that no pair of firms in the complete network want to sever its vertical collaboration. 
The result suggests that the incentives of firms to form vertical R&D collaborations are 
quite large ii 6 = S.
We have assumed that 6 = 0 = 1 .  However, empirical studies31 suggest that 6 
should be different from S. Therefore, it is very intuitive to consider two other cases: 
(z) : (0 =  1, 5 =  0) and (ii) : (0 =  0, 5 =  1). In the two cases, an R&D collaboration 
only benefits one R&D partner in terms of voluntary R&D spillovers. The other R&D 
partner enjoys no voluntary spillover from the link. When a pair of firms Ui and Di 
forms an R&D collaboration between them, they enjoy extra benefits apart from R&D 
spillovers. Even if Di enjoys no voluntary spillovers from the link, its R&D efforts 
benefit Ui and lead to the decrease in the output’s price of Ui. Therefore, the marginal 
cost of Di also decreases. Even though Ui enjoys no voluntary spillovers from the link 
with D i, its R&D efforts benefit Di and lead to the decrease in the marginal cost of 
D i, and hence, make Di a tougher competitor in the downstream market. As a result, 
the R&D collaboration increases the demand for the output of Ui. However, in the 
two cases, a link between Ui and D j has no benefit to the partner which enjoys no
31 See., e.g. Harabi (1998).
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voluntary spillovers. In addition, it brings harm to this partner’s profit. As a result, 
no link between Ui and D j is formed or the existing links between Ui and D j  will be 
severed.
4.4 .3  A ggregate perform ance
We now investigate the aggregate performance of symmetric networks. Given the com­
plexity of computations involved, we have been unable to obtain a general characteri­
zation of efficient networks. Because the results in part 4.4.2 suggest that firms always 
have incentives to form all vertical links between Ui and D i, we will focus on the network 
glk. The following results obtain.
Proposition 4.3
In the network glk, both the total profits of firms and the consumer surplus increase 
with the degree of collaboration k.
Proof:
Proposition 4.3 holds for all three cases: (z) : (0 =  1, £ =  0); (ii) : ( 6 = 0,6 = 1) and 
(Hi) : 0 = 5 = 1. We present here the case (Hi) : 0 = S = 1 . Proofs of the two others 
are in the Appendix. We prove first that consumer surplus increases with the degree of 
collaboration k in the network glk by showing that Q (^ ) increases with k.
0 (n{\ = ____________ (a — c — d)n2(l +  n)2j ____________
n(n2 +  1)(47 — 2& — 4) +  7  +  n4y +  n2 (k2 +  67  — 4)
Denote B 4  as the denominator of Q(glk). Because the numerator of Q(glk) is a positive 
constant with respect to k, we shall prove that consumer surplus increases with k by 
showing that B 4  decreases with k. The following result shows that B 4  decreases with 
k.
=  —2n(l — &n +  n2) < 0 (4.16)
Next, we prove that total profit of firms increases with k by showing that the derivative
114
of PSi{glk) with respect to k is positive. Where: PSi(glk) = 'Ki{gk) +
(1 +  2TZ)2 (Bs)
(4.17)
(4.18)
F3=n4(4 l 7 -k2+ 4k-12)+ 4n6 (7-1 ) + 7 + 8n7 + 4n5 (57+k-2) +4n3 ( 1 l 7 +k-2) +n2 (267-4).
F4=n3 (257-k2+4k-12)+4n5 (7 -I )+ 7 + 4n4 (47 -(-k-2)+n(77-4)+n2 ( 197+4k-8).
B5= 2n(27-k-2)+ 2n3(27-k-2) + 7 +n47 +n2 (67+k2-4).
dPSi(gk) _  [a — c —
~  f l  4 -(l +  2yi)2(B6)3 (4.19)
The derivatives of F5 and Bq with respect to 7  are:
^ = ( l + n ) 4(2+14n-2kn+32n2-13kn2+38n3-26kn3+32n4-18kn4+20n5)>0
^ ^ = l+ 4 n + 6 n 2+4n3+n4>0.
Because 7  ^  2, it is sufficient to show that +5 > 0 and Bg > 0 if 7  =  2 . Plugging 
7  — 2 into B5 and B q.
F5>-2kn-15kn2-66kn3+334n4-3k2n3-154kn4+390n5-9k2n4-210kn5+340n6-15k2n5-159kn6+210n7-
12k2n6-62kn7+80n8-6k2n7-6kn8+12n9>0.
Bg—2+4n-2kn+8n2 +k2 n2+4n3-2kn3+ 2n4 > 0.
Proposition 4.3 is in contrast with the outcome of the context of horizontal R&D 
networks within one tier industry (see Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001) where an 
intermediate degree of collaboration maximizes total profit of firms. Intuitively, our 
result is driven by the double marginalization effect that is absent within the context 
of one-tier industry. The result shows that vertical R&D collaborations mitigate the
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negative effect of the double marginalization on social welfare.Since social welfare is 
the sum of total profit and consumer surplus, the above analyses allow us to state the 
following proposition.
4.4 .4  Efficiency
Proposition 4.4
Social welfare increases with k in glk. The complete network is the unique efficient 
network within the class of networks glk.
Taken together with the results on stability properties of different networks, our re­
sults show that private incentives to form vertical R&D collaborations are not adequate 
from a social welfare point of view in the two cases: (z) : (0 =  1, Æ =  0) and {ii) : ( 
0 =  0, (Ü =  1). In particular, the network gl0 is pairwise stable while the network 
is not pairwise stable. While the network gl0 yields the smallest values of total profit, 
consumer surplus and social welfare, the complete network ^ _ 1 obtains the highest 
values within the class of network glk.
In the next part of the chapter, we consider a framework, in which there are two up­
stream and two downstream firms. This simple setting allows us to explore asymmetric 
networks.
4.5 A sym m etric networks w ith  voluntary spillovers
In this part, voluntary spillovers are assumed to vary. In particular, 5 G [0,1] and 
9 E [0,1]. By calculation, We find that when 7  ^  2 , profit functions are concave and all 
variable are non-negative for all 6 and 6 E [0,1]. For simplicity, we assume that 7  =  2 .
There are sixteen possible architectures of network. Due to the assumption that the 
cost functions of the two firms in each tier of the industry are ex-ante identical, ten 
network structures will emerge with different qualitative results. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
these networks. Firms are denoted as nodes and a link represents an R&D partnership.
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Figure 4.1: Different network structures 
From this part, for a variable %, where z G {e, æ, tt, rj, g}, we adopt the following 
notations throughout to denote variables at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: 
Z i ( g e ) denotes firm i in the empty network
Zi (gc) denotes firm i in the complete network
Zi(g^) denotes firm i in the pattern j  network
4.5.1 R & D  efforts
P roposition  4.5
R& D  efforts of the upstream firm Ui and the downstream firm D f.
(i) Increase whenever they form the collaborative link between each other
(ii) Decrease when Uj and D j form the collaborative link between each other and 
there are no links between Ui and D j or Uj and D i.
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Figure 4.2: Network architectures when Ui and Di form a link
Proof: See the Appendix.
Result (i) reflects the presence of efficiency effect of the link in the absence of com­
petition effect. It is in line with result (i) of proposition 4.1. Result (ii) says that both 
Ui and Di have the incentive to reduce their R&D effort when Uj and D j set up the 
collaborative link between each other in the moves from the empty network (ge) to the 
pattern 1 network (g1) and then to the pattern 3 network (gs). The intuition behind 
this result is that when the link is formed, D j becomes a tougher competitor to D i and 
therefore leads to decrease in the output of D i. This, in turn, lower the output of U{. 
A lower output makes farther increase in R&D effort more costly, and therefore creates 
an incentive to lower R&D effort.
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Figure 4.3: Network architectures when Ui and D j form a link
4.5 .2  S tab ility
In this sub-section, we consider stability properties of asymmetric networks. The analy­
sis yields the following result.
Pairw ise stab ility  
P roposition  4.6
In the parameter space (5^9),the following vertical networks emerge endogenously 
as pairwise stable:
(i) g3 when the difference between 6 and 5 is sufficiently large
(ii) gc when the difference between 6 and 8 is not large.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 4.4 reflects the pairwise stability structure of vertical R&D networks in the
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current setting. In figure 4.4, the Ci; C2 ; C3 ; and C4 curves are the set of (4,6 ) 
values that solve the equations 7î i (g7) = 7Ti(gc), 7T2(g7) =  7T2(g3), =  ^i(^3) and
r/2 (g7) =  V2(9c) respectively. is pairwise stable for all the values of (4, 9) in the region 
to the left of the curve C3 or below the curve C2 . The complete vertical network gc 
emerges as pairwise stable in the region between the curves C\ and the curve C4 . It is 
interesting that both gc and g3 are pairwise stable for the set of (4,9) values between 
the curves C\ and C2 or between the curves C3 and Cfi.
Proposition 4.6 shows that, apart from the two types of network g3 and gc, at least a 
pair of an upstream firm and a downstream firm has an incentive to set up a new vertical 
collaboration in all other network structures. We note that at least one collaborative 
link between Ui and Di is absent in all other network structures. Because both Ui and 
Di have incentive to set up the link, these network structures are vulnerable.
e
0.2
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 o.s 1.0
Figure 4.4: Pairwise stable industry  structures
Consider now part (i) of the proposition. Note that Ui has no incentive to set up
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the link with D j for the set of (5,6 ) values in the area above the curve C3. Intuitively, 
when spillovers 5 that the upstream firm enjoys from the downstream is sufficiently 
smaller than spillovers 6 that the downstream firm enjoys from the upstream firm, 
the gain of Ui from both indirect and direct efficiency effect is dominated by the loss 
from competition effect caused by spillovers that D j enjoys from Ui which makes D j a 
tougher competitor for D i. In contrast, when 6 is sufficiently smaller than 5, D j loses 
the incentive to collaborate with U{. This is shown by the area under the curve Cg. In 
this case, the competition effect of the link on the profit of D j exceeds the efficiency 
effect.
Part (ii) of the proposition reflects the area between the curves C\ and C4. First, 
in the area between the curves Cg and C3, both Ui and D j in the network g3 have the 
incentives to form the collaborative link with each other to become the network g1. 
Second, in the area between the curves Ci and C4, both Uj and D{ have the incentive 
to form the link between them in the network g7 to establish the network g°.
Strong stab ility
P roposition  4.7
In the parameter space (5 ,6), the complete network is the unique strongly stable 
network if the difference between 6 and 6 is not large.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In particular, the network g° is the unique strongly stable network for all the values 
of (6 , 0 ) in the region between the curves C\ and C4. Otherwise, no network is strongly 
stable. Intuitively, the competition effect in g3 is similar to gc due to the symmetry 
of both networks. In gc, both downstream firms are tougher competitors than in g3. 
However, in gc, all firms are enjoying higher level of efficiency effect. The deviation 
from the network g3 to the network g7 may make some firms worse off because they 
face the disadvantage from competition effect due to asymmetry. In contrast, all firms 
are better off if they deviate from the network g3 to gc.
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Figure 4.5: Strongly stable industry structures
4.5 .3  A ggregate perform ance
We now investigate the aggregate performance of different vertical network structures. 
We find that consumer surplus (denoted as CS) increases whenever a new link is formed 
in the existing network. In addition, total profit of firms (denoted as PS) also exposes 
the same behaviour as consumer surplus. Intuitively, these results are driven by the 
double marginalization effect that has been mentioned in the symmetric networks.
Proof: See the Appendix. Figure 4.6 shows network structures whenever a new link 
is added to an existing network.
From the above results on consumer surplus and total profit, we are ready to state 
the following proposition.
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4 .5 .4  Efficiency  
P roposition  4.8
Social welfare increases whenever a new link is added to the existing network. The 
unique social welfare-maximizing network is the complete network for all values of 
voluntary spillovers.
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Figure 4.6: Network structures when a new link is added
Taken together with propositions 4.6 and 4.7 on stability properties of different 
networks, our results show that social and private incentives to form collaborative links 
are not always aligned. The complete network is pairwise and strongly stable as well 
as efficient if the difference between 6 and 5 is not large. gc is efficient for all spillover 
parameters while it is not stable when the difference between 0 and 5 is sufficiently
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large. Therefore, for all values of (Ô, 6 ) above the curve Ci or below the curve C4 in the 
figure 4.5, the private incentives to form vertical R&D network are not adequate from 
a social welfare perspective.
The above results suggest some potential policy implications. In particular, when 
the difference between 6 and 5 is sufficiently large, public policies such as subsidization 
of administration and cooperation costs may be implemented in order to enhance the 
formation of R&D collaborations.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we adopt an assumption in our model that the upstream firms have 
all bargaining power to determine the prices of their outputs. However, in reality, 
upstream and downstream firms often negotiate over these prices. Therefore, it is 
interesting to explore the role of bargaining power distribution on vertical R&D network 
formation. If the bargaining power shifts towards the downstream firms, the prices of 
inputs are naturally lower. In every case, the links between every pair of Ui and Di 
are formed because there is no competition effect of the link. In the extreme case that 
the downstream firms possess all the bargaining power, the upstream firms earn zero 
profits because their outputs are sold at cost. It implies that the upstream firm Ui is 
indifferent whenever it forms a new link. Because D j and Di are better off if they form 
the link with Ui, links between Ui and every downstream firm are formed. Therefore, 
the complete network is pairwise stable.
Another important assumption is the "exclusive relationship" between the upstream 
firm Ui and the downstream firm Di. We now relax this assumption. In this case, 
upstream firms sell perfectly substitutable inputs and earn zero profits if they set price. 
As a result, the complete network is pairwise stable. If the upstream firms set quantities, 
the complete network will emerge endogenously as the unique pairwise stable network 
for all parameter configurations because there is no competition effect of the vertical
124
R&D collaboration.
4.7 Conclusion
The existing literature has focused on vertical R&D cooperation such as: RJVs, verti­
cal R&D cartels. To the best of my knowledge, the literature up to date has not made 
any progress in dealing with the vertical R&D collaboration networks while there are 
a lot of studies on horizontal R&D networks. This chapter fills the gap with a thor­
ough discussion of vertical network architecture that will endogenously emerge and the 
efficiency of these networks.
Our findings suggest that economic factors, such as R&D spillovers can be the driving 
forces behind the network formations. We find that, under certain circumstances, the 
network in which all vertical R&D collaborations are formed is the pairwise and strongly 
stable network. Otherwise, we can observe a sequence of networks due to continuously 
profitable deviations.
We have also investigated the efficiency property of vertical R&D networks. Our 
results suggest that the private incentives to establish R&D collaborations are not al­
ways adequate from a social welfare point of view. These potential divergences imply 
that there is a room for public policy. For instance, R&D subsidy should be consid­
ered in order to enhance the collaborative activities if the difference between voluntary 
spillovers from two directions is sufficiently large.
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Chapter 5 
International R&D Networks
5.1 In troduction
International R&D collaboration has grown fast in the past decades. According to 
Hagedoorn (2002), international R&D partnership accounts for a half of newly founded 
R&D partnerships by the late 1990s. Further empirical evidence suggests that free 
trade agreements (FTAs) have mushroomed since the early 1990s (WTO.org).
International R&D collaborations of firms should be affected by the international 
trade relationships between countries where they are located. In order to explain the 
increase in the number of international R&D collaborations between firms, we need to 
understand other trends that may have occurred at the same time. One of these trends 
is the increase in the number of FTAs. Motivated by the above stylized facts - the 
increase in the number of FTAs and the spread of international R&D collaborations - 
the following question arises: Might the recent trend towards FTAs has increased the 
profitability of international R&D collaborations between firms, and hence contributed 
to the spread of R&D networks across national borders? A model is developed in 
this chapter to explore the emergence of international R&D network under different 
free trade agreement settings. There are three ex-ante identical firms located in three 
ex-ante symmetric countries. The firm in each country can sell in the domestic as 
well as foreign markets. Government of each country can initiate bilateral free-trade
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agreements (FTAs) to abolish the import tariffs of partners, and imposes trade tariffs 
on countries with whom it has no FTA. The set of FTAs between countries creates the 
FTA network. Firms decide whether and with whom to form R&D collaborations and 
these R&D collaborations establish the R&D network. If two firms have a collaborative 
link, they enjoy full private spillovers from each other. Otherwise, they enjoy public 
spillovers from each other32. As a result, we have two layers of network in our model. 
The first layer of network is the FTA network. The second network layer is an R&D 
network.
The literature on network formation devotes considerable attention to the two main 
issues: stability and efficiency of an R&D network (see, e.g., Goyal and Moraga- 
Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Mauleon et. ah, 2008) or an FTA network 
(see, e.g., Goyal and Joshi, 2006; Furusawa and Konishi, 2007). This chapter also 
studies the double-layer network architectures that will endogenously emerge and the 
efficiency properties of the resulting architectures. We employ the definitions of pair­
wise stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and strong stability by Jackson and van 
den Nouweland (2005) to study the stability of each layer of network. However, there 
are two layers of network in our model and so it could be the case that both layers are 
stable. To this end, Zu et al (2011) introduced the concept of double-layer pairwise 
stability. A network is double-layer pairwise stable if both layers of the network are 
pairwise stable. To deal with the case in which a coalition of nodes deviates in each 
network layer, we introduce a new concept of double-layer strong stability in this chap­
ter. A network is double-layer strongly stable if both layer of the network are strongly 
stable. In addition, global welfare works as a measure of efficiency.
To investigate the above issues, a model consisting of a five-stage game played by 
governments and firms is constructed. The timing of moves is as follows. In the first 
stage, governments form bilateral free trade agreements to abolish import tariffs of part­
32Note that private spillovers are always larger than public spillovers.
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ners. In the second stage, firms form R&D collaborations in order to share knowledge 
of cost reducing R&D. In the third stage, the government in each country decides the 
trade tariffs on the countries with whom it has no free trade agreement to maximize 
domestic welfare. In the fourth stage, R&D efforts are chosen non-cooperatively by 
firms. Finally, each firm decides how much to produce for the domestic market and 
how much to export to the foreign markets.
This timing of moves makes the model an appropriate description of a situation 
in which R&D collaboration decisions are mostly long-run while trade tariffs can be 
adjusted by a government on a much shorter basis33. Intuitively, the above timing of 
moves reflects that firms consider trade tariffs as variables when they make decisions 
on R&D collaborations because trade tariffs are expected to be changed by the govern­
ments. The difference between duration of two actions determines the behaviours of 
firms in the game.
In the model, different effects of horizontal R&D collaboration and free trade agree­
ments are investigated. An FTA has a positive effect on the related country’s welfare 
since consumer surplus increases due to higher competition in domestic market and 
domestic firm’s profits from foreign operations also increase because of greater access 
to the foreign market. However, an FTA also has a negative effect on the related coun­
try’s welfare because higher competition in the domestic market leads to lower domestic 
firm’s profits from domestic operations, and the FTA also tends to lowers the tax rev­
enue. The more competitive the foreign market, the less the increase in domestic firm’s 
profit from the foreign market due to the FTA. The less competitive the domestic mar­
ket, the less the increase in domestic consumer surplus due to the FTA. Another indirect 
effect of an FTA: it makes the markets of partners less valuable to foreign firms that 
are already active in the market. An R&D collaboration has the positive effect on the 
related firm’s profit-the efficiency effect- because it lowers the firm’s cost of production
33Using a survey with data from 255 Japanese small and medium manufacturers, Okamuro (2004) found that R&D 
collaborations have the average duration of 4.5 years.
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by the means of technological know-how spillovers. Nevertheless, an R&D collaboration 
also has the negative effect on the related firm’s profit-the competition effect- since its 
partner’s cost of production is lowered too and therefore, its partner becomes a tougher 
competitor.
The first result concerns the influence of trade agreement among related countries 
on international R&D network. We find that free trade agreements are beneficial to 
international R&D collaboration. Intuitively, an R&D collaboration between two firms 
is more beneficial to them if the two countries, in which these firms are located, sign a 
bilateral FTA because the negative effect of competition on the domestic firm’s profits 
is dominated by the gains from greater access to the foreign market. This result seems 
to be consistent with the stylized facts that free-trade agreements have grown fast since 
the early 1990s and international R&D collaborations have emerged at the same time.
The second result investigates the stability properties of international R&D networks 
and FTA networks. We find that the complete FTA network, in which each country 
has FTAs with all others, is always pairwise and strongly stable in the first layer of 
network independently of the R&D network structure in the second network layer. The 
double layer network, in which the first layer is the complete FTA network and the 
second layer is the complete R&D network where each firm collaborates in R&D with 
all others, is the unique double-layer pairwise stable network for all values of public 
spillovers. No networks are double-layer strongly stable.
The next result examines the efficiency properties of double-layer networks. In par­
ticular, we show that all global social welfare maximizing double-layer networks must 
consist of the complete FTA network as the first layer. The double-layer networks that 
consist of the complete R&D network as the second layer are never efficient. Taken to­
gether with the above findings on double-layer stability properties of different networks, 
our results show that private incentives to form R&D collaborative links are excessive 
from a global social welfare point of view. In particular, the complete R&D network
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which is formed under the complete FTA network is always double-layer pairwise stable 
but is never efficient. This conflict between the stability and efficiency of the network 
leaves room for public policies.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. The literature on international R&D col­
laboration networks and on FTAs is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
model. Section 4 examines the stability as well as efficiency properties of R&D and 
FTA networks. Section 5 presents discussion and extensions. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 R elated literature
This chapter contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is a contribution to 
the R&D network formation literature in a closed-economy context (see, e.g., Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Deroian and Gannon, 2006; Zikos, 
2010)34. Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) extend these works by considering three firms 
located in different countries. However, all firms compete in an integrated market - 
the fourth country. We develop this literature by casting the analysis in the context 
of an open-economy where firms compete in different markets. As a result, each firm 
in our model decides how much to produce for the domestic market and how much to 
export to the foreign markets. The ability of firms in our model to gain access to the 
foreign markets allows us to consider behaviours of firms in different markets and to 
incorporate trade tariffs in the model. Our setting allows us to explore the impact of 
FTAs on international R&D collaborations.
Second, this chapter contributes the literature on FTA networks (see, e.g., Goyal and 
Joshi, 2006; Furusawa and Konishi, 2007). These papers examine the formation of free 
trade agreements as a network formation game. Our contribution to this literature is 
that we consider the effects of the formation of free trade agreements on international 
R&D collaboration networks. As a result, we develop a model of double-layer networks
34For more details on these articles see section 2.4.3 of chapter 2.
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where any architecture of free-trading agreements is determined endogenously in the 
first layer of network, and the structure of an R&D network is formed endogenously in 
the second network layer.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) consider a model of n ex-ante identical firms located in n 
symmetric countries. They also show that their main results hold if there are k firms 
in each country. Firms in each country are able to sell in both the domestic market 
and foreign markets. Two scenarios are considered: exogenous and endogenous tariffs. 
In the exogenous tariffs scenario, tariffs are either zero or prohibitive. In particular, 
it is assumed that prior to signing FTAs, each country imposes a prohibitive tariff 
to prevent others from selling on its domestic market. If two countries sign an FTA, 
they impose zero tariff on each other. In the endogenous tariffs scenario, a three-stage 
game is established. In the first stage, countries initiate bilateral FTAs with each other 
to abolish the trade tariffs imposed on partners. In the second stage, each country 
chooses an external tariff to impose on countries with whom it does not sign a bilateral 
FTA. In the third stage, firms in each country decide the domestic quantity and export 
quantities. It is assumed that each country maximizes its social welfare while each 
firm maximizes its profit. The main finding is that bilateralism leads to global free 
trade. Another finding is that if two countries sign a bilateral FTA with each other, 
they lower their trade tariffs imposed on the third countries. This finding suggests that 
bilateralism is consistent with one important element of The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which claims that an increase in tariffs against third parties 
are not the result of the regional trade agreements.
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) investigate a model of many countries trading a con­
tinuum of differentiated products. Each country produces a subset of the continuum 
of products and the size of the subset decides its level of industrialization. The main 
finding is that if countries have a same market size and a same level of industrialization, 
then the complete FTA network is pairwise stable. This result shows that the main
131
finding of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and the intuition behind are robust and hold for the 
setting with differentiated products and price competition.
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature on international trade (see, e.g., 
Kennan and Riezman, 1990; Bond and Syropoulos, 1996; Bond et ah, 2004). These 
works have investigated the effects of free trade agreements on social welfare and on 
incentives of FTA partners to impose tariffs on third countries. However, the trading 
architectures in these works are given as fixed. We develop this literature by allowing 
trading architectures (i.e., free-trade agreement networks architecture) to be emerged 
endogenously by strategic considerations.
Closest in spirit to the approach of this chapter is the article by Zu et al. (2011) who 
reconsider the Goyal and Mongara-Gonzâlez (2001) model in an open economy frame­
work. Zu et ah, (2011) discuss the influence of market-sharing agreements between three 
countries on R&D collaborations of firms situated in these countries. They consider the 
case where a firm located in a country can only sell its product to the other country’s 
market when these two countries initiate a market sharing agreement. In their model, 
governments are first movers who make decisions over market sharing- agreements, and 
firms are followers who make R&D collaboration decisions. The authors introduce the 
concept of double-layer pairwise stability.
There are, however, two differences between Zu et ah (2011) and this chapter. 
First, Zu et ah (2011) consider market-sharing agreements rather than FTA. However, in 
reality, countries discuss a range of free trade agreements, and the absence of a free trade 
agreement is usually not the same as the prohibition of sales. This chapter investigates 
the influence of free trade agreements on international R&D network where a free trade 
agreement refers to the reduction of trade tariff to zero between two countries. This 
approach is more appropriate to reality than market sharing agreement. Second, in 
this chapter, trade tariffs are endogenous variables. A country decides its trade tariffs 
to maximize its welfare. Zu et. ab(2011) do not have trade tariffs in their model.
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Goyal and Joshi (2006) found that the outcomes of the model where trade tariffs are 
endogenous is consistent with the spirit of GATT that an increase in tariffs against third 
parties is not the result of the regional trade agreement. It is an essential motivation 
for this chapter to model trade tariff as endogenous.
5.3 The m odel
The model proposed in this chapter investigates a setting with three ex ante identical 
firms located in three symmetric countries. There is one firm for each country. All firms 
produce a homogenous good35. Because firm i is located in country z, let N  =  {1,2,3} 
be the set of firms (or countries). The interaction between firms and countries are 
described as a five stage game mentioned above. This multi-stage game is solved by 
backward induction. We obtain subgame perfect Nash equilibria of stages three to stage 
five. Next, stage two is solved by applying the notion of pairwise and strong stability. 
Finally, we solve stage one by the same method as stage two.
In the above model, it is assumed that consumers are not mobile. In other words, 
consumers in each country only purchase the good from the domestic market. This 
assumption leads to the situation in which prices in markets of two countries may be 
different even though they initiate an FTA between each other. The assumption can 
result from various sources such as the characteristics of products, the warranty of prod­
ucts, and distribution channels. For instance, some products should be consumed at the 
time they are purchased such as fast foods (e.g. McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken 
and Pizza Hut) and hot drinks (e.g. Starbucks, Costa Coffee). Another example is the 
warranty of products. A product bought from overseas may need to be sent back to 
the foreign country for warranty if it has any problem. Distribution channel is also a 
reason. Samsung sells its mobile phones Galaxy S4 in the United Kingdom through 10 
retailers including O2, Vodafone, T-mobile. Customers in the UK must buy Galaxy S4
35 All results of this chapter hold if we assume that there is a set of three horizontally differentiated products. Each 
firm can produce all three products of the set. In each market, only one product of the set is sold.
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from these retailers and they cannot order the product directly from Samsung (Sam- 
sung.com, 2013). Moreover, customers may prefer to buy mobile phones from the UK’s 
providers of mobile and broadband services (e.g. O2, Vodafone, T-mobile) because of 
"pay monthly plans"36.
Weak mobility of consumers can also result from horizontal product differentiation. 
The results of the model of this chapter are not affected by the assumption that firms 
produce horizontally differentiated instead of a homogenous product if we still assume 
that products in each market are homogenous. Horizontal product differentiation refers 
to differences in products that are unable to be easily evaluated in terms of quality 
such as the difference in colour or design between two virtually identical products. An 
example is the side of a steering wheel in a car. The placement of the steering wheel is 
on the right in countries that drive on the left side of the road, whereas it is on the left 
in countries that drive on the right. As a result, a car produced by Toyota must have 
a steering wheel on the right side if it is exported to the UK but on the left side if it is 
exported to the US.
Empirical studies show evidence in which firms raise prices in response to demand 
conditions. In response to the shortages of its iPod Mini players (Gibson 2004), Apple 
raised European prices for the iPod Mini before launching them there in July 2004. It 
raises complaints of consumers about the difference in prices between the U.S and Eu­
rope (Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg, 2006). Toyota raised the Prius’ price by $580 when 
it encountered supply shortages of the Prius in the U.S. in late 2004 (Bloomberg.com, 
2004).
Networks o f R&D collaboration and networks o f free trade agreem ents
Let gl denote the networks of R&D collaborations if I = RD  or networks of free trade 
agreements i î l  = T\ I £ {T, RD}. The R&D collaborative link (or FTA) between firm 
(or country) i and the firm (or country) j  under the network gl is represented by i j  E gl.
3 6 It is a contract between a customer and a provider of mobile services under which the customer has to use the mobile 
service from the provider in a fixed period of time, and the payment for the mobile phone and service are paid monthly.
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Formally, a free trade network is simply a collection of bilateral free trade agreements. 
Denote gl +  ij  as the network obtained when firms (countries) i and j  add a new link 
between them to the existing network gl. Denote gl — i j  as the network obtained when 
firms (countries) i or j  severs the existing link between them in the existing network 
gl. Define N i(g) as the set of firms including firm i and firms directly connected to firm 
i. Gr d  is the set of all possible R&D collaboration networks. Let GT be the set of all 
possible FTA networks. From this part, we name the network structures (gT , gRD) as 
follows. The first part (gT) specifies the type of FTA network. The second part (gRD) 
illustrates the R&D collaboration network.
R&D effort levels and spillovers
In our framework, firms invest in R&D to reduce their marginal costs. Denote firm 
z’s R&D effort as e*. R&D cost37 is given by Z(ei) = ye? where 7  > 0 denotes the 
efficiency of the R&D technology. In this chapter, following Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez 
(2001), we model public spillovers38. In particular, if two firms have no direct R&D 
collaboration then they enjoy public spillovers from each other - denoted as (3 G [0,1). 
If two firms have a collaborative link then they enjoy full "private" spillover. Denote 
E i as the effective R&D efforts of firm 2, specification for E i is as follow:
Ei = ek+ PYï, ei
M arginal cost
We assume that fixed costs are zero for reasons of tractability39. Denote qj as the 
quantity sold by firm i in the country j . The total quantity sold by firm i in all markets 
is qi = q} + The cost function of firm i in network (gT ,gRD) when producing
the domestic quantity of good q\ and export quantity of good ^  Q4 •
Gi — (Hqi — (c Ei)qi, c > 0
37This specification is introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998).
38For more details on spillovers, see chapter 2.
39The assumption of zero fixed costs is standard in the literature on R&D network formation (see., e.g. Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003).
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Payoffs
The demand function in each country is assumed to be linear and the inverse demand
3
function in country i is represented by: Pi(Qi) = a — Qi where Qi = Q) and
i = l
0 < Qi < a. Qi is the total demand in country i. To ensure that all equilibrium 
variable are non-negative, it is assumed that a >  c. By calculation, We find that when 
7  ^  5 all equilibrium variables are non-negative for all (3 E (0,1] and profit functions 
are concave. For simplicity, we assume that 7  =  5.
Denote as the trade tariff that country j  imposes on each unit of good imported 
from country i. We have tj =  -^ =  0 if there is an FTA between country i and country 
j .  The profit that the firm i is assumed to maximize is the difference between revenue 
and the cost of production, cost of R&D activities as well as the trade tariffs:
TTi = (a — Qi) ql + J2(a ~  Qj )  oi — Q -  23^  "™ 7e?
j#* jY*
Each country chooses trade tariffs in order to maximize its social welfare defined as 
the sum of consumer surplus (denoted as CS), producer surplus (denoted as PS) and 
tariff revenue (denoted as TR). Social welfare of country i under the network structure 
(gT,gRD) is given by:
T R
Without loss of generality, we name FTA the network "the first layer of network", 
and the R&D network "the second layer of network" because an R&D collaboration 
network is formed after an FTA network is created.
S tability  and  efficiency
Pairwise stability and strong stability
We adapt the definitions of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996) and strong stability introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) to
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investigate the stability of international R&D collaboration networks in the second layer 
and FTA networks in the first layer40.
Double layer pairwise stability and double layer strong stability
In this chapter, we consider a double layer network structure, we adapt the concept 
of "double-layer pairwise stability" by Zu et.al (2011).
D efinition 5.1
Let gPRD{gT) be one of the pairwise stable R&D collaboration networks under a 
given FTA network gT. The double layer network (gT, gPRD) is double-layer pairwise 
stable if:
/o r ü  G > w îk F  -  -  u ))
and ^  -  u )) ; ond
^  /o r a// ^ 2/  W ^ ( ^ , ^ ^ ( ^ ) )  < 1 ^ ( ^  +  +  2?)), t/ten
Wi(gT ,gPRD(gT)) > Wi(gT +  ij ,g PRD{gT +  ij)).
Definition 5.1 says that the network {gT , g RD) is double-layer pairwise stable if both 
layers of network are pairwise stable. We also introduce the concept of double-layer 
strong stability. Denote S c as the coalition of countries.
D efinition 5.2
An FTA network gT'(gRD) is achievable from gT (gRD) via deviations by S c if:
(iii) i j  G gT'{gRD) and i j  gT (gRD) implies {2, j}  C S c, and
(iv) i j  G gT (gRD) and i j  £ gT,(gRD) implies { i ,j}  D S c ^  <j>.
D efinition 5.3
Let gSRD(gT) denote one of the strongly stable R&D collaboration networks under a 
given FTA network gT. The double layer network (gSRD,gT) is double-layer strongly 
stable if:
For any S c C N , gfT(gSRD) that is achievable from gT{gSRD) via deviations by S°, 
and i £ S c such that Wi(g,T,gSRD{g,T)) > Wi(gT,gSRD(gT)), there exists j  G S c such
40See part 2.4.3 of chapter 2 for these definitions.
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Definition 5.3 says that the double layer network (gT,gRD) is double-layer strongly 
stable if both layers of network are strongly stable.
Efficiency
We use global welfare as a measure of efficiency of the double-layer networks. We 
say that a network (gT ,gRD) E (GT,G RD) is efficient if it is not dominated in terms 
of global welfare by any other network; that is if W ( g T ,g RD) >  W  (g,T, g ,RD) for all 
(g,T,g'RD) E {Gt :G r d ). Where W ( g T ,g RD) =  Y l w i(9T ,gRD) ■
i=l
5.4 Double-layer networks w ith  public spillovers
Because all firms are ex ante identical and all countries are ex ante symmetric, GT 
includes four different network structures: the empty FTA network (gR); the partial 
FTA network (gj); the star FTA network (gj); and the complete FTA network (gR). 
Only four different R&D network structures yield different qualitative results under the 
complete FTA network or the empty FTA network: the empty R&D network (gRD)] 
the partial R&D network (gRD)': the star R&D network (gRD); and the complete R&D 
network (gRD). However, under the partial FTA network or the star FTA network, six 
conceivable network architectures arise because there are two different network struc­
tures for the partial or the star R&D network structures. Under the Partial-Linked 
Partial network (gp,gRR), the isolated firm of the partial R&D network is situated at 
the isolated country of the FTA network. Under the Partial-Isolated Partial network 
(gj, gRjD), the isolated firm of the R&D network is located in one linked-country of the 
FTA network. Under the Star-Linked Partial network { g j ^ p ^ ) ,  one of the link firms 
is located at the hub of the FTA network. Under the Star-Isolated Partial network 
(gR,g Rf ) ,  the isolated firm of the partial R&D network is placed at the hub of the 
FTA network. Under the Partial-Hub Star network (gp,gRjj ) ,  the Hub-firm of the Star 
R&D network belongs to one linked-country of the FTA network. Under the Partial-
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Spoke Star network the Hub-firm of the Star R&D network belongs to the
isolated country of the FTA network. Under the Star-Hub Star network (gj, gf§) ,  the 
hub-firm of the Star R&D network is situated in the hub-country of the FTA network. 
Under the Star-Spoke Star network the hub-firm of the star R&D network
is located at one spoke-country of the FTA network.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the partial and star R&D network structures under the partial 
and star FTA networks. In all illustrations of this chapter, a firm (a country) is denoted 
as a node. A solid line between two nodes represents an R&D partnership between two 
firms. A dashed line between two nodes is a bilateral FTA between two countries.
Figure 5.1: Partial and Star R&D networks under partial and star FTA networks
We adopt the following notations throughout to denote variables at the subgame- 
perfect Nash equilibrium:
zx(gT ,g RD) where {x,y}  G { E , L , I ,  H, S, C } .  The lower subscript x  denotes the 
position of the firm in the FTA network (the first-layer network) and the upper subscript 
y denotes the position of the firm in the R&D collaboration network (the second- layer 
network).
x ( o t  y) = E  stands for the country (or firm) in the empty FTA (or R&D) network
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a; (or y) — L  stands for the linked country (or firm) in the partial FTA (or R&D) network 
37(or y) =  I  stands for the isolated country (or firm) in the partial FTA (or R&D) network 
a?(or y) = S  stands for the spoke country (or firm) in the star FTA (or R&D) network 
a; (or y) = H  stands for the hub country (or firm) in the star FTA (or R&D) network 
a;(or y) = C stands for the country (or firm) in the complete FTA (or R&D) network
5.4.1 S tab ility  o f  th e  second  netw ork layer
In this part, we investigate the stability properties of R&D networks in the second 
network layer under different trading regimes in the first network layer. Because we 
solve the game by backward induction, the second network layer must be solved first 
because it is formed after the formation of the first layer of network. Applying the 
definition of pairwise stability and strong stability, we obtain the following results. 
Pairw ise and  strong  stab ility  
E m pty  FTA Networks
Under the empty FTA networks {g'£,gRD), no country has free trade agreement. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates different R&D network structures under the empty FTA network.
Figure 5.2: Different empty FTA network structures
By calculation, the following results obtain:
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Solutions E quations
fa  «  0.04 f a  =  0.94
#2 % 0.92 *e (9Ï , 9c D) = Ke (9Ï , 9*D)
% 0.96
Table 5.1: Solutions 5.1
Lem ma 5.1
Pairwise stable R&D networks:
(ge,9eD) for all/3 E \/34, l).
(gï ,9p D) fo r all f3 E [0, ^ )  a n d  (3 E (^3 ,^4 ].
for all ^  E [^2^ 3]- 
{gï ,9cD) for all fi E [0 , /52] and p E [/33, 1).
Strongly stable R&D networks:
(gï ,9eD) for all fi E [ /W ).
for all E [0,^ )  and E 03,^4]. 
for all E 02,^3]-
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.3 illustrates profits of firms in different double­
layer network structures, where the first network layer is the empty FTA network.■ 
The intuition behind the above results is as follows. The empty R&D network is 
pairwise and strongly stable if public spillovers are very large because R&D collabo­
ration only increases knowledge sharing very little. Firms can still enjoy others’ R&D 
efforts without forming any link. If a link is formed between two firms in the empty 
R&D network when public spillovers are very high, they become tougher competitors 
for the isolated firm. As a result, the isolated firm produces less in the foreign markets 
and focuses on its domestic market since it has tax advantage there. The two countries, 
in which the linked firms are located, will lower their import tariffs imposed on the 
remaining country in order to attract the isolated firm because of the reduction in their 
consumer surpluses, and therefore their social welfare. These reductions in trade tariffs
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are  d e tr im e n ta l to  th e  linked  firm ’s p ro fits  an d  m ake th e m  pre fer to  sever th e  link.
Pro fus
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41Figure 5.3: Profits of firms in em pty FTA networks
As public spillovers become smaller, the increase in R&D knowledge sharing due to 
R&D collaboration vis-à-vis non-collaboration is larger. As a consequence, the partial 
R&D network is pairwise stable and then the star R&D network. Finally, the complete 
network is pairwise stable if public spillovers are not too large.
The partial R&D network is also pairwise and strongly stable if public spillovers 
are small because the network structure is very asymmetric so the isolated firm has a 
significant cost disadvantage. Therefore, the link firms do not want to collaborate with 
the isolated firm. As public spillovers grow, the profits of the firms in different network 
structures become similar so the asymmetry between networks decreases. Therefore, 
the partial R&D network is destabilized as public spillovers increases.
P artia l FTA Networks
Under partial FTA networks (p j, gRD), two countries in each network structure 
have a bilateral free trade agreement with each other. Figure 5.3 presents different
41 The intersections between lines in all figures can be shown by mathematica calculations.
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R&D collaboration network architectures under the Partial FTA network. Given the 
partial FTA network as the first network layer, the R&D network in the second layer 
of network can be deviated by firms as we can see in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Different partial FTA network structures
By calculation, the following results obtain:
Solutions E quations
=  0.94
^6 -  0.96
Table 5.2: Solutions 5.2
Lemma 5.2
Pairwise stable R&D networks: 
for all/) G (A;,!)- 
(#P ) for all ^ E (A p M
{9p,9cD) for all /) G [0,^5] and /) G (/?6 , 1 ) .
Strongly stable R&D networks:
No network.
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 illustrate profits of firms in 
different double-layer network structures, in which the first network layer is the partial
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FTA network. I
0
Figure 5.5: Pairwise R&D link deviations under partia l FTA networks
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Under the partial FTA network, the empty R&D network is no longer stable because 
both firms located in the two linked countries of the FTA networks have the incentives to 
collaborate with each other. Intuitively, when an FTA is formed between two countries, 
the firm in each of the two countries has greater access to the market of the other one,
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and incurs higher competition in the domestic market. It turns out that the former 
effect dominates the latter one so the competition effect of an R&D collaboration is 
reduced because of greater access to the foreign market.
Star FTA Networks
Figure 5.9 presents different R&D collaboration network architectures under the star 
FTA network. Given the star FTA network as the first network layer, the R&D network 
in the second layer of network can be deviated by firms as we can see in figure 5.10.
Q
A
0 ---------0
Figure 5.9: Different star FTA network structures
Lem ma 5.3
Pairwise stable R&D networks:
{9Ï,9cD) for all fi G [0,1).
Strongly stable R&D networks:
No network.
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 illustrate profits of firms in 
different double-layer network structures, where the first network layer is the star FTA 
network. ■
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G \
Figure 5.10: Pairwise R&D link deviations under star FTA networks
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Under the star FTA network, the complete R&D network is the unique pairwise 
stable R&D network. All other R&D network are no longer stable because firms in the 
partial R&D network always have incentive to deviate to the star R&D network, and
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then the complete R&D network.
The partial R&D network is not stable because there must be an FTA between the 
country where the isolated firm is located and the country where a linked firm is located. 
The FTA destabilizes the partial R&D network because greater access to foreign market 
reduce the competition effect of the R&D collaboration. It is the same reason that leads 
to the instability of the star R&D network.
C om plete FTA Networks
Figure 5.14 presents different R&D collaboration network architectures under the
complete FTA network.
Lem ma 5.4
Pairwise stable R&D networks:
(gc,9cD) for all (3 E [0,1).
Strongly stable R&D networks:
No network.
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.15 illustrates profits of firms in different double­
layer network structures, where the first network layer is the complete FTA network.■
Under the complete FTA network, every country has FTAs with all others. Has 
been mentioned above, if two countries sign an FTA between each other, the two firms 
located in these countries have more incentive to collaborate in R&D with each other 
because the competition effect of the R&D collaboration decreases. Therefore, all firms 
have the incentive to collaborate with all others under the complete FTA network. As 
a result, the complete R&D network is the unique pairwise stable one.
From the above lemmas, we are ready to state the following result.
Proposition 5.1
Free trade agreements are beneficial to international R&D collaborations.
Proposition 5.1 can be shown by referring to the stable R&D networks under each 
FTA network in the lemmas 5.1 to 5.4. It is easy to see that the interval of spillover rates
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where R&D networks, other than the complete R&D network, are pairwise and strongly 
stable is narrowed as the number of FTAs increases. On the other hand, FTAs enlarge 
the interval of spillover rates where the complete R&D network is pairwise stable.
Figure 5.14: Different complete FTA network structures
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Figure 5.15: Profits of firms in complete FTA networks
Intuitively, proposition 5.1 shows that an R&D collaboration between two firms is 
more beneficial to them if the two countries, in which these firms are located, sign a 
bilateral FTA because the negative effect of competition on the domestic firm’s profits 
is dominated by the gains from greater access to the foreign market.
We note that the competition in each market is higher when all countries sign FTAs 
with each other. The result is initially surprising when we compare it with the outcome
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in a closed economy. In particular, the partial R&D network can be pairwise stable 
when firms compete in an integrated market and the complete R&D network is the 
unique pairwise stable network when firms operate in independent markets (see Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzâlez, 2001). In contrast, our result shows that when all the markets 
are very competitive, the complete R&D network is the unique pairwise stable R&D 
network. The intuition behind the difference in these results stems from the fact that 
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzâlez (2001) compare the case where firms operate in indepen­
dent markets and the case where they compete in an integrated market. In the latter, 
all firms incur higher competition. However, we consider the case where more FTAs 
are formed among countries. The domestic market becomes more competitive to the 
domestic firm but the foreign markets are less competitive to it since it can have access 
to foreign markets with no trade tariff. The latter effect overcomes the former one so 
the overall competition is lower.
5.4.2 S tab ility  o f th e  first netw ork layer
In this part, we consider the deviation made by countries in the first layer of network 
given a specific R&D network structure on the second network layer. Applying the 
definitions of pairwise stability and strong stability, we obtain the following results.
Em pty R&D networks
Given the empty R&D network as the second network layer, the FTA network in 
the first layer of network can be deviated by countries as we can see in figure 5.16.
Define:
Solutions E quations
% 0.19
Table 5.3: Solutions 5.3
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Lem m a 5.5
Pairwise stable FTA networks: 
for all/3 E [0 , ^ ] .  
for aU ^  E [0 , 1).
Strongly stable FTA networks: 
for all ^  E [0,1).
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.17 illustrates social welfare of countries in 
different double-layer network structures, where the second network layer is the empty 
R&D network. ■
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0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Figure 5.16: Pairwise FTA link deviations w ith em pty R&D networks
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Figure 5.17: Social welfare levels of countries w ith em pty R&D networks
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P artia l R&D Networks
Given the partial R&D network as the second network layer, the FTA network in 
the first layer of network can be deviated by countries as we can see in figure 5.18. 
Define:
Solutions Equations
f g  % 0.67 w /(s„ T ,s„Rf )  =  w j ( s M D )
Table 5.4: Solutions 5.4
Lem m a 5.6
Pairwise stable FTA networks:
(#p for all ^  E 
(gc,9pD) for all p E [0,1).
Strongly stable FTA networks:
{gc,9p D) for a ll (3 E [0,1).
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 illustrate the social welfare of 
countries in different double-layer network structures, where the second network layer 
is the partial R&D network. ■
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Figure 5.18: Pairwise FTA link deviations with partial R&D networks
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Figure 5.19: Social welfare levels of countries in ( p f , ^
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Figure 5.20: Social welfare levels of countries in (pg ,
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Figure 5.21: Social welfare levels of countries in {.Os i 9 ^ L >) and {9  c') 9 p D )
S tar R&D networks
Given the star R&D network as the second network layer, the FTA network in the 
first layer of network can be deviated by countries as we can see in figure 5.22.
/
\
z
© X
Figure 5.22: Pairwise FTA link deviations w ith star R&D network
Define:
S olu tions E q u a tio n s
9^ % 0.13 W G Z d i f )  =  w 'K s J . s S P )
Table 5.5: Solutions 5.5
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Lem m a 5.7
Pairwise stable FTA networks: 
all/3 E [0,/3g). 
for aU ^  E [0 , 1).
Strongly stable FTA networks: 
for all E [0,1).
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.23, 5.24, and 5.25 illustrate the social welfare of 
countries in different double-layer network structures, where the second network layer 
is the star R&D network. ■
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Figure 5.23: Social welfare levels of countries in ( # T , ^ ) ,  (pp  , p f ^ ) ,  ( p f ,  ^ ^ )  and p ^ )
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Figure 5.24: Social welfare levels of countries in ^  ( p f  ? p f
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Com plete R&D N etw orks
Given the complete R&D network as the second network layer, the FTA network in 
the first layer of network can be deviated by countries as we can see in figure 5.26.
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Figure 5.26: Pairwise FTA link deviations w ith complete R&D networks
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Figure 5.27: Social welfare of countries w ith complete R&D networks
Lem m a 5.8
Pairwise stable FTA networks: 
for all ^  G [0 , 1).
Strongly stable FTA networks: 
for all ^  E [0 , 1).
Proof: See the Appendix. Figures 5.27 illustrates social welfare of countries in dif­
ferent double-layer network structures, where the second network layer is the complete 
R&D network. ■
We elaborate on some aspects of lemmas 5.5 to 5.8. On the one hand, an FTA allows 
a foreign firm to have greater access to the domestic market. The domestic market will 
be more competitive to the domestic firm so the domestic firm’s profit from the domestic
158
1 ^ 7 ' hi
-
hW.k'.:
market is lowered but national consumer surplus will increase. On the other hand, the 
FTA allows the domestic firm to have greater access to the foreign market, and therefore 
increase the domestic firm’s profit from foreign sales. The former effect is both positive 
and negative whereas the latter one is positive to the country’s social welfare.
First, the Partial FTA network is pairwise stable for sufficiently small public spillovers 
if the second layer of network is the empty, partial, or star R&D network. When public 
spillovers are sufficiently small, a firm enjoys small R&D efforts of others without form­
ing R&D collaborations. If the firm located in the isolated country of the Partial FTA 
network is in an disadvantage position, it has a high marginal cost of production so it is 
less competitive. The isolated country has no incentive to form an FTA because the in­
crease in competition in the domestic market will not be high enough to raise consumer 
surplus more than the decrease in both tax revenue and producer surplus. However, 
when public spillovers are higher, all firms become more competitive. Therefore, an 
FTA makes the domestic market much more competitive so the increase in consumer 
surplus can surpass the decrease in both tax revenue and producer surplus.
Second, the complete FTA network is the unique pairwise stable FTA network if the 
second layer of network is the complete R&D network. In this case, each firm has R&D 
links with all others so all firms are competitive. If the isolated country initiates an 
FTA, competition in the domestic market will be much higher so the consumer surplus 
increases more than the decreases in both the producer surplus and the tax revenue. 
Therefore, the isolated country’s social welfare increases because of the FTA and the 
country has the incentive to form this FTA.
From the above results, we have the following propositions.
5.4 .3  D ouble-layer stab le  netw orks  
Proposition  5.2
The Complete - Complete network is the unique double-layer pairwise stable network
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for all (3 £ [0,1).
Proposition 5.2 follows from lemmas 5.1 to 5.8. The Complete FTA network is always 
pairwise stable FTA network in the first network layer regardless of the R&D network 
in the second layer, while the Complete R&D network is the unique pairwise stable 
R&D network under the complete FTA network. Therefore, the Complete-Complete 
network is double-layer pairwise stable.
Apart from the complete FTA network, only the partial FTA network is pairwise 
stable if public spillovers are not large and the second layer of network is the empty, 
partial, or star R&D networks (see lemmas 5.5 to 5.8). However, if the first network 
layer is the partial FTA network, all the empty, partial, and star R&D networks are 
not pairwise stable in the second layer if public spillovers are not large (see lemma 
5.2). Therefore, no other networks apart from the Complete-Complete network are 
double-layer pairwise stable.
P roposition  5.3
No network is the double-layer strongly stable network.
Proof: Since there is no strongly R&D collaboration network in the second network 
layer, there is no double layer strongly stable network.
5 .4 .4  Efficiency
Define:
Solutions Equations
f  io =  0.27 W ( g l , g f D) =  W (g J ,g ^ D)
/3n  «  0.45 W{g^,g^D) =  W ( g J , g ? D)
Table 5.6: Solutions 5.6
P roposition  5.4
The following networks are global efficient: the Complete-Star network for all (3 £ 
[O,j0lo], the Complete-Partial network for all (3 £ {ffio, fin], and the Complete-Empty 
network for all f3 £ [ffii, 1).
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Proof: In our model, if every country chooses its tariffs to maximize global welfare 
instead of its own national welfare, all the optimal internal tariffs are equal to zero42. 
To prove this result, we consider the empty FTA networks. It can be verified that 
— ' lp=o< 0 and d Wg py 2— " lp=o< 0- Therefore, the efficient network must 
consist of the complete FTA network as the first layer of network. Figures 5.28 illustrates 
global social welfare in different double-layer network structures, where the first network 
layer is the complete FTA network. ■
1.65
0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 5.28: Global welfare levels of efficient networks
We provide some intuitions behind the above results. On the one hand, R&D col­
laborations are beneficial to global welfare because they reduce the costs of firms, and 
increase their profits and quantities. On the other hand, R&D collaborations are detri­
mental to global welfare because well-connected firms undertake very little R&D efforts 
due to the competition effect. When the network is sparse, the former effect dominates 
the latter one, leading to the increase in social welfare as more links are added to the 
existing network. However, in the dense network, the latter effect dominates the former 
one, leading to a decrease in social welfare when more links are added to the existing
42 W e  a r e  i n d e b t e d  t o  P r o f e s s o r  G u i l h e r m e  C a r m o n a  f o r  p o i n t i n g  t h i s  o u t .
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network. This is the reason why the complete R&D network is not the efficient network.
Public spillovers can be considered as a substitute for R&D collaborations. The 
increase in public spillovers leads to greater sharing of R&D outputs without a severe 
decrease in R&D efforts because firms still do not share R&D efforts completely as 
the case of R&D collaborations. So the sparser network is efficient as public spillovers 
increase.
Taken together with propositions 5.2 and 5.3 on stability properties of different 
networks, our results show that private incentives to form R&D collaborative links are 
excessive from a global welfare viewpoint. In particular, the complete-complete network 
is the unique double-layer pairwise stable for all G [0,1) but it is never efficient.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we use network formation games to study R&D collaboration of firms 
under different trading regimes. We also explore the effects of R&D spillover in the 
network form of R&D collaborations where firms are doing R&D in their own labs and 
sharing knowledge by creating R&D collaborative links. A model of three firms located 
in three different countries is adopted. Despite the simplicity of the framework, the 
findings and intuition can be extended to more general contexts. Moreover, the new 
concept of stability- double-layer strongly stability- introduced in this chapter can be 
widely applied to more general cases.
We showed that free trade agreements extend the interval of spillovers in which the 
complete R&D collaboration networks are stable and contract the interval of spillovers 
where other R&D collaboration networks are stable. This result seems to indicate a 
possible link between R&D networks and FTAs. In particular, this indicates that free 
trade agreements are beneficial to international R&D collaborations. The result seems 
to be consistent with the stylized facts that free-trade agreements have grown fast since 
the early 1990s and international R&D collaborations acount for an important part of
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newly founded R&D partnerships at that time.
Another finding is the double-layer network structures that will endogenously emerge 
in the long-run. The complete FTA networks is always strongly stable in the first 
network layer regardless of the architectures of R&D networks among firms in these 
countries. This result suggests that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent 
with global free trade. In addition, all efficient double-layer networks are formed under 
the complete FTA networks. This result shows that private incentives to form bilateral 
FTAs are adequate from a global social welfare viewpoint.
Finally, the complete R&D network which is formed under the complete FTA net­
work is the unique double-layer pairwise stable network for all values of spillovers but. 
the double-layer networks that consist of the complete R&D network are never global 
efficient. Our results show that private incentives to form R&D collaborative links are 
excessive from a global social welfare viewpoint.
We have employed a simple setting with specific functional form s for demand, cost 
conditions to carry out our analysis. In addition, we assume the symmetry across firms 
and markets. Our framework can be extended in future work to explore the effect of 
asymmetries across markets and firms and to consider a more general setting of demand, 
and costs.
s
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion
Within the R&D network literature, economists have examined the incentives of 
firms to form R&D collaborations and the resulting implications from a social welfare 
point of view. Building on the seminal paper by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), 
a generic finding is that there is a conflict between stability and efficiency properties 
of the R&D networks of firms who are competitors. However, the architectures of the 
R&D networks that will endogenously emerge and the nature of the conflict between 
stability and efficiency heavily rely on the market structures and the heterogeneity of 
firms in the networks. In this thesis, we have investigated the stability and efficiency of 
different R&D network types in different frameworks. C hap ter 3 has extended previous 
studies by investigating R&D collaboration networks with an industry leader. Since the 
leader firm invests more in R&D than follower firms, follower firms have incentives to 
collaborate with the leader firm in order to enjoy large R&D spillovers from the leader 
firm. We found that the leader firm tends to be the central node of R&D networks. 
However, a conflict between stability and efficiency arises because the network in which 
the leader firm is well-connected performs badly in terms of social welfare. When the 
leader firm is well-connected, firms connected to the leader firm enjoy the large R&D 
efforts of the leader firm and they reduce their R&D efforts considerably. This decrease 
results in a higher price and lower quantity. Even though the total profit of firms is 
higher, consumer surplus is much lower so social welfare decreases.
C hap ter 4 shows that the market structure plays an important role in the conflict 
between stability and efflciency. Chapter 4 has filled the gap in the literature with a 
thorough discussion of both the vertical R&D network architectures that will endoge­
nously emerge and the efficiency of these networks. In contrast with the outcomes of 
horizontal R&D network that private incentives to form R&D links are excessive from 
a social welfare viewpoint, we find that the private incentives to establish R&D collab­
orations are not always adequate from a social welfare point of view due to the double 
marginalization effect.
C hap ter 5 has used network formation games to study R&D collaboration of firms 
under different trading regimes. We have shown that free trade agreements are ben­
eficial to international R&D collaboration. It is initially surprising when we compare 
our results with the outcomes of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) who found that 
competition has a negative effect on R&D collaborations. In our framework, when two 
countries initiate an FTA, the domestic market of each country becomes more com­
petitive. However, it turns out that the overall competition is less because the firm in 
each country gains greater access to the foreign market. We also have found that, in 
symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. In addition, private 
incentives to form bilateral FTAs are adequate from a global social welfare viewpoint. 
Finally, our results show that private incentives to form R&D collaborative links are 
excessive from a global social welfare viewpoint. This result is in line with the outcome 
of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001).
In this thesis, we have employed a simple setting with specific functional forms for 
demand, cost conditions to carry out our analysis. In addition, we often assume the 
symmetry across firms and markets. Our framework can be extended in future works 
to explore the effect of asymmetries across markets and firms, and to consider a more 
general setting of demand, costs.
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Appendix to chapter 3
A l.  Equilibrium O utcom es in n-firm case
Denote: ai =  a — c
A l . l .  Network (Fully connected leader)
Ki (gf )=4(ai )2 [2k(n-l)-k2-l+2n+n2 (47-1 )] 7 s /  ( Ai )2 
7rl(g f)= (al)27 (4n7 -l)[2+k2+k(3-2n)+n2+n(27-3)]2/(A i)2
A2. Equilibrium Outcom es in three-firm  case 
A 2.1. The em pty network
ei(gB)=(ai)(5-4/8)(l+5/3-2/32)/A4, i^ l  
ei(gB)=(ai)(21+13^-30^2+8/33)/A4
Leader Firm
qi(gB)= 12(ai)(7+ 9^-4^ 2)/A4
7ri(gB)=2(ai)2(7 + 9 M 3 2)2(15+12/H 82)/(A4)2
Follower Firms
qî (ëE )—12(ai)(l -f-5^-2^2 ) /  A4 
7ri(gE)=:2(ai)2(l+5/3-2/32)2(47+40/3-16/32)/(A4)2
Aggregate performance
W(gB)=2(a1)2(3745+15810/3+12245/32-12748/33-316^4+1440/35-192^6)/(A4)2
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PS(gB)=2(ai)2(829+3498/3+4433lS2-1804/S3-2620/34+1440/95-192/96) /  (A4)2
CS(gB)=72(a1)2(9+19/3-8/32)2/(A 4)2 
Where: A4= llô  +241/3 -124y32 +52/33 -16/34.
A2.2. T he leader partia l netw ork 
e2(gi p )=  (ai)(14+ll/3-17^2+4^3)/4A6 
e3(gtP )=  (ai ) (5-4/3 ) (" 1+3/+Ô2 ) /A 5  
ei(gLP)=3(ai)(14+ lll3-17/32+4^3)/4A5
Leader Firm
qi(gi P )= 9(ai)(7+ 9/3-4/32)/A 5
Ti(gLP)=9(ai)2(7+9/3-4/32)2(20+4,3-/32)/8(A5)2
Follower Firms
Q2 (gLP)=3 (ai ) (7+9^-4^2)/ A5 
^2(gz'jD)=(ai)2(7+ 9y5-4/32)2(68+ 4/5-y52) /8(A5)2 
q3(gI,P)= 12(a i)(l+ 3y5-y52)/A 5 
^3(g^P)=2(ai)2( l + 3 ^ 2)2(47+40^-16/)2)/(A5)2
Aggregate performance
W(gLP)=(ai)2(24884+74476/3+28231^2-44402/33+5179184+1768/35-208^6)/4(A5)2
PS(gi p ) = (ai)2(6452+19180/?+9799/32-9842/33-2021/34+1768/?5-208/36)/4(A5)2
CS(gi p )=72(ai)2(8+12^-5^2)2/(A 5)2 
Where: A5=103+155lS-66y32+13/33-4;34.
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A2.3. The follower partial network
ei(gFP)=(ai)(4+17^-23^2+61S3)/2A6, 
ei ( g ^ ) —(ai ) (6+17/?-23/32+6^3)/Ay
Leader Firm
qi(gJi'p )=12(a1)(2+7/9-3/32)/A 6
iri(gp p )=2(ai)2(2+7/3-3/32)2(15+12/3-4/32)/(A6)2
Follower Firms
qi(gjrp)=6(ai)(-l-5,8+2/32)/A 6
Ti(gFP)=(ai)2(l+5/3-2^2)2(56+24/3-9^2)/2(A6)2
Aggregate performance
W(gFP)= (a i)2(824+6704/g+11365/32-9942^3+321164+828/86-108^6)/(A 6)2
PS(gFP)=(ai)2(176+1520/3+3157/32-1302J83-1479^4+828/55-108y96)/(A 6)2
CS(gFP)=72(ai)2(3+12/3-5/32)2/(A 6)2 
Where: Ay=38+151^-66y92+17^3-6^4.
A2.4. The leader star network
ei (gL5)=4(ai) (2-/3)/A7,i^ l ; ei(gL5)=(ai)(14-3/5+/52)/A 7 
qi(gZ"S)=12(ai)(14-3^+y52)/A 7; 7n(gLS)=46(ai)2(14-3^+/32)2/(A 7)2 
qi(gZ"5')=48(ai)/A7 
7ri(gLS):=32(ai)2(68+4/3-/32)/(A 7)2
169
Aggregate performance
W(g£S)=2(ai)2(24108-6556^+2727/32-354/33+59/34)/(A r)2
PS(gi s )=2(ai)2(6684-1804l8+819/32-138/33+23^4) /  (Ay)2
CS(gi s )=72(ai)2(22-3/?+/32)2/(A 7)2 
Where: A7=290-37/6+15y92.
A2.5. T he follower s ta r  netw ork 
e2 (gFS)=  (ai ) (40+26/9-31/92+16^3-3(94)/A 8 
e3(gFS)=  12(ai)(8+6/?-13/32 +3/33)/A8 
ei(gFS)=12(a1)(2-/3)(8+7/3-3/32)/A 8
Leader Firm
q i(gFS)=144(ai)(8+7/3-3/32)/A 8
Ti(gjrs)=288(ai)2(8 + 7 M S 2)2(20+4/?-/32)/(A s)2
Follower Firms
q2(gFS)=12(ai)(40+26/?-31lS2+16/33-3/94)/A8
T2(gFS)=142(a1)2(40+26^-31/32+16/33-3y94)2/(A 8)2
q3(gFS)=144(ai)(2+3/?-/62)/A s
’r3(gJ7'S)=288(ai)2(2+3/3-/32)2(56+24/3-9^2)/(A8)2
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Aggregate performance
W(gFS)=2(a1)26 1/(A 8)2; PS(gFS)=2(a1)26 2/(A 8)2
CS(gFS)=72(ai)2(160+14618-79,92+16/93-3/34)2/(As)2 
Where: A8=2072+189413-977,32+296/03-69/34.
01=1251776 +2299616^ -136004^2 -85286S/33 +451003/34 -181588^6 +55070/36 - 
10272/37 +963/38. 
02=330176 +617696^ +6700^2 -206740^3 +92695j34 -59044^5 +28790/36 -6816^7 
+639(38.
A 2.6. The com plete network  
ei(g^)=(ai)/67; ei(g^)=3(ai)/67
qi(gC')= 36(ai)/67; tti (gc')=414(ai)2/ 4489 
qi(gc')=12(ai)/67; ^  (g^)=142(ai)^/4489
Aggregate performance
W(gc')=2498(ai)2/4489; PS(gc’)=698(ai)2/4489 
CS(gc')=1800(ai )2/ 4489 
A3. Proofs
Proof of proposition 3.2.
Due to the complexity of computations involved, this comparison is made by means 
of the following figures which have been drawn by the software Mathematica 7.0. The 
vertical axis denotes profits. The horizontal axes are the number of firms n varying
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from 4 to 100, and R&D efficiency 7  varying from 2 to 1000. In the case where the 
expression may change the sign, we plot the horizontal plane that goes through (0 , 0 , 0 ) 
to make the intersection clear.
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Figure A l: Profits comparisons
Firstly, the empty network is not pairwise stable. Condition (i) is trivially satisfied 
because there is no link to sever in the empty network. We now check condition (ii).
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From the empty network, either two follower firms or a follower firm and the leader firm 
can form a link. We will show that 7p (gE +  i j ) — tt* (gE) > 0 in the former case with the 
help of a plot. Therefore, the condition (ii) is always violated and two follower firms 
always have the incentive to form the link. In the latter case, 7Tfl (gE +  Ih) — 7Ti(gE ) > 0 
but 7Ti(gE +  Ih) — 7Ti(gE ) < 0  if n is sufficiently large and 7  is sufficiently small.
Secondly, the pairwise stability of the complete network. Condition (ii) is trivially 
satisfied because there is no more fink to form in the complete network. We now check 
condition (i). From the complete network, either two follower firms or a follower firm 
and the leader firm can sever a fink. We show that 7Ti(gc  — i j) — ^i{gC) < 0 in the 
former case, and 'Kh{9 C — W  -  ^i{gC) < 0 and K ^ g 0  -  Ih) — 7ri(#c ) < 0 in the latter 
case with the help of a plot. As a result, condition (i) is always satisfied.
Proof of proposition 3.3.
Figure A2 illustrates the profit comparisons.
-  M 9L 2 ) >0 > 0
Figure A2: Strong stability
If n - 1  is even, we shall show that W ( ^ _ 2) -  W (p7f_3) < 0 . If n — 1 is odd, we show 
that W (g E_2) — W (g E_4) < 0. For gE , we shall show that W ( g E +  Ih) -  W ( g E ) > 0.
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Figure A3: Social welfare levels comparisons
Proof of propos^or, «9. &
Firstly, the pairwise stability of gc  for all (5 < ( 3 Condition (ii) is trivially satisfied 
because there is no more link to form. We now check condition (i). From gc , firms can 
sever a link to deviate either to the follower star network or the leader star network. 
In the former case, ^ i{gc ) > 7ri(gFS) for all (3 E  [0,/32) and 7Ti(gc ) > 7rs(gFS) (where 
i = 1,2) for all /9 E [0,1), whereas in the latter Hi(gc ) > (gLS) (where z =  1,2) for 
all /3 E [0,1). So condition (i) is satisfied. This establishes the pairwise stability of gc  
for all (3 E  [0, / y .  It also shows, of course, that gLS is never pairwise stable and gFS is 
not pairwise stable for all (3 E  [0,/?2)-
Secondly, gFP is pairwise stable for all (3 E ((31 , 1). From gFP, all pairwise devia­
tions by firms can be either gE (condition i) or gFS (condition ii). In the former case
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7Ti{gFP) > n i (gE ) (where z =  1 ,2 ) for all /3 G [0,1) so condition (i) is satisfied. In the 
latter, 'K2{gFS) > ^2(gFP) for all (3 G [0,1) but t t i{gFS) < /jri(gFP) for all /3 G (fii, 1) 
(condition ii is satisfied). This establishes that gFP is pairwise stable for all (3 G (/3i, 1) 
because the leader firm has an incentive to block the deviation to the star network and 
both followers have the incentive to block the deviation to the empty network. It also 
shows that the empty network is never pairwise stable because condition (ii) is always 
violated.
Finally, no other network architecture is pairwise stable. The leader partial network 
is never pairwise stable because firms always have the incentive to deviate to gFP ■ It is 
established by /iT2 {gLP) < 7T2(gFS) and 7rs(gLP) < ^2,{gFS) for all [3 G [0,1) (condition 
ii is violated). In addition, gFS is never pairwise stable because it is not pairwise stable 
for all {3 G [0, ^ )  (condition ii is violated) as well as /3 G (/3l5 1) (condition i is violated).
Proof of proposition 3.7.
From gFP, all coalitions of firms can alter to some network structures apart from 
pairwise deviations: (z) the coalition of all three firms forming R&D collaborations to 
establish gC] {ii) the coalition of all firms severing their existing R&D collaboration and 
forming the new link between the leader and a follower to create gLP. In the latter, a 
group of firms always has the incentive to make the deviation from gFP to gLP because 
TTi{gFP) < 7ri(<7LjP) and ^i{gFP) < 7T2{gLP) for all j3 G [0,1) (the condition is violated).
Next, gc  is never strongly stable. Since Tii{gLP) > 'K\{gc ) and 7T2{gLP) > ^2{gG) 
for all (3 G [0 ,1), the coalition of a follower firm and the leader firm has the incentive 
to deviate to gLP.
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Appendix to chapter 4
B l.  Equilibrium  Outcom es
Denote: <12 = a — c — d
B l . l  The em pty network
xi{ge) = 21(a2)/370; C 8 (g e) =  162(a2)2/1369
rn(ge) = 2817(a2)2/34225; P S ( g e) =  9488(o2)2/34225
ei(ge) = 7(a2)/185; W {ge) = 13538(a2)2/34225
v i(9e) = (o2)2/34225
B1.2. The com plete network
xi{gc) = 3(a2)(7 +  56)/B r, %(g") =  18(a2)2(626 -  700 -  2592)/(B 7)2 
ei(gc) =  2(a2)(7 +  55)/B7; 7r;(gc) =  4(a2)2(1927 -  1405 -  50<52)/(B 7)2
CS(gc) =  16200(a2)2/(B 7)2
PS(g°)  = 4(a2)2(9488 -  2805 -  10052 -  6309 -  22502)2/(B 7)2
W (g c) = 4(o2)2(13538 -  2805 -  10052 -  6306 -  22562)/(B 7)2 
Where: B7=370-385-2052-576-3062.
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B1.3. T he p a tte rn  1 netw ork
z2(£Z1) =  21(a2)(190 -  285 -  1452 +  4.20 + 2102)/2OB8
x ^ g 1) = 399(o2)(1 +  0)/2B8; e i ^ 1) =  133(a2)(l +  S)/Bs
e2(g1) =  7(o2)(190 -  285 -  1452 +  426 +  2102)/1OB8
^ ( g 1) =  3249(a2)2(626 -  986 -  4962)/2(B8)2
^ ( g 1) =  2817(o2)2(190 -  285 -  1452 -  426 -  2162)2/100(B8)2
Tito1) =  361(o2)2(1927 -  1965 -  9852)/(B 8)2
^ ( g 1) =  1927(a2)2(190 -  285 -  1452 -  426 -  2162)2/100(B8)2
CSig1) = 81(a2)2(380 -  285 -  1452 +  426 +  2162)2/8(B8)2
BSto1) =  {a2)2F6/50(Bs)2-, W{gl ) = 7(a2)2F7/200(B8)2 
Where: B8=3515-3925-19652-5886-29462.
F6 =171258400 +  185964853 +  46491254 - 458171706 - 1872437762 +  418420863 +  
104605264 - 1685(171285 - 332086 - 1660462) - 2852(447439 - 996246 - 4981262).
F7 =139634800 +  128945653 +  32236454 - 354152406 - 1480634462 +  290127663 +  
72531964 - 1685(134520 - 23026 6 - 1151362) - 2852(357508 - 690786 - 34S3962).
B1.4. T he p a tte rn  2 netw ork
zi(g2) =  3(a2)(95 + 95 -  252)(7 -  26)/Bg 
z2(g2) =  21(a2)(190 +  276 -  662)/2B9 
ei(g2) =  14(02) (95 +  95 -  252)/B 9 
e2(g2) =  (o2)(7 -  25)(190 +  276 -  662)/B 9
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Ti(g2) =  7708(a2)2(95 +  95 -  252)2/(B 9)2
jj'j (g2) =  36(o2)2(95 +  95 -  252)2(313 +  149 -  292)/(B 9)2
g2(g2) =  2817(o2)2(190 +  276 -  662)2/(B 9)2
v2(g2) =  (a2)2(1927 +  565 -  852)(190 +  276 -  662)2/(B 9)2
CS(g2) =  2025(a2)2(380 +  185 -  452 + 276 -  662)2/(B 9)2
PB(g2) =  8(a2)2F8/(B 9)2; W(g2) =  (a2)2F9/2(B9)2 
Where: B9=5(1190-1356+4262)-652(30-76+262)+5(7030+3576-5462).
F8=  42814600 +66527556 -100096862 -1921326s +21348 64 -365s(2372 +636 -962) 
+454(2372 +636 -962) +5(4308820 +1795506 -2624762 -2268 6s +25264) -52(745328 
+290976 -424262 -324 63 +3664).
Fg=977443600+1479970806-2377326362-37302126s +41446864-144 5S(11513 +2526 
-3662) +1654(11513 +2526 -3662) -452(4356287 +2257386 -4126862 -12966s +14464) 
+45(24160780 +12102756 -21433862 -90726s +100864).
B1.5. The pattern 3 network
Z;(gs) =  21(o2)(1 +  6)/Bio; e;(gs) =  14(o2)(l +  5)/Bio 
CB(gs) =  16200(a2)2/(Bio)2
%(gs) =  18(a2)2(626 -  986 -  4962)/(B 10)2
%i(gz) = 4(a2)2(1927 -  1965 -  9852)/(B i0)2 
W(g3) = 28(a2)2(1934 -  565 -  2852 -  1266 -  6362)/(B i0)2 
BS(g3) =  4(a2)2(9488 -  3925 -  19652 -  8826 -  44162)/(B i0)2 
Where: B10=370-285-1452-426-2162.
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B1.6. The pattern 4 network
x i{gA) =  3(ct2)(7 -  2 6 ) /B i i \  ei{gA) =  2 (0 2 )(7 -  25)/ B n  
CSig4-) = 16200(a2)2/(B n )2 
Î7i(<74) =  36(a2)2(313 +  140 -  202)/(B n )2 
7ri(54) =  4(a2)2(1927 +  565 -  852)/(B n )2 
PS(g4) = 16(a2)2(2372 +  285 -  452+630 -  902)/(B n )2 
iy(54) =  8(a2)2(6769 +  565 -  852+1260 -  1802)/(B n )2 
Where: Bh=37O-1O5+452-150+602.
B 1.7. The pattern 5 network  
z i(55) =  3(a2)(95 +  95 -  252)(7 +  50)/B 12 
x2(g&) =  21(o2)(190 -  285 -  1452 -  150)/2B12 
ei(gs) =  1 4 (0 2 ) (95 +  1045 +  752 -  253) / B 12 
e2(g6) =  (o2)(7 -  25)(190 -  285 -  1452 -  150)/B 12
^ ( g 5) =  18(a2)2(95 +  95 -  252)2(626 -  700 -  2502)/(B 12)2
%(g5) =  2817(a2)2(190 -  285 -  1452 -  150)2/(B 12)2
Ti(g6) =  4(a2)2(95 +  95 -  252)2(1927 -  1965 -  9852)/(B i2)2
7r2(g5) =  (a2)2(1927 +  565 -  852)(190 -  285 -  1452 -  150)2/(B i2)2
CS{g5) = 2025(a2)2(380 -  105 -  1852 -  150)2/2(B 12)2
PS(g5) =  2(a2)2B10/(B 12)2; Wig5) = (a2)2Bn /2(B12)2 
Where: Bi2=5(7O3O-8190-28502) -2853 -652(366-70-502) -35(91O+730+4502).
F 10 =78405® - 15685® - 52(16477844 - 12309300 - 6637S02) +  205s(60784 +  15540 +
179
4056>2) +  <54(615676 - 42006 - 9OO02) - 105(1154060 - 755586 +  37S4562) +  25(6850336 
- 7682466 - 59S7762).
F n  =3136056 - 62725s +  4053(139793 +  31086 +  81062) +  454(779701 - 42006 - 
90062) - 452(23352719 - 15043056 - 6637S62) - 205(3077620 - 1814916 +  7569062) +  
25(39097744 - 39963846 - 22128362).
B1.8. The pattern 6 network
æi(g6) =  21(o2)(1 +  6)(190 +  276 -  662) /2B13
æ2(g6) =  3(a2)(7 -  26)(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)/2B i3
ei(g6) =  (a2)(7 +  55)(190 +  276 -  662) /B i3
e2(g6) =  7(o2)(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)/B i3
iji(gs) =  9(a2)2(190 +  276 -  662)2(626 -  986 -  4962)/2(Bi3)2
g2(g6) =  9(a2)2(313 +  146 -  262)(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)2/(B i3)2
7Ti(g6) =  (a2)2(1927 -  1405 -  5052)(190 +  276 -  662)2/(B 13)2
7T2(g6) =  1927(o2)2(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)2/(B 13)2
CS(g6) = 2025(a2)2(380 -  105 -  156 -  2762)2/2(B i3)2
PSigt) = (a2)2B12/2(B 13)2; W(g6) = (a2)2FÏ3/2(B i3)2
Where: Bi3=35150-40956-333662-6363 -552(190+276-662) -35(910+736-1462).
F i2 =685033600 -768246006 -10398423662 +951417063 +616383964 +15876065 - 
317526s -10052(26612 +100086 -151562 -3246s +3664) -405(1154060 -1034886 -11919362 
-415863 +63064).
Fis =977443600 -999096006 -14508161162 +1115442063 +764006464 +15876065 - 
317526s -10052 (24587 +100086 -151562 -3246s +3664) -205(3077620 -2373516 -29306162
ISO
-831603 +126O04).
B 1.9. The pattern 7 network
æi(g7) = 3 (a 2)(7 +  56l)(190- 105-429-216 l2)/Bi4
æ2(g7) =  21(o2)(1 +  0)(190 -  285 -  1452 -  156)/B u
ei(g7) =  14(a2)[190 -  1052 -  426 -  2162 + 35(60 -  146 -  762)]/B14
e2(g7) =  2(o2)(7 +  55)(190 -  285 -  1452 -  156)/B u
%(g7) =  18(a2)2(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)2(626 -  706 -  2562)/(B i4)2
%(g7) =  18(a2)2(190 -  285 -  1452 -  156)2(626 -  986 -  4962)/(B i4)2
%i(g7) =  4(a2)2(1927 -  1965 -  9852)(190 -  105 -  426 -  2162)2/(B i4)2
7r2(g7) =  4(a2)2(1927 -  1405 -  5052)(190 -  285 -  1452 +  156)2/(B i4)2
CS(g7) =  4050(o2)2(380 -  385 -  1452 +  576 +  2162)2/(B i4)2
PS(g7) = 2(a2)2B14/(B 14)2; W{g7) =  2(a2)2B16/(B 14)2
Where: Bm= 70300 +  61653 +  14054 - 199506 - 721862 +  13866s +  31564 - 652(858
- 1236 - 4962) - 25(6650 - 8736 - 36962).
F i4=  685033600 - 1332805s - 196005s - 2600932806 - 6580300862 +  2655916263 +  
4S7226364 - 6747306s - 992256s +  8454(24692 - 25586 - 102962) +  22453(46778 - 47226
- 191162) - 1252 (4025464 - 9213666 - 21988662 +  442476s +  720364) -45(40316480 - 
88926606 - 265S94862 +  3788826s +  66S4364).
Fi5=977443600 - 1332805s - 196005s - 3478162806 - 9154278362 +  314070126s +  
52652S864 - 6747306s - 992256s +  8454(29417 - 25586 - 102962) +  565s(225587 - 188886
- 7Ô4462) - 1252(5577289 - 11906916 - 31911162 +  442476s +  720364) -45(54936980 - 
110857356 - S46692362 +  3788826s +  66S4364).
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B 1.10. T he pattern  8 network
zi(gs) =  3(a2)(7 +  5fl)(190 +  185 -  452 +  270 -  692) /B 15
æ2(g8) =  15(a2)(7 -  29)(38 -  25 -  39)/B15
ei(g8) =  2(a2)(7 +  55)(190 +  185 -  452 +  270 -  692)/B 15
e2(g8) =  10(a2)(7 -  25)(38 -  25 -  39)/B15
7)1 (g8) =  18(a2)2(190 +  185 -  452 +  279 -  692)2(626 -  709 -  2592)/(B 15)2
7)2(g8) =  900(a2)2(38 -  25 -  39)2(313 +  149 -  292)/(B 15)2
7Ti(g8) =  4(a2)2(1927 -  1405 -  5052)(190 + 185 -  452 +  270 -  692)2/(B 16)2
7T2(g8) =  100(a2)2(1927 +  565 -  852)(38 -  25 -  +39)2/(B 16)2
CS{gs) =  16200(o2)2(190 + 45 -  252 +  69 -  392)2/(B i5)2
PS(gs) = 2 (a2)2F16/(B 16)2; W(gs) = 2 (a2)2F17/(B 15)2
Where: B15=70300 -12453 +4054 -46209 -404792 -27993 +9094 -252(1276 +939 -6092) 
-25(1540 +4389 +9392).
F 16=  685033600 +  992055 - 16005s +  296194809 - 2990338892 - 414358293 +  S8656394 
+  502209s - 81009s +  4854(6461 +  2409 - 17592) - 1653(102712 - 30759 - 2S3592) - 
2452(705302 +  1018379 - 4454192 - 211593 +  60094) - 45(5694680 +  8226849 - S8222292
- 67593 +  963094).
F i7=  977443600 +  99205s - 16005s +  480874809 - 388457S892 - 44351829s +  95946S94 
+  502209s - 81009s +  4854(7136 +  2409 - 17592) -1653(110812 - 30759 - 2Ô3592) - 
2452 (956402 +  1099379 - 4859192 - 211593 +  60094) +  45(8772680 +  9198849 - 93082292
- 6759s +  963094).
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B2. Proofs
B .2.1 P roof o f proposition 4.2
Due to the complexity of computations involved, these comparison is made by means 
of the following figures which have been drawn by software Mathematica 7.0. The 
vertical axis denotes profits. The horizontal axes are the number of firms varying from 
3 to 100, and R&D efficiency 7  varying from 2 to 1000. For the deviation from the 
parallel network (i.e. gl0) to the network gg +  i j  when S = Û = 1, we assume that 7  
varies from 3 to 1000 to ensure the non-negativity of variables in equilibrium.
Firstly, the empty network is not pairwise stable. Condition (i) is trivially satisfied 
because there is no link to sever in the empty network. We now check condition (ii). 
From the empty network any pair of firm Ui and Di has the incentive to form the link 
between them. We will show that (gE + iï) — tt^(gE) > 0 and %{gE +  ii) — Vi(gE) > 0 
with the help of a plot. Therefore, condition (ii) is always violated and the empty 
network is not pairwise stable.
Secondly, the pairwise stability of the complete network in the case 8 = 6 = 1. 
Condition (ii) is trivially satisfied because there is no more link to form in the complete 
network. We now check condition (i). From the complete network either a pair of 
firms Ui and Di  or the pair Ui and D j  can sever the link between them. We show 
that K ^ g 0 ) — 'Ki(gc  — ii) > 0 , r)i(gC) — r)i(gC — ii) > 0  in the former case, and 
7Tj(gc ) — ,JTj(gc  — ij) > 0, r]i(gC) — ^ (gc  — ij) > 0 in the latter. Hence, condition (i) 
is satisfied.
The complete network is not pairwise stable if (5 =  1, 5 =  0) or (5 =  0, 0 =  1). In 
these cases, condition (i) is violated because /7Tj(gc ) — 71 j (gc  — ij) < 0 if 5 =  1, 6 = 0 
or r]i{gC) — r)i{gC — ij) < 0 if 8 = 0, 6 = 1. Therefore, either the upstream firm Ui or 
the downstream firm D j  has the incentive to sever a link in these cases.
Finally, the parallel network gl0 is not pairwise stable if 5 =  0 =  1 but it is pairwise
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stable if (5 =  1, # =  0) or (5 =  0, 5 =  1). The parallel network glQ is not pairwise 
stable if 5 =  # =  1 because the condition (ii) is violated as — ^ j ( g lQ +  i j )  < 0 and
rli {Qq) — rh (,Ço +  i j )  < 0. Therefore, the pair of Ui and Dj  has the incentive to form a 
link between them.
The network glQ is pairwise stable if (£ =  1, d =  0) or (£ =  0, d =  1) because of the 
followings. First, condition (ii) is satisfied because 7Tj(gl0) -  7Tj(glQ T i j )  > 0 if (d =  1 , 
d =  0 ) and rji(gl0) — rn(glQ +  i j ) > 0 if (£ =  0 , # =  1). Second, condition (i) is also 
satisfied because T r ^ )  -  T r ^  -  2%) > 0 and % (^) -  ^ ( ^  -  #) > 0  in both cases.
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Figure B l: S tability of the  em pty network
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Figure B2: Stability of the complete network
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Figure B3: S tability of the parallel network
B .2 .2 . P roo f of proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3 holds in two extreme cases: (z) and (zz). Given the complexity of 
computations involved, we have been unable to obtain a general characterization of 
efficient networks.
Consider th e  case (z): (# =  1, <5 =  0).
Prove that consumer surplus increases with the degree of collaboration k  in the 
network glk.
Qidk)  =  (a — c — d)n2(l +  n )2(l +  2n)7 / B 16 
Where:Bi6=:2n(37-k-2)+7(l+2n2+ 2n5)+ n 4(97-2k-5)+n2(n + l)(k 2+147-2k-9).
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Because the numerator of Q(glk) is a positive constant with respect to k, we shall 
prove that consumer surplus increases with k by showing that Big decreases with k. 
The following result shows that Big decreases with k.
(9BiG/ ^k  = —2n(l +  nj — kn 4- 72^ ) <C 0
Prove that total profit increases with k in the network by showing that the derivative 
of PSi(glk) with respect to k is positive. Where: PSi(glk) = tt*(glk) +  rji(glk).
9PSi(glk)/dk = 2 (a — c — d)2n2(l +  n)yF18/ ( B 17)3
The derivatives of Big and B17 with respect to 7  are
<9Bi g/<97=2+10n-21m+14n2-9kn2+12n3-9kn3+1 On4 > 0.
<9Bi7/<97=l+6n+14n2+16n3+9n4+2n5>0.
Because 7  ^  2, it is sufficient to show that Big > 0 and B 17 > 0 if 7  =  2 . Plugging 
7  — 2 into B19 and Big.
Fig>-4kn +164n2 -30kn2 +428n3 -134kn3 +726n4 -6k2n3 -325kn4 + 866n5 -450kn5 
-18k2n4 +762n6 -24k2n5 -354kn6 +474n7 -145kn7 -18k2n6 +182n8 -6k2n7 -22kn8 +30n9 
> 0.
Bi7= 2+ 4n-2kn+8n2+k2n2+ 4n3-2kn3+ 2n4> 0 .
Consider th e  case (ii): (d = 0,6 = 1).
Prove that consumer surplus increases with the degree of collaboration k in the 
network glk .
Q k l)  =  (a -  c -  d ) ^ ( l  +  n )2 (l +  2?2)7/Big
Where:Bi8= 2n2(77-k-3)+ 7 + 2n57 +n(67-l)+ n 4(97-2k-5)+n3(167+k2-6).
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Because the numerator of Q(glk) is a positive constant with respect to k, we shall 
prove that consumer surplus increases with k by showing that Big decreases with k. 
The following result shows that Bis decreases with k.
dBig/dk  =  —272(1 — kn +  77. ) < 0
Next, prove that the total profit increases with k in the network by showing that the 
derivative of PSi(glk) with respect to k is positive. Where: PSi(glk) = 71 i (g[) +  r)i(glk).
d P S i ig iyd k  = (a — c — d)2n3j F 19/ ( B ig)3 
The derivatives of Fig and Big with respect to 7  are:
dFi9/d j= 4  +40n -4kn +176n2 -40kn2 +452n3 -170kn3 +768n4 -396kn4 +936n5 - 
544kn5 +848n6 -440kn6 +548n7 -194kn7 +220n8 -36kn8 +40n9>0.
dBig/d7 —l+6n+14n2+16n3+9n4+2n5>0.
Because 7  ^  2, we shall show that Big > 0 and Big > 0 if 7  =  2. Plugging 7  =  2 
into Big and Big.
F i9>-8kn +336n2 -76kn2 +848n3 -324kn3 +1420n4 -734kn4 +1692n5 -996kn5 +1508n6 
-12k2n5 -7721m6 +952n7 -12k2n6 -3221m7 +372n8 -12k2n7 -441m3 +60n9>0. 
Big=2+lln+22n2-2kn2+2tin3+k2n3+13n4-2kn4+4n6>0.
B2.3 P roo f of proposition  4.5
Result (i) follows directly from comparisons: xi(g1) > xi(ge); X2 (gs) > X2 (g1)] 
3:1 (^ )  > ^ l(^ )  > %2(^ ); 3:1 > 3:1 (^ );
%2W ) > a:2(^ ); and ei(p^) > e i(^ ); e2(p3) > 62^^); ei(p3) > ei(p2); ei(pG) > e2(^ );
e2 {g7) > e2( / ) ;  ei(g7) > e2(p6); ei(g8) > ei(p4); e2{gc) > e2(p8). Result (ii) follows
s
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directly from com parisons:^#1) < ^2(#e); ^i(#3) < xi{g1)’, ^ ( g 1) < e2(#e); ei(#3) < 
eife1).
To compare R&D efforts analytically, we have to deal with very lengthy formulas. 
Therefore, we shall not present these formulas. Instead, we present the steps used to 
prove proposition 4 .5 . For example, we have to show that r^G?3) — ^2(#1) > 0 for all
8 6  (0,1] and 6 e  (0,1]. It is easy to see that the denominator of %2(#3) — X2 (g1) is 
positive so the sign of x2(#3) — x2(#1) depends on its numerator. To prove that the 
numerator of X2 (gs) —X2 (g1) is positive, we expand it. Because: 8 E (0,1] and 6 £ (0,1],
^  8s and 0t ^  6s i î t  > s and t, s E N. Using this result, we have been able to prove 
that the numerator of x2(#3) — X2 (g1) is positive.
B2.4 P ro o f of proposition 4.643
First, gc is pairwise stable for all the set of (8,9) values in the area between the 
curves Ci and C4. From gc, firms can deviate either to g7 or #8. In the former case, 
7ri(#c) > 7ri(#7) and > #2 to7) f°r all (8,6) values in the area between the curves
C2 and C3, whereas in the latter ^ ( g 0) > ^ ( g 8) and #2(gc) > #2to8) f°r all 8 and
9 E (0,1]. This establishes that gc is pairwise stable for all the set of (8,9) values in the 
area between the curves Ci and C4. It also shows, of course, that neither g7 nor #8 is 
pairwise stable in this area.
Second, #3 is pairwise stable for all the set of (8,9) values in the areas under the 
curve C2 or above the curve C3. From #3, the possible deviation of firms is either g7 
or gl . In the former case, we have 7:2 to3) > ^2 to7) and #i(#3) > ig^g7) while in the 
latter, we have t ^ # 3) > ^ { g 2) and 772to3) > ^ t o 1) for all the set of (8,9) values in 
the areas under the curve C2 or above the curve C3. This confirms that #3 is pairwise 
stable and the networks g7 and g1 are not pairwise stable for all the set of (8,9) values 
in the areas under the curve C2 or above the curve C3.
43If 7Tj >  TTj for all values of ( 6 , 6 ) ,  we can compare profits analytically by the same technique as R&D efforts 
comparisons. If >  n j  for some values of ( 6 , 6 )  and tt; >  tt^  otherwise, we use simulation to compare them.
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Third, no other network architecture is pairwise stable. The empty network is not 
pairwise stable because 7ri(#e) < and ?7i(#e) < ^ ito1) for all 5 and 6 E (0,1].
It means that U\ and D\ have incentives to collaborate with each other to make the 
deviation to gl . In addition, we have 7T2(gl ) < 712(#3) and #2to1) < #2to3) for all 5 and 
6 E (0,1] so the deviation from gl to #3 may happen.
Firms in #2 can deviate either to #5 or #6. Because of the fact that 7Ti(#5) > 7ri(#2);
#ito5) > ?7ito2); TTito6) > 7:2to2) and ^ito6) > %to2) f°r a11 5 and 0 E (0,1], firms 
have incentives to make both deviations. Both networks #5 and #6 can be deviated to
#7 since ^ t o 7) > ^ to ^ ); ?72to7) > %to^); ^ ito 7) > ^ to ^ ) and %to7) > %to^) for all
8 and 6 E (0,1]. g7 is also not pairwise stable for all 8 and 6 E (0,1] because it can 
be deviated to either g° or #3. We already prove it by showing gc and #3 are pairwise 
stable in the first part.
In #4, firms have the incentive to alter the network to #8 because 7Ti(#4) < 7Ti(#8) 
and 77ito4) < #ito8) for all 8 and 6 E (0,1]. In addition, we have ^ ( p 8) < ^ ( g 0) and 
772to8) < 772 (gc) for all 8 and 6 E (0,1]. It confirms that #8 is also not pairwise stable.
B2.5 P ro o f of proposition 4.7
Two possible candidates for strongly stable networks: #3 and gc. However, only gc 
emerges as strongly stable for all (8,6) values between the curves Ci and C4. From 
#3, the coalition of all firms have the incentive to form the link between Ui and Dj to 
create gc.
From gc, all coalitions of at least two firms can deviate to some network structures. 
Each network structure may be the result of deviations by several coalitions of firms. 
We list here the resulting network structures that can arise with different qualitative 
results: (i) the coalitions of firms (i.e. two upstream firms Ui or two downstream firms 
Di or one upstream firm and one downstream firm) severing their collaborative links to
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form ge] (ii) the coalitions of firms severing the two collaborative links between each Ui 
and Dj to create g3; (Hi) the coalition of firms severing the collaborative links between 
each Ui and Di to build g4; (iv) the coalition of firms severing the links between each Ui 
with Uj as well as the links between U2 and D2 to make g1; (v) the coalitions of the firms 
severing some collaborative links to form g2; (vi) the coalitions of firms deleting some 
vertical collaborations to form g5; (vii) the coalition of firms deleting the collaborative 
links between U2 and D2 as well as Ui and D2 to create gQ.
Firstly, 7Ti(gc) > ^ ( g 6) and r]i(gc) > Viig6) for all 8 and 6 G (0,1], so each firm 
in gc has the incentive to block the deviation. Secondly, any coalition of firms in gc 
has no motivation to sever collaborative links to create g3 because 7^  (gc) > 7Ti(g3) and 
r)i(gc) >  r]i(g3) for all 8 and 6 G (0,1]. It also confirms that g3 is not strongly stable 
for all 8 and 6 G (0,1]. Thirdly, the deviation from g° to p4 should be blocked by any 
coalition of firms because tt^(gc) > 7Ti(g*) and r/^g0) > %(p4) for all 8 and 9 G (0,1]. 
Fourthly, the deviation from gc to g l should be blocked by any coalition of firms because 
any coalition of firms who may make this deviation must include U2 and D2 . However, 
^ 2 (gc) > ^ ( g 1) and 772(yc) > 772(S'1) f°r all 8 and 6 G (0,1] which means that U2 
and D2 always have the motivation to block the deviation. Fifthly, the two firms U2 
and Di who are present in any possible coalition of firms who can make the deviation 
from g° to g2 will have incentive to block this deviation since 7ri(gc) > 7Ti(g2) and 
772 (yc) > 772 (^2). Sixthly, deviation from gc to gb should be blocked by at least one firm 
in any possible coalition of firms who can create the deviation because ^ 2 (9 °) > ^ 2 (g5) 
and 772 (gc) > 772 (<75). Any coalition of firms who can cause this deviation must include 
at least one of the two firms U2 and D2 so there is at least one firm worse off in any 
coalition. Finally, at least one firm will be worse off in any coalition of firms who cause 
the deviation from gc to gQ. Any coalition mentioned must comprise at least one of the 
two firms U2 and D2 . However, 'K2 (gc) > 7r2(<76) and 772(pc) > 772(<76) so there will be
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at least one firm who wants to block the deviation.
32 .6 .  P roof o f th e results o f A ggregate performance
We now investigate the aggregate performance of different vertical network struc­
tures. Following directly from comparisons: CS{ge) < CS{g1) < CS(gA) < CS(g8) < 
CS(gc); CS(ge) < CS(g2) < C S t f )  < C S t f )  < CS(g% CS(ge) < CS{gl ) < 
CS(g3) < CS(g7) < CS(gc)-, and CS(ge) <  G S ^ 1) <  C S t f )  < CS(gi) < CS(gc) for 
all 6 and 5 E (0,1], where i E {5,6} and j  E {7,8}. We can see that consumer surplus 
increases whenever a new link is formed in the existing network.
Producer surplus also increases with the degree of collaborative activity. It exposes 
the same behavior as consumer surplus. This result follows directly the comparisons 
PS{ge) < PS(g2) < PS(g4) < PS(gs) < PS(g=); PS(ge) < PS(g2) < P S t f )  < 
PS(gi) < P3(gc)-, PS(ge) < PS ig1) < PS(gs) <  P3(g7) < PS(gcy, and PS(ge) < 
PS(gl ) < PS(g') < PS(g3) < P3(gc) for all 6 and S 6  (0,1], where i e  {5,6} and 
j e  {7,8}.
193
Appendix to chapter 5
C l. E quilibrium  O utcom es
The relevant expressions of Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solutions of some
networks are very lengthy so we do not present them here.
Denote: a\ = a — c 
C l . l  T he em pty  FTA networks
C l .1.1 T he em pty-em pty  netw ork { g ^ g ^ )
4  = 30ai (467 +  1920 -  160/32 +  192/33 -  48^4)/A 2
e f  =  3ai(3 -  2/3)(467 +  351/3 -  158/32 +  84/33 -  24/34)/A 2
qj = 20ax(934 +  543^ -  318^2 +  27603 -  72/34)/A 2
qi =  20ai (934 +  543,6 -  31862 +  27603 -  72/34)/A 2
CS§ = 1800(ai)2(467 +  351,3 -  158/32 +  84^3 -  2464)2/(A 2)2
WE =  15(ai)2X2/(A 2)2; J r | =  15(ai)2X i/(A 2)2 
Where: Ai=781+933/3-474,92+252/33-72/34.
A2=42497+23157/3-1302662+15912/33-5568/34+129665-28866.
Ki =  20282277 +  32399526,3 +  339025362 - 181622463 +  456408064 - 2890560/35 +  
5645766e +  9676S67 - 1981446s +  691206s - 6912610.
K2 =  55176517 +  848529666 - 152034762 - 70352646s +  1578024064 - 101212806s 
+  24365766e - 34099267 - 1290246s +  691206s - 6912610.
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C l.1 .2 . The em pty-com plete network (g'f. g^ D)
4  = 1929ai/6398; eg =  108oi/3199
Trg =  4234107(oi)2/20467202
q\ = 1363ai/3199; 4  =  797ax/6398
CSg =  2332800(ai )2/ 10233601; Wg =  5218560(ai)2/10233601
C l.2 The partial FTA networks 
C l.2.1. The partial-com plete network {gp,g^D) 
t f  = 4  = 1168331ai/8066794 
_  i222986ai/4033397
Trg =  107805289687385(ai)2/520585323507488 
vrg =  122520384582963(ai)2/520585323507488 
eg =  610183ai/16133588
eg =  310557ai/8066794 
q{ = q l  = ql = ql = 10155865ai/32267176 
q\ = ql = 2047795ai/16133588 
gl =  ^  5482541oi/32267176
=  6939739ai/16133588
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CS% = 665344416421441(o1)2/2082341294029952 
C S ÿ  = 121778486138241(oi)2/520585323507488 
W g  = 1147808956043549(a1)2/2082341294029952 
W f  =  71092416143781 (ai)2/ 130146330876872 
C l.3 The star FTA networks 
C l.3.1. The star-com plete network (g j , Qc D) 
=  t |  =  38580oi/264481 
Trg =  18848195145(oi)2/69950199361 
Trg =  14079601050(o1)2/69950199361 
eg =  12099ai/264481; eg =  10170ai/264481 
q\ = q\ = ç.j =  74230e i /264481 
ql = q\ = ql = ql = 83875a1/264481 
ql = ql = 45295ai/264481 
CSg =  24795418050(a1)2/69950199361 
CSg =  926289225(ai)2/2855110178 
W §=  6234801885(ai)2/9992885623 
W g=  77042336325(oi)2/139900398722
196
C l.4 The com plete FTA networks
C l.4 .1 . The com plete em pty network (g^,g^D)
6i= 3ai (3 — 2/3)/A3
7rg=  15(a.)^(53 +  36^ -  12^2)/(A 3)2
3ai(3 — 2/5)/A3; '■/'= 20ai/A3
C S g=  1800(a1)2/(A 3)2
W g= 15(oi)2(173 + 36/3 -  12/32)/(A 3)2 
Where: A3=71-12^+12/32.
C l.4 .2 . T he com plete partial network (//J, gpD)
= 15(ai)2( l l  +  15,3 -  6/32)2(68 +  12/3 -  3j32)/4(A4)2
=  15(oi)2(4 +  9 ^ -  3/32)2(53 + 36^ -  12/32)/(A 4)2
= 3ai (22 +  19/3 -  27/32 +  6^3)/2A4
=  30,(3 -  2(8) (4 +  9 ,3 - 3/32)/A 4
g’, =  g| =  10a, (11 +  158 -  682)/A 4
g| =  20a,(4 +  9 8 - 3 8 2)/A 4
=  1800(a,)2(5 +  8 8 -  382)2/(A 4)2
=  15(ai)2JV3/4(A 4)2; W& =  15(a,)2h '4/(A 4)2 
Where: A4=344+5378-21682+6383-1884-
K3=20228+622928+2624182-3515483+432984+97285-10886.
K4=3848+139928+950182-743483-107184+97285-10886.
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C l.4.3. T he com plete star network {gj., <jfD)
=  1155(ai)2(26 -9 /3  +  3/32)2/(A 5)2
irg =  6000(ai)2(68 +  120 -  302)/(A 5)2
eg =  3a1(2 6 -9 0  +  302)/A 5
e® =  60oi (2 — 0 )/A j; r/i, =  ql =  400ft 1 / A 5
=  20a! (26 - 9 0  +  302)/A s
=  CSg =  1800(ai)2(22 - 3 0  +  0 2)2/(A 5)2
W f =  15(ai)2JÏ5/304(A5)2; W f =  600(a1)2/:f6(As)2 
Where: A5=1522-2130+11102.
K5=llO132-518760+246O902-487803+81304.
Ks=2132-2760+12902-1803+304.
C l.4.4. T he com plete com plete network (gJ,g^D)
e{ — 3ai/71; e0 =  3ai/71
=  1155(ai)2/5041; ql =  q- =  20ai/71
CSg =  1800(ai)2/5041; W f =  2955(ai)2/5041 
C2. Proofs
C2.1 P roof o f lem m a 5.1
Firstly, {g^,g^D) is pairwise stable for all /? E [/54, 1). Prom {g^,g^D) firms can 
deviate to {ge,gpD)- However, 7r§(g^,g^D) > ^ { g ? ,g^10) for all /3 E (/54, 1) and
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'^Ejig'e ig^D) — 71 Big's ^gpD) if — A - Hence, no firms have strict incentive to form 
the R&D collaborative link between them. This establishes that (pjT, g^D) is pairwise 
stable for all f} £ [/54, 1). It also shows, of course, that (gj, g^D) is not pairwise stable 
for all fi £ (/34, 1).
Secondly, ig^,gpD) is pairwise stable for all /? G (/33,/34] and {3 £ [0,/3i)- Prom 
(pj, the possible deviation of firms is either (gj, 5/ ^ )  or g^D). In the former 
case, 7r^(g^,g^D) > 7r§(g^,g^D) for all f3 £ (^3,/54) and £ [0 ,/y . In the latter, 
^Eige^gp0 ) > ^ E i g ^ g ? D) for a11 z3 G and P G [O,^). Note that if ^  =  ^4
then the R&D collaborative link between two linked firms in the partial R&D network 
will not be severed since no firms are better off if they delete the R&D link because 
7rE(g'e 1 gp'D) — ^sig's ^g?D)' However, if /? =  /?3 then the R&D link between a linked 
firm in the partial R&D network and the isolated firm will be formed since the isolated 
firm in the partial R&D network has the strict incentive to become the spoke firm in 
the star R&D network if /? =  ^ 3. This confirms that {g^ ,g^D) is pairwise stable for all 
(3 £ (/?3,/54) and (3 £ [0, f t) .  This also establishes that {gJ,g^D) and [g^,g fD) are not 
pairwise stable for these values of spillovers.
Thirdly, ig^,g^D) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all (3 £ [02 ,/%]. From 
((%T, g f D), the possible deviation of firms is either (<%T, gpD) or {g^, g^D). In the former 
case, and for all ^  G (^2,^ 3)-
In the latter, > ir%(g];,g^D) for all (3 £ (/32,/93). Note that iî (3 = (32
then the R&D collaborative link between two spoke-firms in the star R&D network 
will not be formed since no firms are better off if they establish the R&D link between 
them because ^ [ g ^ -,g^D) =  In addition, if /3 =  /33 then the R&D link
between the hub-firm and the spoke-firm in the star R&D network will not be severed 
because the no firms have strict incentive to do so. This confirms that {g^,gfD) is 
pairwise stable for all /3 G [/32,/33]. This also establishes that (g^,gpD) and [g^,g^D) 
is not pairwise stable for these values of spillovers.
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Fourthly, (g^, g^D) is pairwise stable for all /3 E [0, /52]. Prom g^D), the possible 
deviation of firms is { g l , g f D). However, ^ ( g ^ , g^D) > 7T^(g^,g^D) for all (3 G [0,/32)- 
Note that if /? =  /32 then the R&D collaborative link between any two firms in the 
complete R&D network will not be deleted since no firms are better off if they cut 
the R&D link between them because ^ { g ^ -, g^D) =  ^ { g ^ , g f D). This confirms that 
(9e,9c'D) is pairwise stable for all /3 G [0,/?2]. This also establishes that { g ^ , g f D) is 
not pairwise stable for these values of spillovers.
Next, we consider the strongly stable R&D networks:
Firstly, {g^,g^D) is strongly stable for all /5 G [/34, 1). From {g^,g^D), a coalition 
of firms can deviate either to {g^-, gf D) or {g^,g^D) apart from all pairwise stable 
deviations. However, 7r^(g^,g^D) > 7 rg (# f ,c ^ )  > ^ { g l ,9^D) and 7 t | ( ^ , ^ b ) > 
for all [3 G [y54, 1). Hence, no firms have strict incentive to form the R&D 
collaborative link between them. This establishes that {g^,g^'D) is strongly stable for 
all /3 G [/34, 1).
Secondly, all coalitions of at least two firms in {g^,gpD) can deviate to {g^,g^D)- 
However, ^ { g ^ , g^D) < , 9pD) f°r all P G (%,/94] and [3 G [ 0 , / y .  It shows that
the coalition of two firms in { g ^ g ^ )  has no motivation to form R&D collaborative 
links to create (gJ,g^D) for all (3 G (/?3,/54] and fi G [0,/^).
Thirdly, (g^ ,g fD) is the strongly stable R&D network for all /3 G [/32, /33]. Apart 
from all pairwise stable deviations, the possible deviations by a coalition of firms in 
is Since 7 rg (& T ,^ )  > and for ah
[3 G [id 2, /33] so all firms have the incentive to block the deviation.
Finally, (g^, g^D) is never s tro n g ly  s tab le  R&D n etw o rk  b ecau se  th e  co a litio n  o f tw o 
firm s h as  th e  incen tive  to  de le te  th e  link  w ith  th e  o th e r  firm  to  e s tab lish  th e  p a r tia l  
R&D n etw ork  for all [3 G [0, /32].
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C2.2 P roof o f lem m a 5.2
Firstly, (#J, <7^ P) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all fi E (/36, 1). From 
(£p , Qpi)  firms can deviate either to (gj, g f§ )  or top, g?D)- However, Tr^toJ, PpL*) > 
^ f to p ^ fn  ) and ^ L i d p ^ p i )  > Trftop for all /5 6 (/36,1). This establishes that
to j, glpL*) is pairwise stable for all [3 E (/36, 1). It also shows, of course, that the neither 
(dp j 9 f n )  nor (gp,9eD) is pairwise stable for all f3 E (%, !)•
Secondly, top\p3f) ^  the pairwise stable R&D network for all (3 E (/35,/36]. From 
top the Possible deviation of firms is (dp, 9 ^ )  or ( d p ^ p f )  or top, 9 ^ ) -  In
the first case, ^ t o p  > ^itop and ^ to p  , ^ )  ^  ^ztop , ^ )  for all ^  E
(PsiPel- In the second, ^ ( g ^ g f g )  > ^ ( g ^ g ^ f )  and ^ l(gp ,g^§)  > ^ t o p , ^ )
for all/) E Finally,Trg t o p , > ^ E top ,^ )aJid 7r^ top ,^ in ) > T r f to p ,^ )
for all p E (/)5,/)6]. This confirms that ( g ^ g f ^ )  ^  pairwise stable for all (3 E (/35, /36].
Thirdly, (gp,g^D) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all ,6 E [0,/)5]. From 
(gp i gpP), the possible deviation of firms is either (gp,gf§)  or (gp,gf<P). In the first 
case, Trgtop > 7rftop,pfF) and ^ to p  ^  ^ftop for all ^ E [0 ,^ ].
In the second case, n^igp ,g^D) > vrf (g J^S P ) for all j3 E [0,/55].It establishes that 
the Partial-Complete network (gp,g^D) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all
P  G [0,/35].
Next, all other networks are not pairwise stable for all p  E [0,1). From (gp,gpD)> 
firms have the incentive to deviate to (gj,gpp)  because Tr^toJ,9ph) > top , 9e'D) for 
all p E [0,1). (gp,gpP) is not pairwise stable because 7rf (gp,gf§) > ^ ( d p ^ p P )  and 
^ l i d p g ^ p )  > ^U d p d p P )  for all P E [0,1). It shows that firms in top have the
incentive to alter the network structure to (pj, g^p)- (gp, g fp )  is not a pairwise stable 
R&D network because firms in the network have the incentive to deviate to (gj, g^D)- 
It is easily confirmed by inequalities: ^ i ( g P g ^ D) > ^pdp  ,g fp )  for all p E [0,1). 
Finally, no network is the strongly stable R&D network for all P E [0,1). Three
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possible candidates for strongly stable networks: (pp and {gp,9cD)-
However, Qp^Qpi is not the strongly stable R&D network for all j3 E (/56, 1) because
v L(9p,SpiD) > *l (9p ’9p l ) and r f ( g ? ,g g f )  > for all /3 e  (^6,1). It
confirms that the coalition of a linked firm and the isolated firm in (9^ , 9^ )  has the 
strict incentive to alter the network to (#J, g ^ f ) .  (#J, g f§ )  is the not the strongly stable 
R&D network for all /? E (/d5, /56] since the coalition of two firms located at the spokes of 
the R&D network has the incentive to delete their existing R&D collaborations to make 
the empty R&D network. It is easily shown by inequalities: tt^(g j, g^D) > 7r £ (^ ,  g f§ )  
and nfigp,  g^D) > 7rf(g^, g f§ )  for all /3 E (/35,/36]. (pj, g^D) is not the strongly stable 
R&D network because the two firms located in the two linked countries always have 
the strict incentive to alter the R&D network structure to It can easily be
shown by the inequality > 7 r£ (p J ,^ D) for all f3 E [0,1).
C2.3 P roof o f lem m a 5.3
Firstly, {g^,g^D) is pairwise stable for all (3 E [0,1). From (gJ,g^D) firms can devi- 
ate either to or (9^ , ^ ) .  However, >
^ H ^ g ^ g f s )  and ^ s i g j ^ c 0 ) > for a11 P e  [0,1). This establishes that
{g's ^9c'D) is pairwise stable for all /? E [0,1). It also shows, of course, that the neither 
[ g ^ g f s )  nor (g's  ^9 f n )  i^  pairwise stable for all /3 E [0,1).
Second, all other networks are not pairwise stable for all ft E [0,1). From { g ^ g ^ D), 
firms can deviate either to ( g ^ g p f )  or {g^, 9 ^ ) .  In the former, ^ ( g T ,g £ jD ) > 
whereas in the latter > 7 r g ( ^ ,p ^ )  and 7 r ^ ( ^ , ^ )  >
^ ( g j ,g^D) for all ft e  [0,1). It shows that firms in (g^,g^D) have the incentive
to make both deviations, {g^-, gf p )  is not pairwise stable because firms have the in­
centive to alter the network structure to (gJ,g^P).  It is shown by the inequalities:
( H i d f o r  all E [0,1). More­
over, ^ ^  for all 9^ E [0,1). It
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exhibits that firms in (g j , g^jP) always have the incentive to alter the network structure 
to ( g ^ g f g )  for all/3 6 [0,1).
Next, no network is strongly stable for all /3 G [0,1). The only possible candidate 
for strongly stable network: {gJ,g^D)- However, this only candidate is not a strongly 
stable R&D network because the coalition of two firms in the network has the incentive 
to sever their existing R&D collaboration with the remaining firm to become (gj, 9pjD)- 
It is shown by the inequality: tt^{g^ gpjD) > ^ ( g ] ; , g^D) for all /3 G [0,1).
C2.4 P roof o f lem m a 5.4
First, (g j, g^D) is pairwise stable for all /3 G [0,1). From (gj, g^D) firms can deviate 
to (g^:g^D). However, ^ { g ^ ,g^D) > i r ^ g j ,g -^D) for all /3 G [0,1). This establishes 
that (gç, g^D) is pairwise stable for all f3 G [0,1). It also shows, of course, that (#T, g ^ )  
is never pairwise stable.
Second, all other network structures are not pairwise stable. (g^,g^D) is never 
pairwise stable since (ÿ-0) > ^ ( g ^ , g ^ D) for all /3 G [0,1). It confirms that
(9ci9e'D) should be altered to (g^,gpD). (gc,9pD) is never pairwise stable because 
'Kc(9'c ’9?D) > ^c id c^p H )  f°r all yd G [0,1). It shows that firms in (g j , g^D) have 
the incentive to alter the network structure to [g^, gf'D).
Third, {g^,g^D) is not strongly stable because ^ { g ^ , g p D) > ^ { g ^ ,g^D) for all 
/3 G [0,1). It establishes that the coalition of two firms in (g^,g^D) has the incentive 
to sever the R&D collaborative links with the remaining one to form (g^,gp D).
C2.5 P roof o f lem m a 5.5
First, (gp,geD) is pairwise stable for all /3 G [0, /37) . From {gp,g^D), governments 
can deviate to or (gJ,g^D). Because W §(gJ ,g^D) > W ^(g J ,g ^D) for all
(3 G [0,1) but Wg(gT,g^D) < W f(g p ,g ^ D) for all /3 G [0,/37), it shows that the 
country having no FTA in (gj, g^D) have no incentive to alter the network structure to
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{9 ^9 ™ )  for aU P G [0,/57). Moreover, W ^{g^ ,g^D) > W§{g^,g^D) so governments 
in (g^ ,g fD) always have the incentive to deviate to (gp,g^D). It shows that (gp,g^D) 
is the pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,/37] and (g^,g^D) is never pairwise 
stable FTA network for all /? G [0,1).
Second, (g^,g^D) is pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1). From 
governments can deviate to (g f ,g^D)- However, W ^ (g J , g^D) > W g(gJ ,g^D) for 
all (3 G [0,1). This establishes that {g^^g^D) is the pairwise stable FTA network for 
all (3 G [0,1). It also shows, of course, that (g f ,g^D) is never pairwise stable for all 
fG  [0,1).
Finally, (g^,g^D) is the unique strongly stable FTA network for all (3 G [0 ,1). Two 
candidates for strong stability FTA network: g^D) and (gj, g^D). From ($T, g^D),
all coalitions of at least two governments can alter to some network structures: (i) 
( 4  W c(p f,p f^ ) > 7r#(#r,9f^) for all ^  G [0,1), so
each government in (g^,g^D) has the incentive to block the deviation. Secondly, the 
coalition of two governments in (g^, g^D) has no motivation to sever FTAs to create 
{gpi9eD) for all /3 G [0,1) because W ^{gJ,g^D) > W ^{g^ ,g^D) for all /5 G [0 ,1). 
This establishes that the deviation from (9c ,9^D) to (9p,g^D) should be blocked and 
{gc,9eD) is the strongly stable FTA network for all /9 G [0 ,1). It also exhibits that 
(9pi9e'D) is never strongly stable.
C2.6 P roof o f lem m a 5.6
First, (gp, g ^ )  is a pairwise stable FTA network for all f3 G [0, /38]. From (gj, gffl) ,  
the possible deviation of governments is either (g^,gpD) or (g^, gpp)- In the for­
mer, W^ig^gKjP)  > W ^ (g f ,g ^ D) for all (3 G [0,1). In the latter, W£(gT,g*g) < 
w h ( 9 Î ’9p l)  for all (3 G [0,1) but W j i g ^ g f f i )  > W ^ g ^ g f f i )  for all (3 G [0,/38). It 
confirms that (g j , g pi ) is pairwise stable FTA network for all /3 G [0, /38). It also shows 
that (ge,gpD) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all j3 G [0,1).
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Second, (g^, 9pD) is a pairwise stable FTA network for ail (3 G [0,1). From (gj, gpD), 
governments can deviate either to (g j , gpj^) or {g^, gpp)- However, W ^ g ^ , gpD) > 
w s ( 9 ^ 9 p p )  and w c(9c^9pD) > w s(9Ï:9pp)  for a11 Z3 G [0,1). This establishes that 
governments in (gP gpD) have no incentives to deviate to (gPgpp)  for all (3 G [0,1). 
Moreover W ^(g P g p D) > W ^ g P g ^ f )  for all (3 G [0,1) so governments in (gPgpD) 
have no incentives to alter the FTA network structure to (gP 9pp) for all (3 G [0,1). It 
shows that {gPgpD) is the pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1), and neither 
(9p9pp)  n o r  (9p9pp)  ^  a- pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1).
Third, (gP gpD) is not a pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1). Since
( p ^ , ^ )  for all ^  G [0,1) so 
governments in (gj, g^p)  have the incentive to alter the FTA network structure to form 
(9P9pp)  for all/3 G [0,1).
Finally, (gPgpD) is the unique strongly stable FTA network for all [3 G [0,1). Two 
candidates for strongly stable FTA networks: (pj, g^P) and (gP gpD). From (g^, g^D), 
the possible strong deviations made by governments: (z) (gPgpD); (ii) (gP 9pp)] (Hi)
for all fi G [0,1). In the second, W p g P g ^ D) > W p g P g ^ P )  and W p g P g ^ D) > 
wl(9P9pp) for all /3 G [0,1). In the third, W^(gPg^D) > WpgPgpD) and 
w c(9 P 9 p D) > w l(9 P 9 p p )  for all (3 G [0,1). It confirms that (gPgpD) is a strongly 
stable FTA network for all /3 G [0,1). It also shows that (^J, g^p) is never a strongly 
stable FTA network.
C2.7 P roof o f lem m a 5.7
First, (gP g f§ )  is a pairwise stable FTA network for all /3 G [0, /39). From (pj, gf§ ) ,  
the possible pairwise deviation of governments is (gPg^D) or (g P g fp )  or (gPgfp)-  
t/ze /zrst, k F ^ ( ^ , ^ )  > and for
all /3 G [0,1). In the second, W p ( g P g f § )  < W § { g P g f§ )  for all /3 G [0,1) but
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but W f(g T ,g f§ )  > W§{gT,gf<P) for all (3 E [0,/39) . It confirms that { g ^ g f § )  is a 
pairwise stable FTA network for all /3 E [0, /39). It also shows that {g^,g^D) is never a 
pairwise stable FTA network for all j3 E [0,1).
Second, (g^, g^D) is a pairwise stable FTA network for all /3 E [0,1). From (g j , g^D), 
governments can deviate either to ( g j , g ^ )  or (g j^gf^) .  However, in the former
while in the latter ^
Wç{g^, g^D) > Wg(gT,gfç?) for all j3 E [0,1). This establishes that governments in 
(.9^•> 9f D) have no incentives to deviate to any of the star FTA the network for all 
(3 E [0,1). It also shows that both {g^,9f § )  and (g^gfcP) are not pairwise stable FTA 
networks for all /? E [0,1).
Third, (pj, pfcp) network is not the pairwise stable FTA network for all j3 E [0,1). 
Governments in always have the incentive to alter the FTA network to
(9 l ,gfs)  because Wg (gf.gfg ') > W fig ^ g g? )  and W ^ g ^ g f f )  > W ^ g ^ g ^ )  
for all [3 E [0,1). It shows that (g^, gfc?) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for 
all yd E [0,1).
Finally, (g^,g^D) is the unique strongly stable FTA network for all 13 E [0,1). Two 
candidates for strongly stable FTA networks: (gj, g ^ )  and g^D). From (g^, g^D), 
the possible strongly deviations made by governments: (i) {g^,gfD)', {ii) {g^gf^)'-,
(^ ) )' ^  ^6 /W , > W g X # T ,^ ) and >
WE(9e,9?D) for all 13 E [0,1). In the second, W g { g ^ ,g fD) > W^{gT,gf<P) and
>  ^ ( P p i P ^ f o r a f i / S  G [0,1). ),
and TFg(9f , ^ )  > M f for all ^  E [0,1). It
confirms that ($T, gpD) is a strongly stable FTA network for all yd E [0,1). It also shows 
that the other candidate is never a strongly stable FTA network.
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C2.8 P ro o f of lem m a 5.8
First, ( g ^ g ^ D) is pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 e [0,1). From (g^,g^D) 
governments can deviate to (gj, g^D)- However, (g  ^ , g^D) > W §  (g j , g^D) for 
all /5 G [0,1). This establishes that (g^, g^D) is the pairwise stable FTA network for 
all (3 G [0,1). It also shows, of course, that (g f ,g^D) is never pairwise stable for all
f E [ 0 ,l).
Second, all other network are not the pairwise stable FTA networks for all [3 G [0,1). 
(gj, g^D) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1) since W§(g^, g^D) > 
W£(gT,g?D) and Wg{gJ,g?D) > W f ( g J ,g ^ D) for all /3 G [0,1). It exhibits that 
governments in (g^, g^D) always have the strict incentive to alter the FTA network 
structure to {gJ,g^D). Moreover, W ^(gp ,g^D) > W ^{g^ ,g^D) for all j3 G [0,1). It 
confirms that {g^ ■)g^'D) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all f3 G [0,1).
Finally, (gc,g^D) is the unique strongly stable FTA network for all (3 G [0,1). 
The only candidate for strong stability FTA network: (g^,g^D)- From (g^, g^D), all 
coalitions of at least two governments can alter to some network structures apart from 
pairwise deviations: (i) (ü ) ( d p ^ c 0 )- Firstly, W§{gJ,g^D) > n%(gj, gRD)
for all (3 G [0,1), so each government in (gc,g^D) has the incentive to block the devi­
ation. Secondly, the coalition of governments in (<%T, g^D) has no motivation to sever 
their FTAs to create {gp,g^D) for all [3 G [0,1) because (g^, g^D) > (g j , gcD) 
and W $ (g ï ,g?D) > W f  (g j , g^D) for all [3 G [0,1). This establishes that the deviation 
from (gT, g^D) to (gj, g^D) should be blocked and (gj, g^D) is the strongly stable FTA 
network for all [3 G [0,1).
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